MILITARY TECHNICAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT – THE BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE OF INTERACTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

Cooperation and development are common themes of Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil has participated in the evolution of international cooperation for development since the beginning, for many years as a recipient country. Recently, Brazil has become interested in being an international protagonist in the area of development and cooperation. Since 1999, with the creation of the Ministry of Defense, it has been possible to think about unified military technical cooperation (MTC). In this Brazilian outlook for interaction in the 21st century, horizontal MTC stand out, with Africa being an area of attention. In this paper, we analyze aspects of Brazilian MTC with the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries (CPLP). We consider the possibility that MTC can be presented as an element of Brazilian paradiplomacy for development. Unlike the Organization for the Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD), Brazil includes MTC as an element of development cooperation, believing that security and defense are issues directly related to development. The recent stage of the MTC of Brazil with CPLP states has resulted in more coherent defense, security and development policies linked to Brazil’s interests. Brazil created the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). However, many of the MTC projects carried out by Brazilian armed forces with other countries are performed outside the Agency. Therefore, we analyze MTC through projects of the ABC, Ministry of Defense and the armed forces.

Key-Words: Technical Military Cooperation. Development. CPLP. Brazil

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INTRODUCTION

One usually sees the Brazilian perspective of military technical cooperation (MTC) for development compared to that of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), without including projects and programs in these areas as development issues. However, we realize that the Brazilian view\(^3\) considers the OECD proposal for technical cooperation for development to be restricted to the economic field\(^4\). The Brazilian view of MTC for development has a different perception, much more aligned with the technical cooperation for development promoted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). These proposals are based on initiatives that give benefits in terms of public administration and development of the state that receives the cooperation, where security and defense can be elements of technical relevance similar to health, education or electoral issues.

Considering that the OECD is the most renowned actor in development cooperation, we point out that the concept of development proposed for great powers has long been based on economic growth, with no relevant variables such as social and educational growth or improvement in quality of life, or promotion of the guarantee of fundamental rights. On the other hand, the twentieth edition of the UNDP report (2011) emphasized that “people are the true wealth of a nation,” so that development should not be limited to the idea of accumulation of wealth and capital of a state. The United Nations proposes that the development of a country must be linked to human development, aiming at an environment capable of providing long, creative and healthy lives. This UNDP perspective is aligned with Amaryta Sen’s thesis, where development is perceived as an

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\(^3\) Brazil is not a member of the OECD and its Development Assistance Committee; it did not accept the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness because it believed they reinforced the economic priorities of Northern donors; but Brazil has actively participated in the theme.

\(^4\) The establishment of the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe led to the creation of the European Organization for Economic Cooperation in 1961, which was succeeded by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). According to Article 1 of the Convention signed in December 1960, the OECD aims to promote policies aimed at: achieving the highest level of economic growth and sustainable employment and raising the quality of life in the member countries, stability and contributing to the development of the world economy; contribute to the economic expansion of member and non-member countries; contribute to the expansion of world trade, on a multilateral and non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with international obligations.
amplifier of subjective and individual freedoms\(^5\).

Following the OECD perspective, until the 1980s peripheral countries and recipients of foreign aid or international cooperation for development (ICD) generally received vertical cooperation actions focused on industrialization and the adoption of public policies aligned with the capitalist model, especially considering the ideological dispute of the Cold War\(^6\). International development cooperation was rarely aligned with improvement of the social structure or with the guarantee of fundamental rights. However, in the Cold War, with the movement of non-aligned countries and decolonization process in Africa and Asia, questions about this vertical and economic focus of ICD emerged. Alternative models and principles were launched in 1977 at the 32nd session of the United Nations General Assembly on Trade and Development, which also brought together peripheral and semi-peripheral countries that tried to influence the process and find areas of mutual interest.

At the end of the twentieth century, new questions to this model of international cooperation for vertical development emerged. At this time, the peripheral and semiperipheral countries already had a minimum alignment of interests and a movement (South-South cooperation) arose in the field of cooperation. This topic highlighted that successful public policies produced in the South can be adjusted to their realities by cooperation. It was a new model of cooperation that could share similar perceptions and degrees of development\(^7\). Besides that, in the early years of the twenty-first century, emerging countries have been using development promotion as one of their foreign policy strategies.

According to the report “Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009\(^8\)”, during this period, Brazil

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6 We should add that development cooperation during the Cold War already included the strategic and security topics, such as military training within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States.


invested 2.9 billion reais. Of this amount, 76% corresponded to contributions to international organizations or international banks, and humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation increased significantly, from 28.9 million reais in 2005 (7.53% annual investment) to 184.8 million reais in 2009 (25.51% of the amount). Thus, development cooperation by the Brazilian government has increased significantly in the last ten years, so that now it is equivalent to the amount invested by Canada and Sweden.\(^9\)

### BRAZIL, COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES

Another relevant aspect of modern international development cooperation is the responsibility given to IDC to contribute to global stability and international security. Nevertheless, this is a controversial point. According to Bruno Ayllón, the securitization of the ICD was a consequence of the September 11, 2001 attacks. After that, the concentration of official development assistance went to the key countries where there was a perceived need to fight against international terrorism. Since the 1990s, the United Nations has been a relevant actor in peace and security and promoting development. Among its actions, we can highlight peace operations under the aegis of the Peacebuilding Commission, created in 2006, or other actions that relate security and development, such as cooperation programs for Security Sector Reform and for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of combatants. In the UN structure, the articulation among peace, security and development gained even more emphasis with the extension of the concept of security in the 1980s and the raising of human security to a higher political level in the 1990s.

