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ABSTRACT
This article aims to analyze the importance of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) to Brazil from a strategic point of view. The analytical scheme proposes two aspects: cooperation and dissuasion. The latter was evaluated having as a parameter the means of actions derived from the institutional strengthening that security and defense require against the interests of the Brazilian state in its strategic environment. The time frame covered the period between 1995 and 2016, in the transition of foreign policies from the so-called “autonomy through participation” foreign policies, during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration, to the “autonomy through diversification” policies, in Lula’s and Rousseff’s administrations. The analysis concluded that being the Brazilian military hard power still insufficient concerning the needs required from a regional leadership in the South Atlantic, Brazil’s strategy has led to the application of soft power in its version of smart power. The research had an empirical basis to query the historical documents and the support of the relevant literature.

Keywords: Brazilian Foreign Policy. Defense Policy. CPLP. Cooperation. Dissuasion. Smart power. Strategic Environment.

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INTRODUCTION

This article aims to analyze the importance of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) to Brazil from the point of view of cooperation and dissuasive interests of the Brazilian state in its strategic environment, the South Atlantic. The period covers more than 20 years, comprising the foreign and defense policies of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (FHC), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's (Lula), and Dilma Rousseff's (Rousseff) administrations within the CPLP, a group of Lusophone countries composed of Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and Sao Tome and Principe. In 2002, after declaring its independence, Timor-Leste became an integral part of the community.

Created in 1996, the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) was an important advance in Brazilian diplomacy, placing Brazil as the main actor of the community and generally affirming the Brazilian presence in Africa. Although the Brazilian population has deep African roots, Africa only gained greater prominence in the country’s diplomatic agenda after the so-called “Independent Foreign Policy” (IFP), formulated and implemented during President Jânio Quadros’ short government, between January and August 1961. However, with minister Afonso Arinos ahead of the Chancellery, the IFP was more rhetorical than political practice, based on a more consistent theoretical body during that brief period. Its conceptual foundation was the work of another Chancellor, San Tiago Dantas, who forever marked the country’s diplomatic history regardless of being ahead of Itamaraty only between September 1961 and July 1962. What made the IFP so meaningful was that it affirmed Brazil’s intention to negotiate with every country given its national objectives and interests, affirming its leading role on the international scene.

In its time, certain authors perceived the IFP as a tactical maneuver, in the sense that, on the external plane, it sought to adopt a transformative (progressive) view of Brazilian politics, while internally pursuing a more conservative approach. Others criticized it for its nationalist voluntarism. However, the IFP openly expressed a claim to autonomy at the international level, aiming at the entry of Brazilian products into the international market unbound by political-ideological limitations. In this way, it marked a new era of Brazilian foreign policy in both global and multilateral terms. Global, because Brazil started exploring trade/political relations with other regions, acting beyond its regional system.
Brazil was updated with the new international context of the early 1960s, characterized, on the one hand, by the growing economic recovery of the countries of the European Economic Community and Japan, and, on the other, by the process of decolonization of Africa and Asia, as well as by the Non-Aligned Movement. The new phase of foreign policy was also marked in multilateral terms, as the country began to seek new partnerships with countries and regions for its interests, to the detriment of preferential relations with the United States of America (VISSENTINI, 2003, pp. 28–29).

The autonomist habit, however, was present before the IFP, for example, in the Vargas period from 1930 to 1945, when Brazilian foreign policy at the juncture of World War II was designated as “autonomy in dependence” (MOURA, 1980). Other exercises on autonomist foreign policies took place during the second Vargas’s administration (1951–54) and notably in the final years of Juscelino Kubitscheck’s government (1956–60).

The autonomist orientation was present, too, after the IFP. In the technocratic-military cycle (1964/1985), it was particularly remarkable in the Geisel government (1974-79), when the search for the universalization of the Brazilian foreign policy was called “responsible pragmatism” by specialists. This policy generally resumed the IFP, as it again brought to the fore Brazilian interests as opposed to the ideological issues of the Cold War. It was a foreign policy of multiplying international contacts while prioritizing development and national interests (Garcia 1997). In a context in which Portugal was losing control over its overseas empire, this guideline provided the opportunity for Brazil, as the largest Portuguese-speaking country, to become these peoples’ aspirations flagship for the pursuit of economic development projects and political protagonism at the international level. With a sense of opportunity, Brazil encouraged and promoted good relations with countries on the other side of the Atlantic to make itself present and, eventually, participate in negotiations that would alter the established order (GONÇALVES; MIYAMOTO, 1993).

The foreign policy throughout Figueiredo’s administration (1980-85) deepened the policies of the previous government. The effect of closer diplomatic relations with Africa has resulted in Brazil’s greater involvement with the continent’s problems. This involvement has, with different degrees, extended to subsequent civilian governments without significant course changes since 1985, being present throughout Collor’s (1990-92) and Itamar Franco’s (1992-94) administrations, and intensified during under the rule of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-
2002) (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007). Throughout this period, Brazil has strengthened its active participation in all international organizations, with emphasis on the defense of the environment and human rights and prioritizing the pursuit of an economic multilateralism in which CPLP’s participation has always been a fact, although at oscillating rates.

In a world of great transformation, accelerated after the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of new international actors – such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) – the antagonists in international trade became more intense. In this new context, Brazil sought to place itself more assertively in the international system. CPLP was created during this period, when “the country sought to act on large fronts, contemplating what were considered to be its most satisfactory priorities, at least at that time”. (MIYAMOTO, 2009, p.31).

According to Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007), FHC’s administration adopted a foreign policy characterized as a reconciliation between the “affirmative autonomy of participation in international forums” and the “alignment with major international centers”. This policy ended up losing momentum after the Asian crisis, which profoundly affected the world economy in 1997. Thanks to the ripple effect, the consequences of the financial tsunami in the globalized world affected countries such as Brazil, which had been increasingly integrated into the international system since the 1930s.