According to Sanahuja, since the 1980s, security concepts have been expanded, incorporating economic, political, social and environmental subjects. The traditional emphasis on state security has gradually incorporated new concepts that give relevance to the security of people, their environment and their livelihoods. Besides that, cooperation agencies and development aid policies were confronted with crisis and armed conflict prevention and management, as well as post-conflict reconstruction. Development and cooperation policies started to include the security issues for the purpose of building sustainable states, not just

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\(^9\) We note the difficulty of drawing comparisons between countries’ cooperation budgets, because there is no world standard of elements that should be included in these budgets.
limiting the agenda to infrastructure and economic activity as in the past. In short, an international consensus and a comprehensive agenda of peace-building policies is now entrenched, bringing agreements and documents to the UN or the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development committees, such as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC10).

Also regarding this issue of securitization of ICD, we point out the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in the framework of the UN, in August 2015. The agreement contemplates 17 objectives and 169 goals, in diverse areas, such as eradication of poverty, food security, reduction of inequalities, inclusive economic growth and governance. Goal 16 – “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels,” reinforces the UN perspective that it is not possible to have sustainable development without first having a peaceful and just society. The new Agenda recognizes the importance of peaceful, just and inclusive societies, also considering the importance of human rights. With the SDG, factors that raise violence and insecurity, such as inequality, corruption, poor governance and illegal arms and financial flows, are now themes of the UN Development Agenda11. For same countries, the insertion of these themes is also a source of conflict, especially the undeveloped ones that fear intervention actions and relaxation of the concept of sovereignty.

From the perspective of Latin American countries on this point, we highlight a debate between the Pandiá Calógeras Institute of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MD), the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in February 2016, with employees of Latin American governments and academics, in order to consider ways to advance the UN’s peace and security agenda. Two proposals were presented: to avoid securitization and militarization of development assistance, but to ensure the complementarity of actions aimed at security and development; and to make a distinction between agendas and priorities associated with counterterrorism and anti-organized crime activities on the one hand and peacekeeping, peacebuilding and women’s rights agendas on the other. This vision has

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strong alignment with the Brazilian approach.

According to Bruno Ayllón, these questions about the securitization of ICD occur in a context different from the emergence of South-South relations during the Bandung Conference. If the spirit of that time was the search for alternatives within the Cold War, now, the logic that leads emerging countries to intensify South-South cooperation is to promote their international insertion, creating new mechanisms for political dialogue. The author adds that today one can see a process of disruption of the monopoly of cooperation of the OECD countries, building a “new aid architecture” that includes many emerging countries as cooperation donors. This international insertion in a new architecture would allow the military element to act with legitimacy of the Security Council, such as Brazil’s participation in MINUSTAH.

Considering this, we propose that Brazil is one of those emerging countries that seeks international insertion, where ICD has become a relevant key. Therefore, Brazil tends to follow the securitization of ICD, despite its historical discourse of nonintervention and peaceful settlement of disputes. In the Brazilian’s historical approach, as elements of this securitization of ICD, we can highlight its participation in multilateral peace operations of the UN, including the armed forces’ participation in activities of international

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12 South-South Cooperation (SSC) is a concept that includes a range of elements that compound relations between developing countries in temporary coalitions for multilateral negotiations. SSC would also be part of international development cooperation (IDC). The foundations for SSC began in 1978 when the Buenos Aires Plan of Action was established by the UN. Cooperação Sul-Sul: um ensaio conceitual. Iara C. Leite. Available at: www.mundorama.net/?article=cooperacao-sul-sul-um-ensaio-conceitual-por-iara-costa-leite. Accessed 7 March 2019.

13 Between 2005 and 2009, the Brazilian budget was equivalent of 307 million dollars for peacekeeping operations, including equipment, supplies, administration and logistics. The UN reimbursed Brazil approximately 127 million dollars, which suggests that the country invested about 180 million dollars. CINTRA, Cooperação Brasileira para Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009, op. cit. Brazil has been sending troops or observers since the Suez crisis, contributing in the Dominican Republic, Mozambique, Angola, East Timor and recently Haiti. Only on three occasions did Brazil contribute significant contingents: UNEF I (battalion with 600 men); UNAVEM III (military and police observers, infantry battalion - 800 men, engineering company - 200 men, two advanced health posts, 40 staff officers); and MINUSTAH (more than 37,000 military personnel). Nevertheless, Brazil was in a position of command six times: UNEF I (two generals had operational command of the mission), UNAVEM I, II and UNPROFOR (commanded the contingent of military observers), ONUMOZ (commanded the military component during a year) and MINUSTAH (commanded the military force since the implementation of the mandate in 2004). Brazilian tasks in conflict areas are border and ceasefire monitoring, seizure and assurance of arms, logistical transport, installation of bridges, escort of authorities, verification of elections, demobilization and integration of combatants, civil administration of the territory in
cooperation for development by the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries and the Union of South American Nations.

In 2014, Ambassador Antonio Patriota said that Brazil believes that stability and peace are essential for development. He also pointed out that effectively sustainable peace can be only achieved if governments and civil society, together, deal with the causes of conflict\textsuperscript{14}. This is not a new position; he reiterated the argument produced by Brazil about the interdependence between security and development. He also emphasized the importance conflict prevention and Brazilians’ desire to reform multilateral institutions, not only the UN Security Council, but also the Peacebuilding Commission. This point of view expressed by Patriota is not unanimous in the Foreign Ministry; some diplomats oppose including the topic of security in development cooperation, considering that the majority of contemporary armed conflicts are internal and any Brazilian interference would be contrary to Article 4 of the Brazilian Constitution, which states that stresses nonintervention and maintenance of sovereignty are elements of the nation’s international relations\textsuperscript{15}. However, these same diplomats assume that many of these armed conflicts are influenced by global factors, making the situation more complex, which would legitimize the UN actions through the Security Council. In fact, Brazil agrees with the concept of peacebuilding within the framework of the UN, although it does not support the association of the discourse of “fragile countries” and “statebuilding”, and recurrently highlights that inequality and poverty