Still according to the authors, regarding the previous paragraph, another foreign policy gained relevance: the “autonomy for diversification”, understood as a search for new centers of power, emphasizing cooperative relations, without, however, abandoning great centers of world power. This foreign policy strategy peaked during Lula’s administration (2003–10), in which some of the main goals were related to South-South relations and the pursuit of greater relative power in the international system, including the demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. (UNSC). Rousseff’s foreign policy strategy (2011-2016) pursued the continuity of the principles of autonomy through diversification, but without the assertiveness of the previous government because of the lack of stronger involvement of the first dignitary in foreign policy, among other factors. Internally, the hiccups of the economy worsened over the course of her first term (2011–14) before completely deteriorating during her following term, when a serious and unavoidable crisis led to her impeachment on 05/12/2016.
This research seeks to highlight the importance of the CPLP for Brazil from the point of view of its “strategic environment”, understood as the South American region, the South Atlantic, the bordering countries of Africa and, from 2012, Antarctica, as part of the National Defense Policy (NDP). The analysis focuses on the period from 1995 to 2016, comprising the administrations of Presidents Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff, pointing out the cooperation, as well as the deterrent instruments in the South Atlantic, in activities most closely related to Africa and, consequently, to CPLP. The concept of “smart power” drives research, as formulated by, as formulated by Joseph S. Nye Jr. (1937–), who combines the concepts of “cooperation” and “deterrence” as strategic state instruments.

In addition to this introduction, this work is split into four parts and a conclusion. On the first, the conceptual basis that grounded the investigation is presented. The next three examine the application of the foreign policy pillars of FHC’s, Lula’s and Rousseff’s administrations, with emphasis on the CPLP.

**COOPERATION, DISSUASION, AND SMART POWER**

In the complex context of international relations, the concept of “cooperation” does not enjoy peaceful theoretical consensus. According to the theorists of the neoliberal institutionalist school Robert Owen Keohane (1941–) and Robert Marshall Axelrod (1943–), cooperation refers to the process of policy coordination through which significant international players adjust their behaviors to other players’ existing or expected preferences. Realist school theorist Hans Joachim Morgenthau (1904-80) understands cooperation as political action, a foreign policy instrument of a state, to expand its powers, prestige, and economic gains in the international system (MILANI, 2012; VIOLANTE, 2017).

Constructivist school theorists generally define it as an ethical involvement to promote a collective work intended at bringing about beneficial and essential changes in society. From this perspective, cooperation stems from both humanitarian imperatives and ethical commitments.

From the historical point of view, international cooperation, as currently practiced, is a recent thing. It can be perceived as one of the most important consequences arising from the end of World War II. This global conflict engendered a new structuring of the international system, based on the polarization between two emerging hegemonic fields led on the one
hand by the US and, on the other, by the former USSR. It was characterized by a strong economic bias initially used as a tool that served more to the interests of central countries than to those in the periphery. Regarding Brazil, as already mentioned in this article, it was only in the 1960s that the foundations of an independent foreign policy were formulated, leading to the economic development process noticeable in the country from the 1930s. With the IFP, it can be said that Brazil started to claim its own space in the world set of nations, and, therefore, to aim for greater autonomy in dealing with international cooperation.

During the 1950s, cooperation practices (in the form of economic aid or humanitarian assistance) gained ground in international relations. With pressure from developing countries, cooperation has gradually but increasingly incorporated the dimension of development and social issues (PUENTE, 2010).

At present, as common instruments of International Development Cooperation (IDC), we can mention: a) financial cooperation, such as grants, privileged concessions; b) technical cooperation, through knowledge exchange, technology transfer; c) scientific and technological cooperation, such as fostering research and exchange of technical information; d) educational cooperation, such as a scholarship programs for foreigners; e) humanitarian aid, used to minimize the effects of natural disasters, armed conflicts among others; and (f) food aid, through the transfer of food resources in the event of food instability.

At the geopolitical level, the different means of cooperation can be typified as follows:

a) **North-South cooperation** between a developed and a developing country. It is also called vertical cooperation. Multilateral and bilateral bodies have currently developed greater support for this type of cooperation. As an example, there is the cooperation between Germany and Brazil for the development of the Brazilian nuclear program (1970s).

b) **triangular cooperation**, which is the mixed cooperation made up of two or more developing countries and supported by Northern resources. For example, the Brazil x Canada x Haiti Immunization Program under WHO recommendations; and

c) **South-South cooperation**, a horizontal cooperation or technical cooperation for developing countries (TCDC) that takes place between two or more developing countries, based on the principles of
horizontality, consensus, and equity, having the conference of the United Nations Convention on CTPD, by the Plan of Action of Buenos Aires (PABA) in 1978, as its fundamental milestone. It is noteworthy that it is very difficult to achieve complete equity in the interrelationship between states, even horizontally. Even in technical cooperation, and to a lesser extent, verticality will still be present in the relationship between the receiver and the provider (PUENTE, 2010).

Directly opposed to cooperation is the concept of deterrence. The latter can be characterized by “[...] the maintenance of sufficiently powerful military forces ready for immediate employment capable of discouraging any military aggression” and as a response to avoid “[...] action for fear of the consequences. It is a state of mind originated from the existence of a threat liable to unacceptable retaliation.”

These definitions, however, do not reflect the full complexity of the concept. Andre Beaufre (1902-75) and Raymond Aron (1905-83) further qualify these definitions:

Deterrence tends to prevent an adverse power from deciding to use its weaponry or, more generally, from acting or reacting to a given situation due to the availability of a set of devices that pose a sufficient threat. Therefore, what is sought with this threat is a psychological result (BEAUFRE, 1966, p. 35).

To be dissuaded means to prefer the result of inaction than the result from the action if it were to bring about the expected consequences in terms of international relations, the execution of an implicit or explicit threat. A state will be all the more sensitive to deterrence the more it believes in the adversary’s will to execute the threat; the greater the damage caused by such execution, and the more acceptable the inaction alternative seems (ARON, 2002, p. 519).

Therefore, the purpose of deterrence is to reduce and/or inhibit the use of force by an adversary, so that he considers the imposition of our will acceptable. It is noteworthy that it does not depend simply on the military power of a state, but on a combination of factors, actions,
and attitudes resulting from its national power. This is how one can better understand the breadth of the concept. It is interesting to note that its meaning remains current; the way it is used in the existing types of conflicts is what changes.

The relationship between cooperation and deterrence is presented when states seek to use them in combination to maximize results and gains in their national strategies for seeking absolute and relative gains and thus achieving more power in the international system. In the words of former Brazilian Chancellor Celso Amorim meant to characterize the Brazilian position within the cooperation x deterrence dialectic: “If the Brazilian attitude will be of deterrence to the rest of the world, it should be of cooperation among its neighbors [...]. Cooperation is the best deterrent between friendly states.” By comparing two concepts so distinct in their meanings, Amorim strives to unite deterrence and cooperation in the same strategy. Deterrence, for when collective security systems fail, and national interests need to be protected. And cooperation in seeking to minimize the difficulties in planning the defense conditions for friendly states and the tendency to postpone possibilities for deepening regional security mechanisms.