\textsuperscript{15} “Brazil has been against military intervention even in the face of human rights violations in Kosovo (1998-1999), or in Darfur/Sudan (2004-2006). However, the country was in favor of military intervention in Rwanda (1994), Brazil rejected the use of force in Libya (2011) and in Syria (2012). Since the beginning of the Lula administration, Brazil has drawn attention to reduce inequality and poverty as a means of guaranteeing security. The Brazilian view would be supported by the focus on prevention, the use of force only as a last resort, the importance of not causing more damage or instability than is trying to solve, always emphasizing the necessity of authorization by the UNSC and the relevance of monitoring and accountability. These elements are present in President Dilma Rousseff’s Speech at the opening of the 66th Session of the UNGA in September 2011, where the Brazilian vision of ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RwP) is presented in counterpart to the doctrine of ‘Responsibility to Protect’(R2P).” Brazil and R2P: A Rising Global Player Struggles to Harmonise Discourse and Practice. Eduarda Hamann. Available at: https://issuu.com/gcdp/docs/a-rising-global-player-struggles-to. Acessed 7 March 2019.
can lead to increased crime and violence\textsuperscript{16}. As Sanahuja says, the issue of “failed states” or “fragile states” is at the center of the academic and political debate on the nexus between security and development, which is one of the elements the securitization of the agenda of development in recent years\textsuperscript{17}.

There is a dual behavior of Brazil\textsuperscript{18} in relation of the nexus between security and development, both in the political-diplomatic (MRE) and in the politico-military (MD) spheres, something that influences actions of Brazil’s ICD this century. This dual focus of the security and development nexus is partly visible in Brazil’s engagement in Haiti\textsuperscript{19}, which has been the greatest Brazilian political-military activity abroad in the last decade. It can be added to this dynamic that Brazil, as an emerging country, as proposed in the overall strategy of Lula\textsuperscript{20}, Nelson Jobim and Celso Amorim, could not produce the concept of development in a conservative way, mainly because Brazil would have lessons and good practices to share in political and social fields, and also in the armed force field\textsuperscript{21}. This commitment


\textsuperscript{17} SANAHUJA, Construcción de la paz, seguridad y desarrollo. Visiones, políticas y actores, op cit.

\textsuperscript{18} According to Amorim (2003), Minister Lafer introduced the concept of “constructive moderation” to guide this dual engagement of foreign policy in peace and security issues between 2001 and 2002. Muggah and et al., A promoção da paz no contexto pós-2015: o papel das potências emergentes, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{19} The Brazilian battalion in MINUSTAH engaged integrated security and development activities, with initiatives supported by the ABC, such as the construction of wells, roads and houses, as well as conducting robust military operations. The Brazilian cooperation with Guinea Bissau also reveals a link between security and development activities (UN Peacebuilding Commission for Guinea Bissau). O envolvimento de civis em contextos pós-conflito: oportunidade para a inserção internacional do Brasil. Eduarda Hamann. Available at: igarape.org.br/wp-content/themes/igarape_v2/pdf/IPEA_cap_especialistas_civis.pdf. Accessed 7 March 2019.

\textsuperscript{20} In the Lula government, some measures suggested that defense would have new space in the conception of foreign policy. In this direction, initiatives such as the reformulation of the National Defense Policy (PND), the launch of the National Defense Strategy (END), and the creation of the South American Defense Council (CDS), contributed to bring this topic closer to foreign policy. Novos Tempos? Considerações sobre Diplomacia e Defesa no Governo Lula (2003-2010). Alexandre Fuccille and et al. Available at: journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/69531?lang=fr. Accessed 7 March 2019.

\textsuperscript{21} The USA promoted the creation of the Organization of American States in 1948, and Brazil participated as a recipient of OAS development cooperation, mainly training armed force actions of the Latin American nations inserted in the ideology of the Cold War. After the end of Cold War, in July 2008 the US Navy reactivated its 4th Fleet, expanding its engagement in military exercises in the Atlantic Ocean; in 2007, it created the African Command of the United States with strategic priority of action in the Gulf of Guinea region;
to the maintenance of peace is consistent with its multilateralism as well as being a means to strengthen Brazil’s influence. More than that, peacekeeping activities would also reinforce domestic priorities, including adequate training and equipment for the military, as well as becoming a currency of exchange between the military and government for strategic projects desired for many years.

Speaking little more about Brazil’s great strategy, we can highlight the roles of the jurist Nelson Jobim and the Ambassador and Defense Minister Celso Amorim for the alignment of Brazilian foreign policy issues with MTC in countries considered strategic. On several occasions, considering the relationship between development and security and the Brazilian approach, the ambassador affirmed that Brazil was not guided by nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states, but considered the nonintervention concept in light of another precept, based on solidarity and non-indifference. Amorim stated more than once that Brazil should be able to combine “hard power” with “soft power” in its overall strategy. The political performance of Minister Amorim was relevant for the implementation of effective activities in relation to Africa, especially for MTC. In addition, the fact that the second version of the PND (2012) was drawn up when the Ministry of Defense was under the command of an experienced diplomat certainly contributed to the PND being well attuned to the main lines of foreign policy, particularly with regard to the characterization of the international and regional environment and the

in 2009 it installed a radar system in the Sao Tome and Principe maritime zone; and since 2010 it has been promoting a naval assistance project for countries of the Gulf of Guinea to promote maritime security.

22 Muggah and et al., A promoção da paz no contexto pós-2015: o papel das potências emergentes, op. cit.

23 Nelson Jobim took over in 2007 and remained until the first year of the Dilma Rousseff administration (2011), being the longest-serving minister of defense until today. According to Fuccille et al., among other things, Jobim’s success as MD was due to the political will of the government to advance a Brazilian defense agenda, combined with the institutional profile of the minister, who had broader capacity for dialogue. Fuccille and et al., Novos Tempos? Considerações sobre Diplomacia e Defesa no Governo Lula (2003-2010), op. cit.