The use of cooperation and deterrence as different strategies that can be conceived in combination was proposed by Nye in the book “Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics” (2004). In it, the concept of politics on the international stage is proposed as follows:

The ability to set preferences tends to be associated with intangible parameters, such as an appeal to personality, culture, values, and political institutions. Politics are perceived as a legitimate or moral authority. [...] States can achieve the results they seek in world politics (when) other states admire their values and follow their example (Nye, 2004, p. 5).

In “The Future of Power” (2012), a much later book, Nye defines power simultaneously as a source of resources, both tangible and intangible, and the result of behavioral postures. In this conception, “military power” and “economic power” (bases of the so-called “hard power”) combine both resources and behaviors, underlining the importance of power conversion as a key variable in the pursuit of
efficiency and effectiveness of states in achieving their national objectives. Their intended results, rather than the resources available, must be at the heart of the concerns of government strategists.

Power is also defined concerning relational aspects. On the one hand, it manifests itself by imposing behaviors and outcomes through threats and rewards; on the other, by controlling the action agenda that limits the strategic choices of those suffering their actions; and, finally, in the ability to shape the beliefs and perceptions of partners or opponents (NYE, 2012). Soft power is more present in the last two relational aspects of power. While the hard power is more closely linked to the first.

In seeking to combine the joint performance of these types of power, Nye (2012, p. 14) presents the concept of smart power as “the combination of hard power with the soft power of persuasion and attraction,” which, in other words, means integrating networks of diplomacy, defense, development, and soft and hard power tools into a winning strategy. He adds that “a 21st-century intelligent power narrative is not about maximizing power or preserving hegemony, but about finding ways to combine resources into successful strategies in the new context of power diffusion and the emergence of new centers or vanishing points in the international system, identified by him as the “rise of the rest” (NYE, 2012, p. 262).

These concepts serve as a basis for a strategy that requires the synthesis of liberal-institutional and neorealist theories, as they observe the world at all levels, encompassing internal and external conjunctures to understand how power is exercised with and over other states.

Therefore, besides the military and economic aspects, the smart power must encompass other areas that, if properly considered, may lead to a more interdependent and cooperative relationship between states to obtain absolute and relative gains. These areas are:

a) **alliances, partnerships, and institutions** – the state’s commitment to international organizations and the establishment of alliances with traditional states and partners;

b) **global development** – directly related to the state’s capacity for action in promoting other states’ economic, political, and social development. The development of the donor state intending to apply construction strategies based on smart power is, therefore, mandatory;

c) **public diplomacy** – corresponds to the firm and transparent performance of the state’s diplomatic organs together with its open
dialogue with public opinion, both internally and externally. This is one of the most complex areas and an important source of soft power;

d) **economic integration** – the most sensitive area of all within the smart power construction strategy, since it is in the economy that the greatest competitions and divergences are perceived between the developed and developing states. It is, thus, directly linked to the maintenance of the guidelines of a hegemonic state. Economic integration must produce situations that enable the meeting of individual business needs of a state, while also attending to the entirety of benefits that can be generated for the entire international community.

e) **innovation and technology** – are closely linked to how a state can build its international power through investments in new energy arrays, high technology, and high added value equipment, to support national and international development. (ARMITAGE; NYE, 2007) (AYRES PINTO, 2011).

*Smart power* strategies should be able to bring about changes in power policies between states. What will allow states to be a reference to others will be a power of cooptation based on absolute gains that also reflected in considerable relative gains, so as to spend fewer resources on purely coercive (and always expensive) strategies, and more in resources allocated into cooperation (less expensive than the former). Thinking about power today goes beyond maintaining the *status quo* of a coercive leader who, with power above others, ends up forcing them into submission, probably at an unacceptable cost to himself.

It is with such theoretical foundation – here summarized in a spirit of synthesis – that FHC’s, Lula’s, and Rousseff’s administration foreign policies from 1995 to 2016 are analyzed.


In both FHC’S mandates, foreign policies sought to establish universalist, non-exclusionary partnerships that could strengthen the country’s position in multilateral forums. Central countries were the most sought after for these alliances in North-South cooperation. However, the search for more autonomy, especially in the second half of his second term, given the negative external conjuncture of Brazil as a de facto, and not only discursively relevant player in the international system, has made
new regional partnerships effective, mainly the ones with MERCOSUR; African countries, both bilaterally and through the CPLP; as well as others from the South-South axis, such as Asian countries.

In this context, the proposal for the creation of the CPLP, which dates back to the first meeting held between Portuguese-speaking Heads of State and Government, in November 1989, in São Luís do Maranhão, under the initiative of President Sarney (1985-90), received strong encouragement from the Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal, José Aparecido de Oliveira (1992-95). Thus, in July 1996, the CPLP was founded at the First Conference of Portuguese-speaking Heads of State and Government in Lisbon. Although not a major priority issue of FHC’s first term, even during the most bilateral and liberal moments of its foreign policy, there has always been an African policy within the MFA (BRAZIL, 2014a).

This community is a privileged forum for deepening relations between member states that benefit from common historical, ethnic, and cultural ties. The CPLP focuses its actions on three general objectives: political-diplomatic concertation, cooperation in all areas, and the promotion and diffusion of the Portuguese language. Within the political conciliation framework, the coordination of positions in multilateral forums was emphasized, as well as the cooperation in the electoral sector, including through joint observer missions during member state elections. In technical cooperation, it is noteworthy that the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP), together with Timor-Leste, are currently the main recipients of Brazilian cooperation, which has prioritized training in the areas of professional education, food security, agriculture, health, and institutional strengthening, among others (BRAZIL, 2014a).

Brazil’s presence in the CPLP can be perceived from two perspectives: the first, in its use to project Brazilian interests abroad, seeking to maximize all possible existing resources, including the occupation of larger spaces than other states in the nations of that community; and, the second, because it infers that Brazilian foreign policy acts jointly with the CPLP in meeting world interests impossible to obtain individually (MIYEMOTO, 2009).

These Brazilian perspectives for CPLP are present in Keohane and Nye’s (1998) analysis of the complex interdependence, where the authors state that an interdependent relationship is a relationship between mutually dependent actors. This does not mean that such relations are symmetrical. Asymmetries can be counterbalanced not only by hard power
but by the state’s ability to balance its vulnerabilities and sensitivities at the multiple levels of international politics.

It is noteworthy that the Portuguese-speaking states have always received attention from the Brazilian state, although it was not always a priority in Itamaraty’s agenda. Former Chancellor Lampreia’s speech during the opening of the CPLP Ministerial Conference in 1998 is a good example of that:

“By holding this meeting here in Salvador, we wanted to unambiguously demonstrate how much we are committed to making the CPLP, gradually but effectively, a diplomatic reality, a force for all of us, to help us better design and defend our common international interests based on consensus” (LAMPREIA, 1999, p. 8).

However, although the relations with this Community were considered of utmost importance, under the political; economic; cultural; and maritime defense and security biases during the first, and much of the second term of FHC’s administration, they did not move towards higher priorities. and intensifications.

The institutionalization of the CPLP in 1996 and the rapprochement with post-apartheid South Africa are initiatives that illustrate Cardoso’s selectivity with Africa, which nevertheless contributed to closer trade relations and political concertation between the states. Thus, Brazilian cooperative actions with Africa were pragmatic and had greater commercial prominence with Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa, in continuity of a pattern already presented during Itamar Franco’s administration (1993-94), when Cardoso was his chancellor (MENDONÇA JR., 2014). In the words of FHC, as Franco’s chancellor (1993, p. 317): “[...] the insistence or promotion of relations with African countries would have been a mistake, having served only for the Brazilian military to assert an alleged hegemony in the South Atlantic, with Brazil gaining nothing in economic terms.”

FHC shifted positions more specifically in the second half of his second term, where South-South cooperation was driven by a change in his foreign policy endorsed by the assumption of Chancellor Lafer, as well as internal and external conjunctures. As a result, there was greater
diversification of partnerships and resources for developing countries in a “new” model of international insertion.

As a forum, CPLP grew a lot even before that, especially in the maritime defense and security area. Since the beginning of FHC’s administration, there have been five CPLP defense ministers’ meetings. At the II Meeting of Ministers of Defense of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, held in Praia (Cape Verde), on May 25, 1999, the Permanent Secretariat for Defense Affairs (SPAD, from the Portuguese “Secretariado Permanente para os Assuntos da Defesa”) was created, including representatives of the Ministers of Defense and also the Generals Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the countries concerned. Eleven SPAD meetings were held from 1999-2002 to propose practical measures in this area. At the Fifth Meeting of Defense Ministers, held in May 2002 in Lisbon, the Statute of the Center for Strategic Analysis for CPLP’s Defense Affairs – CAE/CPLP was approved. CAE (from the Portuguese “Centro de Análise Estratégica” – or Strategic Analysis Center, in English) is headquartered in Maputo and has subsidiary nuclei in all other capitals of the Member States (DIONISIO DA SILVA, 2015).

Cooperation via CPLP is based on institutional instruments that are pillars for the security and defense dynamics, namely: Meeting of Ministers of National Defense, Meeting of Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, Meeting of Directors of National Defense Policy, Meeting of Directors of Military Intelligence Services, the Center for Strategic Analysis, and the Permanent Secretariat for Defense Affairs (SPAD), all of those relevant during FHC’s administration.

Relevant in Africa’s defense and security, FHC’s government followed up with what was done during Franco’s administration in 1994, by signing the military-naval cooperation agreement with Namibia, which practically made the Brazilian Naval Mission operational in that country. The Mission’s main objective was: “the creation and strengthening of the Namibian Ministry of Defense Naval Wing.” In 2001, it took place the formalization of a new agreement that expanded Brazil’s assignments in the institutional and operational establishment of the Namibian navy. However, it can be said that this cooperation agreement was a spasm largely due to the naval diplomacy exercised by the Brazilian Navy regarding defense and security in the continent. FHC’s administration did not direct any actions of similar relevance towards CPLP Member States during his government, despite demands presented at various Defense meetings. There was a lack of a greater protagonism and political will.
In 2002, with this shift in the foreign policy paradigm, Africa managed to match the number of cooperation projects and resources destined to the South American continent. A strategy to promote greater visibility and leadership together with the bordering countries of the West African coast can be perceived, even if still insipient given the potential and assertiveness presented mainly throughout the 1970s and 1980s (PUENTE, 2010).

Therefore, FHC’s foreign policy can be summarized as being, at first, mainly focused on an emerging country policy based on the implementation of a late and milder neoliberalism than that implemented throughout Latin America, and also on the participation in almost all international forums, especially those whose members carried greater systemic relative power. Subsequently, at the end of his government, close to the second half of his second term, there was a shift to a more autonomous line that approached an “autonomy for diversification”. The African countries that most benefited from this change were those inside CPLP; Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa. In this political context, despite these changes, the formulation of a smart strategy was carried out without major investments, based on what the “new world order” had established – participation in its international organizations aiming for a prominent place in the international system. This imperfect strategy was altered by belatedly contemplating a storm of external shocks that transformed the praised “beneficial globalization” into the called “asymmetric globalization”.

FHC’s administration relatively cared for three adjacent smart power strategic areas where CPLP’s prominence was tangible: a) **alliances, partnerships, and institutions** – with support for CPLP’s creation and institutionalization together with the establishment of cooperation agreements with these countries, in addition to the emphasis on regional integration – mostly sought after in MERCOSUR; b) **global development** – which could be perceived through the aid provided for development of the recipient countries of the South-South cooperation, especially late in his government, however very selectively regarding South American countries, the PALOP and in MERCOSUR’s and CPLP’s institutionality; and c) **public diplomacy** – intensified by the personality of the president who exercised the presidential diplomacy as to contribute to Brazil’s persuasion in the international system.

The following quote from an interview by President FHC, as he reflects on Weberian thinking in politics, ultimately helps to reflect his
thinking, which may have influenced the changes in his foreign policy over the two terms: “[they] change in small parts”.

“If you imagine they are big structures, and that they change because they break, then you will be stuck as you are waiting for the forces to build up. But if you have a more Weberian view, which is not so, then you can imagine that you can induce a short-circuit and that things don’t necessarily change in their entirety, they change in small parts, and that these changes that are not seen globally are important. Anyway, this all has influenced me a lot” (CARDOSO, 2010, p. 27).