24 The PND of 2012 proposed that in its strategic environment, the country seeks to deepen relations of cooperation. The strategic environment extends beyond the South American region, including the South Atlantic and the neighboring countries of Africa, as well as Antarctica.

discursive articulation between the two areas throughout the document\textsuperscript{26}. Amorim reconciled in his political trajectory, diplomacy and defense in the period in which the Brazilian State return to interest in Africa. Thus, due to his influence there has been an increase of Brazilian MTC for Africans, especially for Portuguese speakers, legitimized in the discourse of cooperation for development.

**MILITARY TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND THE BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE**

Although technical cooperation has been provided by Brazil for some four decades, in this century the activity has gained volume in terms of resources and numbers of actions, as well becoming a political element of Brazilian foreign policy. The budget of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency practically tripled between 2006 and 2010, from 19 million reais to 52 million reais\textsuperscript{27}. Considering the 80 countries to which Brazil has provided technical cooperation, 23 are on the list of fragile countries of the World Bank or OECD (2012) (corresponding to 28.75\% of the total number of countries\textsuperscript{28}). The range of issues in which Brazil cooperates is very broad, ranging from health policies to land improvement policies for family agriculture. This approach is present in Brazil’s activities in Haiti and Guinea Bissau, for example, countries where Brazil combines security consolidation with support in more development-related areas such as health and agriculture. The cooperation structure generally involves Brazilian governmental institutions that have know-how in the area of cooperation, for example, Embrapa in the area of agriculture, Fiocruz in the area of public health and the Armed Forces in the area of security management at ports and airports as well as border surveillance issues. Some countries, such as Portugal, call this type of action an element of paradiplomacy, foreign policy actions conducted by subnational state actors\textsuperscript{29}.

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\textsuperscript{29} Paradiplomacy can be defined as the involvement of subnational governments in
In this article, we define technical cooperation as the implementation of joint projects involving experts for personnel training, production of teaching material, also possibly including donation or construction of equipment, as well as conducting diagnostic studies and research in a specific thematic area. International technical cooperation (ITC) was established by Resolution 200 of the UN General Assembly in 1948. According to Amado Cervo, Brazil has a conceptual evolution of thinking of ITC, in which ITC moved from its primitive meaning, technical assistance, to that of technical cooperation for development. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), created in 1987 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the preponderant but not exclusive actor of Brazilian ITC, and aims to engage in technical cooperation with high-level participation of personnel and national agencies. Initially, the Agency was focused on the cooperation received, although now this is a lesser part. In recent decades, the focus has been on the cooperation offered to developing countries. The TC provided by Brazil, whether in the health area or military area, is directly related to the conception and implementation of successful national public policies, aiming to produce public administration benefits for the recipient countries. The relationship between the domestic plan (successful public sector policies) and the international plan (foreign policy) is relevant to understand the exact dimension of the Brazilian technical cooperation agenda. We propose that this agenda fits perfectly into this relationship.

The ITC provided by Brazil has as main external partner and sponsor the United Nations Development Program. Hence, we consider international relations, through the establishment of permanent or temporary (ad hoc) formal and informal contacts with foreign public or private entities, aiming to promote socioeconomic or political results, as well as any other external dimension of its own constitutional competence. Paradiplomacia & Entes Não-Centrais no Cenário Internacional. Alvaro C. C. Branco. Curitiba: Juruá, 2011.

According to Amado Cervo, the TC provided by Brazil to the developing countries, registered until the 1990s in the ABC archives, did not always correspond to formal projects, and was more of a demand for cooperation that reached the government or Brazilian agencies, registering around of 700 initiatives. The Brazilian executors were the same state agencies that in Brazil had previously participated in the ITC provided by the countries of the North. The sponsors, in addition to government agencies, were the UNDP, UN agencies and, to a lesser extent, cooperation between the countries of the region, the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank. Socializando o desenvolvimento: uma história da cooperação técnica internacional do Brasil. Amado Cervo. Brasília, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, v.37, n.1, 1994, pp. 37-63.

the conceptual perspective of UNDP development cooperation. Resolution 2688/1970 of the General Assembly established that the UNDP32 mandate aims to provide assistance to build self-sustaining capacities in developing countries33. In the 1970s, this program was important for Brazilian development, including the financing of projects in the aeronautical, telecommunication, road and rail transportation and nuclear programs, helping to prepare human resources for sensitive areas34. Some of these projects included officers of the armed forces.

Considering Brazil’s great strategy, the country’s perspective as a donor of ITC, and the issue of securitization of the IDC, we can point out that Brazilian activities for technical cooperation for development can support actions of conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy and peace-building, as well as support for UN’s conflict prevention efforts. By the end of the decade 2010, Brazil had participated in 42 of the 65 UN peacekeeping operations, ranking 14th in UN budget rankings and 28th in budget rankings of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO35) . Brazil is a relatively small military actor compared to the great military powers, with only 1% of the volume of military spending in the world. On the other hand, Brazil has 1/3 of all military expenditures in Latin America and it is the second largest exporter of small arms and ammunition in the Southern Hemisphere. Another point is the recent investment to upgrade defense infrastructure, which places Brazil as one of the region’s countries with the means to project its military capacity.

We must emphasize that the creation of the Ministry of Defense in 1999 can be considered a paradigm change for Brazilian MTC. It brought gains to strategic discussions on defense policy, civil-military relations and reframing of the Armed Forces, but also contributed to a structured

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32 UNDP was created in 1965 with the union of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance with the UN Special Fund. The program provided funds for ITC by contributions from member countries.

33 We define self-sustainability as the capacity of the State to promote its own public policies based on its own resources.

34 One of these projects is for training of personnel by the structuring of a training center of the Brazilian Navy. Another project was sponsored by the International Civil Aviation Organizationand involved the Aeronautical Technology Center and Embraer. This project obtained results in terms of flight protection, computerization, airports and aeronautical ratification. Cervo, Socializando o desenvolvimento: uma história da cooperação técnica internacional do Brasil, op. cit.