**LULA’S ADMINISTRATION (2003-2010)**

The “autonomy for diversification” was presented as the main foreign policy directive at the very beginning of Lula’s administration, which can be exemplified in his words, when Chancellor Celso Amorim took office:

“Our foreign policy cannot be confined to a single region, nor can it be confined to a single dimension. Brazil can and should contribute to the construction of a peaceful and solidary world order, founded on the law and principles of multilateralism, aware of its demographic, territorial, economic, and cultural relevance, and of being a great democracy in the process of social transformation. Brazil will act without inhibition in the various international, regional, and global forums [...] We will forge alliances with major developing countries. We will strengthen the dialogue with China, Russia, India, Mexico, and South Africa, among others. We will develop, including through partnerships with other countries and organizations, greater cooperation with African countries. **We will value cooperation within the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP),** including East Timor, its newest member. In Lula’s Government, South America will be our priority.
Our relationship with Argentina is the foundation for the construction of MERCOSUR, whose vitality and dynamism we will strive to rescue” (SILVA, 2003, p. 57-58, emphasis added).

Visentini argues that, in practical terms, the Brazilian government effectively superseded some passivity of the previous government and sought alliances outside the hemisphere to expand its influence in the international sphere. Agenda priorities included the revaluation of MERCOSUR and South American integration, solidarity with Africa, associated with ethical principles and national interest, and the deepening of relations with emerging powers such as China, India, Russia, and South Africa in pursuit of strategic partnerships. Lula also sought to value international institutions to contribute to the organization of a multipolar and multilateral international system. “The principle of democratization of international relations had been explicitly invoked” (VISENTINI, 2007, p. 90).

Cervo and Bueno (2008) highlight the strengthening of the country’s role as an international negotiator, the sovereign defense of national interests, the alliance with emerging countries, and the non-subservient cooperative dialogue with advanced countries and other international forums. According to Pecequilo (2008), Brazil’s international relations were based on the diversification of South-South and North-North cooperation, with active participation in several relevant international forums and institutions such as the G20, IBSA, IMF, and BRICS summit, Brazil’s participation as a force commander in the United Nations Peace Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the Guinea-Bissau Peacebuilding Commission in 2010, the mediation of sensitive issues regarding Iran’s nuclear proliferation and in political instability in South America.

The establishment of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and its Defense Council (CDS), the claims to occupy a permanent seat in the UNSC, and the attempt to reinvigorate the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) (with support from African countries, especially Angola, South Africa, and the PALOP) represented qualitative leaps in foreign and defense policies aiming at closer economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation within the South Atlantic, keeping it free of nuclear weapons., as opposed to the presence of the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) in the South Atlantic.
Additionally, one of the most important achievements of its foreign policy was the “return to Africa” as an important axis of Brazilian foreign relations. Despite some criticism from researchers and politicians towards this option, as they believed Brazil would be fomenting diplomatic efforts towards poorer countries with limited influence in the context of international politics, economy, and geopolitics, it is important to note that, to garner greater influence and power in the international system, it is fundamental to hold not only economic power but also political, social, psychosocial, and military power. These trends need to be assessed regarding these aspects.

Throughout the 1990s, the first decade of the 21st century, and nowadays, Africa has been – and continues to be – one of the world’s fastest-growing regions, motivated by the increasing democratization of its countries, as well as the establishment of better governance actions in the pursuit of political, economic, social, as well as defense and security development. As a capital and technology exporter and a traditional exporter of primary products, services, and manufactures, Brazil has invested in its development, but can yet invest much more through its companies, in demand not only from the countries in its strategic surroundings but to promote its own economic and strategic interests. The internationalization of national companies is an important geopolitical strategy in the search for systemic space and power (VIOLANTE, 2017).

CPLP proved its relevance throughout Lula’s administration. Brazil had greater participation in hosting meetings and forums of this Community. The country started hosting meetings of CPLP bodies only in 2001 and 2002. It also hosted important meetings of the CPLP in 2003, 2006, and 2010 (DIONISIO DA SILVA, 2015).

Brazil’s greater attention to this international forum has satisfactorily responded to the historical conduct of Brazilian foreign policy that favors cooperation over conflict. The president also raised CPLP’s strategic importance, according to his speech at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and Government, held in Sao Tome and Principe in July 2004:

“The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries is more than a space for fraternization among sister peoples. It is an initiative of high strategic value, whose range embraces four continents. We are eight countries with a population of 230 million
committed to democracy and social justice. [...] The CPLP is gaining international voice and personality. It is now a mature organization, capable of reacting readily to crises. It enjoys the prestige of an institution dedicated to the prevention of conflicts and tension [...]” (BRASIL, 2007b, p. 65).

The Brazilian government funded almost the entire Fifth Meeting of CPLP Ministers of Labor and Social Affairs, held in September 2004 in Praia, Cape Verde. This shift in focus towards African states and CPLP Member States was also perceived in other opportunities, such as in the proposition of agreements between MERCOSUR and CPLP, except for Portugal, to favor economic exchanges and the products trade (MIYEMOTO, 2009). In this case, Portugal’s exclusion of Portugal was pragmatic due to its part in the European Union.

Some facts have corroborated the growth in the importance of this entity within the maritime and naval-military context. The first was the holding of the III CPLP Navy Symposium in Rio de Janeiro, which had as its core subject “The guarantee of maritime defense and security at national, regional, and global levels, aiming at the cooperation between the navies of the countries concerned”. During this event, the federal government administration committed to considering ways through which BNDES could finance the sale of equipment and systems to CPLP’s navies through the Empresa Gerencial de Projetos Navais (EMGEPRON).

In this context, due to economic dynamism and integration processes, such as MERCOSUR, UNASUR, and CPLP, the South Atlantic acquired great economic and strategic prominence, mainly due to its control of large amounts of living and non-living resources. Inserted in CPLP’s geographical area there are the Campos Basin and the Pre-salt layer in Brazil, Cabinda in Angola, and the Gulf of Guinea, where Sao Tome e Principe is located. At the same time, the Indian and Pacific oceans that bathe East Timor and Mozambique are prominent areas in the world geopolitics (BEIRÃO; PEREIRA, 2012).

Within the greater assertion of CPLP as an international organization, CPLP’s strategy for the oceans was created in March 2010 at the First Meeting of Ministers responsible for maritime affairs. Its adoption derived from the political will of its Member States, which together have more than 7.5 million km² (2.9 million sq. mi) of vast oceanic areas. This
strategy aims, among other things, to ensure better management and sustainable exploitation of the oceans; to promote the establishment of marine protection areas; the maritime security and surveillance with the interconnection of control, monitoring and information systems; search and rescue areas; weather monitoring; to combat illegal fishing and various types of trafficking (including human and drugs trafficking); among others, while always seeking to maintain the sovereignty and jurisdiction of its Member States. It is worth mentioning the increase in research and scientific knowledge through agreements and cooperation activities that occurred in the intensification of political-diplomatic concertation at the international level that took place through the creation of specific mechanisms, especially during this period (CPLP, 2012).