35 Muggah et al., A promoção da paz no contexto pós-2015: o papel das potências emergentes, op. cit.
MTC policy with strategic state thinking. This MTC policy has as its main element the countries of the Brazilian strategic environment. Even with some operational problems, today MTC is operationalized within the structure of the Ministry of Defense, which is the national institution responsible for formulating the country’s strategic vision in the areas of defense and security. Structurally, there is an International Affairs Sub-Office which is under the Deputy Chief of Strategic Affairs, subordinated to the Joint Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces, which is subordinated to the Minister of Defense. Each armed force also has its respective staff to structure international cooperation. The Brazilian defense officers sent abroad are subordinated to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Affairs. This structure distances the political-strategic decision-maker (minister) from those who take care of the more tactical-operational part of the MTC.

For comparison’s sake, in Portugal the structure of the Ministry of Defense includes a General Office of National Defense Policy, which in turn contains Office of Technical-Military Cooperation Services, which is responsible for coordinating technical-military cooperation with African countries and Timor-Leste, preparing and negotiating Framework Programs (Programas-Quadro36) with Portuguese-speaking countries; coordinating the participation of the Ministry of Defense in the defense component of the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries; and proposing measures and actions for the development of the Program of Support to the Missions of Peace in Africa (PAMPA). A quick analysis of the Portuguese MTC allows us to affirm that Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa are the priority of the Ministry of Defense, something emphasized in the strategic concept of national defense. This analysis also help to explain that Framework Programs are more integrated as strategic tools than the actions in Brazilian MTC, even though the investments and the number of Brazilian activities are broader than the Portuguese. Following this comparison between Brazil and Portugal, we emphasize that both countries have tried to maintain a national military

36 The “Programas-Quadro” are the tools of the Portuguese MTC that establish the activities for cooperation. For example, the program with São Tomé and Príncipe, from 2010 to 2013, had the following objectives: support to the superior structure of the defense and of the Armed Forces of São Tomé and Príncipe; support to the Military Training Center, training of units for joint operations of public interest, humanitarian aid, crisis management and peace support; support to the Coast Guard and the Navigation Support Service. Portugal e a CTM: uma análise das potencialidades, vulnerabilidades, oportunidades e ameaças. Cristian C. O. Vargas. Available at: https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/12242/1/Relato%CC%81rio%20-%20Cristian%20Ospina.pdf. Accessed 7 March 2019.
representation with their embassies in the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, mainly through naval officers.

This alignment of Brazilian foreign policy with the defense policy for Africa has been developed in several planes: on the bilateral side (with each member of the African Union); on narrow multilateral side (with the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries, with the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone Countries (ZOPACAS); and with the India-Brazil-South Africa Forum); and on the expanded multilateral side in the United Nations framework. In general, relations are established through cooperation agreements for military training and donations of materiel, including combined military exercises. In the twenty-first century, we have seen an increase in the relationship through the creation of naval missions in African countries. Returning to the idea of a great Brazilian strategy, according to Amorim, Brazil should build a strategic environment, a belt of peace and goodwill, for which an alignment of politics, defense and foreign policy can be relevant in order to promote world peace and build a more stable and fair world.

According to Abdul-Hak, defense cooperation consists of coordination and reciprocal adjustment of states’ policies against threats, considering the joint use and control of force in inter-state actions. This can be exemplified by NATO’s actions or joint missions of the European Union. Furthermore, the history of defense cooperation has aligned with the Cold War security umbrellas. Military technical cooperation can be considered an exchange of information and experience in the field of defense and security, without the need to align common threats.

37 Portugal seems to have been more successful than Brazil, since in almost all Portuguese-speaking countries it has had a military advisory structure since the 1980s, while Brazil politically opted initially to provide or donate the means. However, the formation of the Namibian Navy by MB; the memorandum in the field of defense between Brazil and Angola, signed in September 2014; and the creation by Brazil in February 2015 of a Naval Mission in Sao Tome are also a recent inflection in Brazilian behavior and an attempt to incorporate in the long term the technical-strategic dimension.

38 In the case of Angola, since 1995 Angolan military officers have been included in the Brazilian military education system and a regular program of visits and internships has been established.


or enemies. In addition, MTC can have elements of technical relevance similar to cooperation in health, education, or electoral issues. In this type of cooperation, there are projects to promote structural changes in countries through institutional strengthening and training of military personnel at Brazilian institutions.

Another relevant point of this Brazilian MTC is that it is more concentrated in the tactical-operational field, although it includes some high-level meetings with the purpose of promoting interoperability of forces and creating joint systems and doctrines, which includes the political-strategic scope. In addition, this MTC includes the possibility of strategic alliances for a specific common objective linked to regional issues or to international commitments. According to Caixeta and Suyama, military cooperation contributes to building trust and strengthening relations between countries. These authors pointed out that this cooperation between Brazil and the South is connected to the purposes of international cooperation for development (ICD) and at the same time seeks to consolidate zones of peace and security as regional public goods, since it is directed to countries that present social and economic vulnerability, political and institutional instability, or that are emerging from conflicts – such as Angola, Mozambique, East Timor, Haiti and Guinea Bissau.

MILITARY TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND THE BRAZILIAN COOPERATION AGENCY

The second government of President Lula and the administrations of Nelson Jobim in the Ministry of Defense and Celso Amorim in the MRE and the MD can be considered as elements of a change in the relationship of the MRE with the MD. In 2007, the General Defense Coordination Office was created, within the framework of the General Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the MRE. This office’s propose was to deal with the political-strategic aspect of Brazilian cooperation with the Ministry of Defense; as well as other technical committees that link the MRE to other ministries. This linkage aimed to promote close interaction of foreign policy with strategic defense policy. Only after this alignment did MTC projects arise.

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41 Caixeta and Suyama, A cooperação Sul-Sul na agenda dos Ministérios: Defesa e Segurança, op.cit.
within the scope of the ABC\textsuperscript{42}. Previously, Brazil’s MTC was fragmented and lacked coordination, which can be attributed to the autonomy that historically guided the action of the singular armed forces in international affairs.

Another formalized partnership between the Brazilian Cooperation Agency and the Ministry of Defense, is the Technical Cooperation Agreement in the Defense Area, signed on May 4, 2010. This instrument allows expanding the activities of the Ministry of Defense and improving ABC’s coordination capacity with regard to the analysis, approval and execution of initiatives in the military area, establishing, above all, the responsibilities of each party and parameters for training\textsuperscript{43}. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency, among other activities, concentrates the country’s technical cooperation\textsuperscript{44}. The ABC website points out that the Agency has supported the provision of spots for military officer from Latin America and Africa in courses at Brazilian military academies\textsuperscript{45}, with the aim of strengthening bilateral relations through technical cooperation and the exchange of experiences with priority countries for the Brazilian government. These training missions are for officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force and intend to convey the Brazilian military experience. In the list of activities, coordinated by the Agency for security and defense issues, are more than 300 initiatives, with predominance of activities classified as military training\textsuperscript{46}, 284 defense activities carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces, and 28 homeland security activities carried out by the Ministry of Justice and two related to the

\textsuperscript{42} We emphasize that this closer relationship between ABC and MD is also a reflection of the National Defense Strategy, launched in 2008 and revised in 2012, which defines the regional environment and strategic environment as a priority focus of cooperation actions.


\textsuperscript{44} In the model defined for the Brazilian CSS, the ABC acts in close coordination with the ministries and public institutions that hold knowledge in the different areas of the Brazilian government. Public institutions provide the experts responsible for cooperation and the ABC pays expenses related to commuting, per diems and air fare. Milani, ABC 30 anos: história e desafios futuros, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{45} The training courses are taught in Brazilian military academies, among them the Military Engineering Institute, the Admiral Wandenkolk Instruction Center, the Agulhas Negras Military Academy, the Air Force Academy, the School of Aeronautics Specialists and the Brazilian Navy War College.

\textsuperscript{46} The training are varied, directed to different ranks of the Armed Forces and covering diverse subjects, such as: Rescue Officer; Fire Fighting; Aircraft Flight and Transportation; Training of Aviator Officers; Security and Surveillance of Maritime Traffic and Search and Rescue; Preparation for Peace Missions; and Intelligence Operations.
National Civil Aviation Agency and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency\textsuperscript{47}. The ABC, in the period from 2010 to 2015, paid the expenses related to air fares, per diems and travel insurance. Since 2016, considering the Agency’s budgetary constraints, the MD started to cover the costs of training and those previously covered by the ABC. In 2010, the ABC provided approximately 545 thousand dollars in support and benefited more than 60 South American military officers. In 2011, the ABC funded 112 training courses offered by the MD and 166 South American military officers were trained, with costs of around 1.4 million dollars. The armed force that has the largest number of courses supported by the ABC is the Army, followed by the Navy and Air Force, as shown in Figure 1.

\textit{Source: ABC 30 years: history and future challenges}\textsuperscript{48}

In 2013, considered one of the most active years, the ABC\textsuperscript{49} financed for Latin America countries 20 training courses offered by the Ministry of Defense, most of them carried out by the Brazilian Army, to countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay (42 military). Considering the cooperation with Africa, during 2013, short and long-term training was provided to representatives from Mozambique, Angola, Nigeria, Cape Verde, Senegal and Sao Tome and Principe (42 military). In that year, the ABC supported the MD in the execution of the First Seminar

\textsuperscript{47} Caixeta and Suyama, A cooperação Sul-Sul na agenda dos Ministérios: Defesa e Segurança, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{48} Milani, ABC 30 anos: história e desafios futuros, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{49} According to the ABC’s database, in the ITC actions executed in the period between 2005 and 2015, the geographical distribution of amounts for the African continent was 49.7\% of the total budget, and the Latin American and Caribbean region received 31.9\% of the total budget executed. Milani, ABC 30 anos: história e desafios futuros, op. cit.
on Security and Surveillance of Maritime Traffic and Search and Rescue within the scope of ZOPACAS\textsuperscript{50} and the Second Advanced Course of South American Defense, with the participation of 66 military officers\textsuperscript{51}. In 2014, MTC with other Latin America countries had great importance compared to other topics, as shown in Figure 2.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{South-South cooperation in Latin America in amount of activity by area in 2014.}
\end{figure}

Source: Atlas of Brazilian Foreign Policy\textsuperscript{52}

In 2014 in Africa, MTC was offered to 33 countries with a budget of 57 million dollars, including Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal and Tanzania. From 2009 to 2017, the training provided by the MD in Africa included 277 military officers. Courses for African officers are usually longer and may last more than a year. For Latin America, activities are shorter (generally from 15 to 30 days). From 2011 to 2016, 263 Latin American military officers participated. In addition, the training offered by ZOPACAS (2010, 2013, 2015) and the Advanced Defense Course\textsuperscript{53} for the South included 202 military officers. Portuguese-speaking African countries are particularly relevant in Brazilian MTC, mainly in technical-operational activities, since they share the same language, making it much easier to share practices through the Brazilian military experience\textsuperscript{54}.

Despite the budget constraints of the Rousseff administration, Figure 3 shows that the number of military projects for Africa increased

\textsuperscript{50} The ZOPACAS Seminar aimed at strengthening joint search and rescue actions among members of the Zone.
\textsuperscript{53} Organized annually by the Brazilian War College since 2012, CAD-Sul is developed over 10 weeks with about 30 civilians and military members of UNASUR countries, in order to develop South American thinking about defense based on regional cooperation and integration.
\textsuperscript{54} Milani, ABC 30 anos: história e desafios futuros, op. cit.
compared to the Lula government (from 5 to 24), not following the decrease of the programs for Africa in the Rousseff period (from 433 to 118). In this analysis, it is important to observe the comparison between a period of eight years (two Lula governments) and another of four years (Rousseff’s first administration), to indicate the advances that were made in that government. The total number of projects increased significantly from one period to another\(^{55}\). We believe this increase was due to the political performance of Celso Amorim at the Ministry of Defense, especially his incentive to military technical cooperation with the Portuguese-speaking countries, but also for the maturity of the relationship between the Brazilian Ministry of Defense and African country’s defense ministries, as well as high-level military meetings within ZOPACAS and CPLP.