Although developments in technical cooperation regarding security and defense were perceived, there is a need to improve the security conditions of coastal states members of the community. Such countries have received increasing attention at meetings, albeit CPLP was not created based on defense and security pillars, as was NATO.

Despite statutory limitations, defense and security could enjoy expanded cooperation, whether through a greater exchange of experiences, the purchase of equipment, or, more specifically, the training of civilian and military personnel to be employed by their states in strategic and defense tasks. These were Amorim’s thoughts in a lecture on “The Defense Policy of a Peaceful Country” when expressing the lines of action, he had taken as a Chancellor (2003-10) and Minister of Defense (2011-2014):

“Brazil’s immediate geopolitical environment is made up of South America and the South Atlantic, reaching to the west coast of Africa. We must build a true ‘goodwill belt’ with these regions that will guarantee our security and enable us to proceed unhindered on the path of development. This is already taking place. Brazil would like to build a ‘security community’ around us, in the sense given to this expression by political scientist Karl Deutsch, that is, a set of countries between which war becomes an unthinkable expedient” (AMORIM, 2012, p. 8).
These assertions, however, do not prevent Member States from choosing to adapt the provisions of the CPLP and its national constitutions to the possibility of employing other states’ armed forces in typical defense actions, such as patrolling, or in other permanent actions within their jurisdictional waters and Exclusive Economic Zones, relativizing their sovereignty to a certain extent. As an important discretionary example, it is noteworthy that Brazil has contributed to Lebanon’s maritime security through the UNIFIL Multinational Task Force under the mandate of the United Nations (UN), since, as pointed out by Beirão and Pereira (2012), the Brazilian constitution does not allow the sharing of Brazilian sovereignty or the sending of armed forces for permanent activities, except under the aegis of the UN.

Notwithstanding the limitations of these country’s national constitutions, it is worth remembering that Portugal is a current member of NATO, which constitutes an impeding factor for the explicit achievement of CPLP’s status of defense and security entity because it could lead to the interference of an extra-regional military alliance within the South Atlantic.

During this period, Brazil’s defense cooperation with Namibia was strengthened, in continuity with what was established in previous governments, with the maintenance and increase of the Brazilian Naval Mission, which had, among its various assignments, the task of assisting in the creation of the Namibian Navy. Other talks were held aimed at the creation of other Naval Missions, mainly through Defense Minister Jobim in Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe. However, despite the advances presented here, many Lula’s, Amorim’s and Jobim’s wishes ended up reflecting more the rhetorics than the actions of a country that aims to become an actual regional leader in its strategic surroundings, especially in Africa, via CPLP – the object of study of this article.

As a counterpoint, while comparing Cardoso’s and Lula’s foreign policies, Barbosa (2011) criticizes the so-called partisanship of the Brazilian foreign policy. According to him, the interests and program of the Workers Party (PT) were ahead of national interests. The author states that his policy had positive aspects, such as: a) the elevation of subjects from low politics to high politics; b) the growth in cooperation and institutionalization of the BRICS through a Brazilian proposal; c) the creation of the G-20; and d) the opening of new embassies in Africa and the strengthening of the CPLP. He adds that these measures were only possible due to the economic, political, and institutional stability achieved...
during Cardoso’s administration and continued by Lula, who added his personality and charisma to it.

Freixo (2015) refutes the arguments of a partisanship/ideologization of the Brazilian foreign policy, “as if there could be any politics devoid of ideology, or that fails to reflect the worldview of the sectors represented in the government and the state bureaucracy”. He adds that the formulation of foreign policies is still very restricted to the designs of the President, his most direct advisors, the bureaucracy of the Itamaraty, and its varied nuances.

Regarding Lula’s African policy, Barbosa (2015) states that the South-South priorities regarding the subcontinent and Africa did not deliver the expected success in placing Brazil as a global player. In this sense, in the same column of the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, Spektor (2015) voices his disagreement by stating that the foreign policies of the two Presidents were more convergent than divergent, except for the “tactical changes” arising from the international conjuncture and the differences in tone and emphasis, but within a common foothold: “The social democracy external project”. For the author, despite the two policies’ “brutal differences in style, the change took place on the sidelines.”

Within more changes than continuities, this time of foreign policy can be considered as an increment to IEP core principles by seeking to deny the existence of ideological boundaries and encourage the multiplication of partnerships. According to Rizzi (2014), these relations in Africa encompassed not only the powerful PALOP but also small countries, which showcased a more inclusive cooperation policy, although still with some selectivity.

Finally, from the point of view of a smart strategy application, Lula’s government has put more emphasis on four of the five adjacent areas of smart power:

a) alliances, partnerships, and institutions – mainly in regional integration processes, including the countries bordering Africa and the South Atlantic as a platform for commercial insertion and maritime strategy, which can be highlighted with greater assertiveness and presence in the CPLP, in addition to the many presidential and ministerial visits to traditional and emerging partners. Building an Atlantic regional integration takes time, political will and financial resources. The same is true regarding CPLP countries’ demands related to maritime safety; b) global development – it could be seen in the development aid offered to southern countries, in cooperative actions that were not restricted to, but
prioritized the Southern Cone countries and the PALOP, either bilaterally or via CPLP; **c) economic integration** – highlighted by trade issues related to CPLP countries; and **d) public diplomacy** – one of the high points of his administration, especially with the charisma of his presidential diplomacy and the increase in cooperation on the vertical and horizontal axes, especially with South America and Africa.

**ROUSSEFF’S ADMINISTRATION (2011-16)**

When she rose to the presidency in January 2011, replacing Celso Amorim with Antônio Patriota as her Chancellor assigned to the Defense portfolio, many expectations arose regarding the directions, continuity or changes, that would be taken by the new BFP.

Some BFP authors and analysts see Rousseff’s foreign policy as a continuity of Lula’s; others pay more attention to shifts in its course of action that have resulted in a sort of decline from the greater assertive stance adopted previously, not only through presidential diplomacy but by the issues advocated by Lula’s government in the international sphere.

As a continuation, there was a priority regarding Brazil’s integration with developing states, especially in MERCOSUR, UNASUR, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and CPLP. It is noteworthy that these institutionalization processes were initiated by Sarney, continued by FHC, and intensified by Lula (VISENTINI, 2015). However, there was a lack of greater assertiveness towards new processes and projects. Rousseff chose to follow up with the measures initiated in the eight years of the previous government, not to mention the lack of public diplomacy based on an inexistent presidential diplomacy, as observed during the two administrations that preceded Lula’s.

According to Saraiva (2016), Rousseff’s foreign policy has dedicated more attention to Brazil-Africa relations than it has moved toward building a political and strategic identity in the subcontinent. Concerning the BRICS, the Declaration of Fortaleza, signed on July 15, 2014, at the end of the 6th Summit, reaffirmed the principles of the coalition’s international action aimed at a significant change in pro-multipolarity and multilaterality within the international system. This event announced the creation of a Development Bank – namely the BRICS Bank – with a starting capital of US$ 100 billion and headquartered in Shanghai. It is also relevant to state that, at this summit, meetings with African countries also
took place, especially with the PALOP, as well as meetings with the eleven South American presidents. This was intended to extend cooperation to these regions, especially regarding infrastructure projects.

According to Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007), Rousseff’s diplomacy was contradictory, as it sought to consolidate multilateralism and multipolarity in international relations while, at the same time, there was a sharp decrease in presidential travels compared to the two previous presidents. The decrease in travel activity also affected senior officials and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) at conferences, summits, meetings, and the drafting of new agreements and partnerships with other states. The “Autonomy for diversification” took place, but more within specific actions and those already developed by the previous government. In this regard, the calls for reform at the UNSC and at the UN itself have been weakened.

According to Cornetet (2014), Rousseff’s foreign policy portrayed a “contention in continuity”. The opening and maintenance of embassies and other diplomatic offices abroad also presented a downward slant. Visits to the African continent were greatly reduced. The PALOP was the most contemplated within this “new” context (OLIVEIRA, 2015).

For Lessa (2015), Cervo and Lessa (2016), Freixo (2016), and Saraiva (2014), the decline in many of her actions had as main factors: a) the weakening of the internal dialogue between the internal political actors and other segments of society, which motivated the major protests of 2013; b) the political-institutional crisis, already drafted at the end of Rousseff’s first term, and accelerated by the fierce presidential dispute of 2014; c) the lack of measures to make up for the fall in revenue and the increase in the public deficit, which caused a breach of trust in the government by domestic and foreign investors/entrepreneurs; d) the internal and external economic crises; e) external shocks related to the so-called “Arab Spring”, which lessened the Brazilian presence in the region, and the 2013 NSA espionage crisis, leading to a certain distancing from the US, following a closer approach initiated early in her first term; f) the asymmetry in relations with China, especially in the trade of numerous manufactured goods with low added value, together with commodity exports at prices much lower than those charged in the previous decade; and f) the president’s lack of interest in foreign policy matters, among others.

More specifically to the CPLP, the Brazilian effort to reinforce cooperation with the Member States was emphasized by the renewal of its commitment to this international organization through the traditional
friendship between Brazil and Africa. These actions have always sought to respect the domestic law of states and international law.

They led to the maintenance of the Brazilian Naval Mission in Namibia, including the signing of a new defense cooperation agreement in 2014. This model of cooperation is understood by the ERM as fully successful, not only in cooperation but also strategically and was eventually expanded into the creation of new Naval Missions centers at Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, CPLP Member States.

In 2013, the defense cooperation agreement with Cape Verde, initially signed in 1994, was finally ratified by the Brazilian National Congress. Amorim, Rousseff’s Minister of Defense between 2011 and 2014, through letter 11422/2012 / MD, highlighted that the military-technical cooperation with Cape Verde was one of the defense priorities for the strengthening of ZOPACAS and CPLP. Thus, Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto, then Commander of the Navy, created by Ordinance No. 444, of 12/08/2013, the Brazilian Naval Mission Nucleus in Cape Verde (NMNBCV), which received the following assignments:

I. surveying Cape Verde Coast Guard’s actual needs with the purpose of preparing a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;
II. managing the human, material, and asset resources under its responsibility;
III. advising the Brazilian Ambassador to Cape Verde on matters under the responsibility of the Nucleus (BRASIL, 2013, p. 1).

The creation of the Marines Technical Advisory Group in Sao Tome and Principe (GAT-FN-STP) also met the precepts outlined in the National Defense Policy (NDP) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Their assignments have contributed to a strategic approach, maritime safety in the strategic environment, and a doctrinal influence for the achievement of national political and strategic objectives.

These cooperative actions in defense are well evaluated by the Ministry of Defense and its counterpart in Sao Tome and Principe. The Commander of the Sao Tome and Principe Marines Unit himself, the First Lieutenant (FN) Tomé Salvador Amaral de Sousa, reminds of Mahan in
affirming that, in the embryonic moment taking place in the cooperation for the Santomean defense, “there’s nothing better than the formation and qualification of the men and, later, the provision of adequate means to those trained men” “[...] means can be amassed in a short space of time, but men cannot”. He adds that, through the GAT-FN-STP, the current stage of this cooperation is very positive and “[...] that for the future, in front of the Coast Guard and its desired objectives (training, career paths, construction and structuring of a base), the acquisition of “Brazilian military assets and equipment will be indispensable” (VIOLANTE, 2017).

From the establishment of the GAT-FN-STP, in a continuum during 2014, the Brazilian Navy Commander founded the Brazilian Naval Mission Nucleus in Sao Tome and Principe (MNBSTP), through Ordinance No. 533/MB of 10 November 2014, with the following attributions:

I surveying STP Coast Guard’s actual needs with the purpose of preparing a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;
II monitoring and supporting the activities of the Marine Technical Support Group in Sao Tome and Principe, reporting to the Nucleus;
III managing the human, material, and asset resources under its responsibility; and
IV advising the Brazilian Ambassador to Sao Tome and Principe on matters under the responsibility of the Nucleus (BRASIL, 2014b, p. 1).

It can be said that, as part of the foreign policy aimed at maintaining the priority for South-South cooperation, the defensive technical cooperation with the CPLP Member States was the strong point of a declining continuity in this form of political-strategic insertion of combining persuasion with the reinforcement of deterrence with countries within the strategic environment.