**Figure 3 - Projects for the African Continent**

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{Projects for the African Continent}
\end{figure}

*Source: ABC 30 years: history and future challenges\(^{56}\)*

It is important to note that some of the military cooperation projects coordinated by the ABC are multilateral. Bilateral cooperation is more frequent with countries of lower military capacity or with a well-established relationship with the Brazilian MD, such as the case of

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\(^{56}\) Milani, ABC 30 anos: história e desafios futuros, op. cit.
Portuguese-speaking African countries. According to the ABC database, in the context of the Portuguese-speaking African countries, MTC projects were carried out under the South-South cooperation umbrella and were classified as military training activities. Army, air force and navy training courses were offered to Mozambique from 2009 to 2016; with Cape Verde from 2010 to 2016; with Guinea Bissau from 2011 to 2012; with São Tomé and Príncipe from 2011 to 2016; and with Angola from 2011 to 2016. In addition, people from the defense ministries of the countries of ZOPACAS participated in meetings sponsored by the ABC from 2010 to 2012. Since 2016, the ABC has included all actions involving Latin American and African countries in a single program called Technical Cooperation in Defense - Latin America and Africa, with activities in 2016 and 2017. Since the end of 2017, this program has included East Timor, and had activities planned up to 2018. Another project was carried out in 2017 and 2018 in order to develop African engineering capabilities in peacetime operations, one result of a triangular UN/BRAZIL/AFRICA partnership.

Finally, we draw the panorama of MTC through the Brazilian Navy with the Portuguese-speaking African countries. Many of these activities of cooperation have been carried out to promote in these countries self-sustaining capacities to manage their maritime areas. We define self-sustainability as the capacity of the State to promote its own public policies based on its own resources. Furthermore, this is perfectly in line with an element of development cooperation proposed by the UNDP.

**BRAZILIAN NAVY AND MTC WITH THE COMMUNITY OF PORTUGUESE SPEAKING COUNTRIES**

Without limitation of terrestrial boarders, the sea is the element that connects nearly all the world’s countries, facilitating international trade (remember the great Iberian navigation voyages). In this sense, every country that cares about its foreign policy should value its Navy as a potential diplomatic agent. This is understood in developed countries like England, the world’s preeminent naval power until the middle of the 20th century (with World War II), and United States, whose Navy is the main armed force\(^\text{57}\). However, there are other international actors that also have

\(^{57}\) Considering the American position as the greatest military and economic power, the United States Navy has a global range, having been used recently to dissuade North Korea from conducting nuclear tests, for example.
have a strong maritime mentality.

The sea is one of the three strategic links among the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries (CPLP), together with language and historical ties. As evidence of this, the organization has the Sea Subjects Forum as one of the Sectorial Ministerial Meetings\(^{58}\), at which are discussed topics related to maritime safety and security\(^{59}\). In this respect, the “CPLP Navies Symposium” was created. The main theme of its fifth version (in Rio de Janeiro, 2018) was “Cooperation between navies to exercise sovereignty in jurisdictional waters.” Since 2000, the FELINO exercise has been conducted since 2000 by the CPLP Member States, intended to improve the interoperability of their armed forces, their capacity of action in UN peacekeeping operations and the promotion of maritime security. The organization has issued some documents related to maritime subjects, such as the 2007 CPLP Strategy for the Oceans and the Maputo Declaration of 2013, which has maritime security as the central topic, especially in the Gulf of Guinea\(^{60}\).

Considering that all the CPLP Member States are coastal, there is a general consensus concerning information sharing about procedures, techniques and pertinent rules for the use of the ocean. In this respect, Brazil and Portugal stand out because of their political and territorial importance and their measures taken. Below we list some examples of Brazilian-Portuguese naval cooperation in the last two decades:

- Courses, internships, (individual and ship), visits and operational boardings;
- Broad exchange program (including both military officers and civilians);
- Biannual meetings of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces\(^{61}\);
- Permanent committee with semiannual conferences of commanders;
- Biannual seminar at the Brazilian Naval War College about CPLP;
- Joint exercises, mainly in the Mediterranean and South Atlantic;


\(^{59}\) “Safety” of life at the sea is related to subjects such as the marine environment preservation, whereas “security” refers to securitized topics like piracy.

\(^{60}\) The main CPLP general document on Defense is the Protocol of Cooperation of Portuguese-Speaking Countries in the Field of Defense

\(^{61}\) Also with Angolan and Mozambican Navies.
- General Treaty of Friendship – 2000;
- Specialist group involving services of maritime security as part of the Joint Technical Commission for Oceanography and Marine Meteorology;
- Commission on Safety of Environmental Heritage – Lisbon;
- Symposium on Historical Cartography – Annual since 2009;
- Cultural and Scientific Cooperation Agreement between the Brazilian Navy and Minho University - 2013;
- Agreement between EGN and the Superior Institute of Social Sciences and Politics of Lisbon University (ISCSP/ULisboa) – 2014;
- Training of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Navy – 2016;
- Agreement on Information Sharing about Maritime Perspectives – 2017;
- Dialogue between the Brazilian and Portuguese defense industry - 2017;
- Program for Factory Acceptance Testing Abroad\(^{62}\); and
- New Agreement on Defense Cooperation (signed on the above occasion\(^ {63}\)).

We believe that the ABC and the Defense Ministry do not necessarily increase Brazilian international cooperation, but institutionalizes it. Even so, a lot of agreements can be characterized by practical actions only, being equally (or sometimes more) effective\(^ {64}\), as is the case of the Brazilian-Portuguese naval cooperation\(^ {65}\).