In an analysis of the smart strategy applied, it can be stated that Rousseff continued previous governments’ projects, with differences on emphasis, mainly in the following areas: a) **alliances, partnerships, and institutions** – multilateral forums, such as the G-20, BRICS, IBSA, CPLP, UNASUR, and MERCOSUR were still valued, but the decrease on presidential and first-tier government visits to traditional and emerging
partners did not require more representative actions. The exception can be pointed at the continuation of defense cooperation such as the PALOP, much due to a desire of the Brazilian Navy and the permanence of Chancellor Amorim, who had served under Lula’s administration and was Minister of Defense from 2011 to 2014; b) global development – South-South cooperation project numbers shrunk from 2012/2013. Priorities were maintained in geographical areas established mainly under the previous government, such as the CPLP Member States in Africa and South America; c) economic integration – can be perceived through the assertiveness of the BRICS in the international scenario. The creation of the BRICS Bank is a good example of this, except for the greater international relevance of China and Russia, much more prominent than Brazil’s. The continued, even if inertial, participation in international organizations related to the African continent, such as the CPLP; d) public diplomacy – MFA has faced a decrease in its travels and representativeness in various meetings, forums, and in the formulation of new agreements/partnerships. Rousseff’s presidential diplomacy hardly existed.

After analyzing the foreign policies of the three governments having the CPLP as the focus point, it can be stated that, in a comparative and strategic analysis, Brazil sought to participate assertively in the CPLP, in spite of the priorities and selectivities of each of the analyzed administrations. Given their rhetoric, very little has been done within an insertion policy through the globalization and multilateralization of their international relations, based on their (soft and hard power) capabilities.

Common economic and strategic opportunities in the “sea that belongs to us” could be better exploited, as meeting CPLP Member States’ demands such as the marine spatial planning, the maritime security, and the exploitation of living and non-living resources through related maritime policies is also of interest to the Brazilian state.

Moreover, National Defense cannot be separated from foreign policy. Actions in Namibia and, more strictly, in Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe are positive in combining disparate concepts of deterrence and cooperation into one smart strategy. This feasibility is confirmed, as stated by Figueiredo (2015, p. 62):

“Power and politics must be linked to national independence, which in turn is linked to defense and development, just as it can be said that true
development does not take place without credible systems of defense. Development and defense are concepts that cannot be thought separately."

However, it has been found that over these twenty years, there have been some economic and strategic spasms that, in face of the need for greater political will and greater financial resources, have inhibited good initiatives in Africa and, more specifically, within the CPLP.

**FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

In terms of its global guidelines, the Brazilian foreign policies during the period under inspection privileged relations with emerging states aiming at its prominence in the international system. Such policies were based, on the one hand, on understanding the changes that occurred in the international relations system after the end of the Cold War (1945 – 1991). On the other hand, in search of a more autonomous foreign policy, on a context of rearrangement of the international system, conducive to the rise of new (average) powers in the world scenario. Under these circumstances, Brazilian foreign policies, in general, aimed at building bridges with emerging countries, devoted particular attention to African countries, especially Portuguese-speaking countries – PALOP –, and the CPLP, as an international organization.

Greater emphasis on relations with Africa came at the end of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s second term, gaining even more assertiveness during Lula’s administration and much of the Rousseff’s administration. The persistence of this policy has boosted Brazil’s more active participation in the Atlantic border, notably, *et pour cause*, in the CPLP.

Foreign policies concerning the CPLP in the period did not lead to the establishment of military alliances that would improve Member States’ maritime security levels in their jurisdictional waters, not least because the constitution of the community did not regard this objective as one of its purposes. Indeed, the possibility of military alliances within the framework of the CPLP was not even considered, but there were maneuvers towards the creation of a “security community” in the sense Deutsch (2015) gave to it in 1957 in the book *“Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience”*, that means, not to conceive that a neighboring state can be
an enemy simply because it exists and that the development of a common identity, motivated by social, political, economic, psychosocial, and such connections, results in a sense of belonging that makes war with these countries unthinkable.

There was knowledge (and awareness) that the development of a military alliance between the countries of the community would encounter difficulties, perhaps unavoidable, given the probable interference of extra-regional powers, together with the fact that Portugal’s status as a member of NATO cannot be disregarded. This did not, however, prevent Brazil from concluding bilateral defense cooperation agreements with Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, being installed in these countries Naval Mission Nuclei. These agreements were negotiated during Lula’s administration and implemented during Rousseff’s administration. There are currently no data and elements available to assess whether Brazilian foreign policy will expand these agreements. It can be assumed that such an expansion would allow the development of a logistical and deterrent belt, which would require the strengthening of the hard power not only in Brazil but in the other CPLP Member States to geographically oppose the belt of islands present in the South Atlantic, which is directly or indirectly controlled by extra-regional powers.

Notwithstanding all that has already been done to bring Brazil closer to the CPLP, there is much more to do: Brazilian initiatives are below what could be perceived as privileged relations. There is a lack of studies to support the expansion of the integration and complementarity processes among the member states of the community, not only regarding their economic value but also their high strategic value. This community has a range of action that encompasses four continents.

Coordinated and attuned policies, through cooperation in the civil and military areas, can generate not only further development but also greater roles in the international system.

On the Brazilian side, it is not enough to rely on the rhetoric of countries with the same language and intersecting historical roots. Policies should be in a place that can well assess the trends of power in the world political system, maximizing available resources and putting into action strategies that emphasize alliances, institutions, and networks in the current context of globalized information. It is not possible to speculate whether Brazil will be a hegemonic actor or a respected player in the international system: achievements never lie in the realm of “wishing
to be”, but within the territory of “being able to”. Success or failure can be empirically measured and analyzed. In the case of CPLP, Brazil has, despite all its drawbacks and obstacles, successfully employed dual-use smart strategy tools, as much in the field of cooperation as in deterrence.

RESUMO

Este artigo tem como objetivo a análise da importância da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP) para o Brasil do ponto de vista estratégico. O esquema analítico propõe duas vertentes, a da cooperação e a da dissuasão. Esta última foi avaliada, em particular, tendo como parâmetro os meios de ações derivadas do fortalecimento institucional que a segurança e defesa requerem frente aos interesses do Estado brasileiro em seu entorno estratégico. A moldura temporal abrangeu o período compreendido entre os anos de 1995 e 2016, na transição das chamadas políticas externas da “autonomia pela participação” no governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso para a da “autonomia pela diversificação” nos governos Lula e Rousseff. A análise concluiu que, sendo ainda insuficiente o poder duro militar brasileiro (hard power), em relação às necessidades que uma liderança regional requer no Atlântico Sul, a estratégia brasileira levou à aplicação de poder brando (soft power) na sua versão poder inteligente (smart power). A investigação teve como base empírica a consulta a documentos históricos e o apoio da literatura pertinente.

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