However, after Portugal, the CPLP Member State that most cooperates with Brazil in the naval sector is Angola. Some examples are:

- Intense exchange program;
- Defense Cooperation Agreement – 2010;
- Training of Angolan military officers – Since 2011;


\(^{63}\) The first one was signed in 2005.

\(^{64}\) The Brazilian Navy still lacks mapping of international cooperation, a matter that is the current research project of Carolina Ambinder of the Professional Master Program on Maritime Studies at the Brazilian Naval War College.

\(^{65}\) It is important to remember that the relation with Portugal is also special because of its condition as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
- Brazilian assistance in the study of the Angolan Continental Shelf\textsuperscript{66};
- Assistance in logistics (provision of patrol ships and uniforms)
  – 2012;
  - “Atlantic Tidings”, a joint exercise also with South Africa and Namibia – 2013\textsuperscript{67};
- Development Program of Angolan Naval Power (PRONAVAL\textsuperscript{68})
  – 2014;
  - Joint exercises (against piracy);
  - Assistance in creating Angola’s Search and Rescue Service\textsuperscript{69};
  - Laying of a submarine cable\textsuperscript{70}; and
  - Technical-administrative inspection\textsuperscript{71}.

Cape Verde, in turn, has a Brazilian Naval Permanent Mission (2015) as the main method for cooperation with Brazilian Navy\textsuperscript{72}. Other examples show the enhancement of this relation recently:

- Defense Cooperation Agreement;
- Diplomatic visits of ships;
- Information sharing about maritime traffic;
- Exchange of military officers to help recruitment and training; and
- Assistance to create the Cape Verdean System of Naval Means Management.

Also important, these are some cooperation examples between the Brazilian Navy and the other navies from CPLP countries (since 1999):

\textsuperscript{66} Brazil also provided assistance to the Cape Verde, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe continental shelf studies.
\textsuperscript{67} Ex.: “Atlantic Tidings” with South Africa and Namibia – 2013.
\textsuperscript{68} Seven patrol ships of 500 tons from the Angolan government, of which four will be built in Brazil with Angolan military assistance and workers as a way of training them, and three will be built in Angola by workers already trained (Correa and Oliveira, 2016).
\textsuperscript{69} In 2016 and 2017, also provided to Cape Verde.
\textsuperscript{70} Initiated in 2006, the cable is going to connect Ceará to Angola for improvement of telecommunications.
\textsuperscript{71} Also found with Mozambique. Available at: https://www.marinha.mil.br/dadm/node/10. Accessed 15 March 2019.
\textsuperscript{72} Brazil has the same with São Tomé and Príncipe since 2014.
Guinea-Bissau
- “Africa 10” Joint Exercise$^{73}$;
- Exchange Program (2001-2011); and

Equatorial Guinea
- Defense Cooperation Agreement – 2010; and
- Diplomatic visits of ships.

Mozambique
- Defense Cooperation Agreement - 2006;
- Exchange Program (2001-2011, 2015 and 2017);
- Assistance for rebuilding the Mozambique Naval School and naval bases; and
- Logistics: sending a Brazilian navy maneuver simulator to the Mozambique Naval School – 2016.

São Tomé and Príncipe
- Logistics: sending inflatable boats, motorboats and rifles – 2010-2014;
- Training of military officers;
- Assistance in nautical signage and hydrography of deepwater ports;
- Assistance in maritime strategy;
- Exchange Program – 2014-2016; and
- Diplomatic visits of ships.

Lastly, although not mentioned as much in this article for not being an African country, East Timor, also a CPLP Member State, is involved in naval cooperation with Brazil, like the presence of observers there, training of its Navy (2015) and military exchanges (2017).

To conclude, Brazil just assumed leadership for three years (2019 - 2021) of the Center for Strategic Analysis (CAE) of the CPLP, giving an opportunity to think about the effects of all these recent cooperative actions.

$^{73}$ Also with Equatorial Guinea.

and initiate some more. Some years ago, for example, the Portuguese Navy Commandant traveled aboard the Brazilian training ship, after which several agreements emerged. In other words, many times international collaboration comes in a bottom-up direction, transforming the tactical or the operational into the strategic and modeling the international cooperation for development.

cooperation received, even if it is MTC adjusted to develop state capabilities to control air or sea traffic, manage port facilities and transfer military technologies and doctrines. MTC did not start with the securitization of ITC, but benefited from it. Likewise, it did not begin with projects under the ABC structure, but the military officers benefited from its structure in line with the foreign policies of Presidents Lula and Dilma for Africa and South America.

On the other hand, the UNDP contributed as an intermediary in the implementation of Brazilian ITC actions in Latin American and African countries. In practice, all Brazilian ITC actions have been implemented through technical cooperation umbrella projects, signed between the Brazilian government and UNDP. Taking this into account, our intention is to emphasize that Brazil associates the discourse of nexus between security and development promoted by the UN, with its own perspective of security and development.

Moreover, we would like to clarify that although the Ministry of Defense is related to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), the interaction between these two important institutions is not consolidated in practice. There is a lack of communication and little strategic alignment. Brazil’s work in ITC has followed the international history of this agenda, especially within the UN. As Milani affirms, ITC has a direct interface with the conception and implementation of national public policies in many different areas, which reveals how relevant the relationship is between the domestic (sectorial public policies) and the international (foreign policy) planes to understand the technical cooperation agenda. Furthermore, in the Brazilian approach, the dissemination of its public policies through cooperation also fulfills a strategic function of legitimizing a given development model75 , and military technical cooperation with African countries is a perfect example.

75 Milani, ABC 30 anos: história e desafios futuros, op. cit.
COOPERAÇÃO TÉCNICO-MILITAR PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO - A PERSPECTIVA BRASILEIRA DE INTERAÇÃO PARA SÉCULO XXI

RESUMO

Palavras Chave: Cooperação Técnico-Militar. Desenvolvimento. CPLP. Brasil
REFERÊNCIAS


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