

GEOPOLITICS, STATE-MAKING, AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN BRAZIL: THE ROLE OF MILITARY POWER AND STRATEGIC PLANNING AT THE HEIGHT OF BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENTALISM

Ricardo Zortea Vieira¹

ABSTRACT

This study is aimed to contribute to the discussion about the causes of the Brazilian experience of institutional evolution and economic development during the “Developmentalist Era”. Our argument is that regional geopolitics and military power, factors ignored in conventional analyses, had a significant impact on the structuring of Brazilian state-making and development policies at a key moment of developmentalism: the Plano de Metas (Goals Plan). To demonstrate this hypothesis, we will reconstitute a tradition of military thought and action rooted in the geopolitics of the La Plata Basin, which linked national defense with economic modernization and political centralization. From the 1930s and 1940s, the evolution of this strategic tradition formed a planning system that articulated doctrines and war hypotheses with military requirements and projects in the economic area. As a demonstration of the functioning and impact of this system, and therefore of the geopolitical variable on Brazilian developmentalism, we will map its performance in projects of the Plano de Metas in the petrochemical, nuclear, shipbuilding, and land transport sectors, as well as in initiatives to obtain external financing. We have found that, in addition to the factors pointed out by the conventional literature, regional geopolitics should be included as one of the causes of Brazilian developmentalism.

Keywords: *State-Making*. Developmentalism. Plano de Metas. Military Power. Geopolitics.

¹ PhD. Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Brazil. Email: ricardozortea2@gmail.com / <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9457-3384>

INTRODUCTION

We currently recognize the importance that war and preparation for war have in state-making and modern economies. In the first case, the European princes' need for personnel and money for their armies led to the overcoming of patrimonialism and vassalage relationships and to the establishment of the modern bureaucratic administration of peoples and territories (Tilly, 1996; Centeno, 2002; Ertman, 1997; Rasler & Thompson, 2012). In the second case, the financial needs of the war led to the creation of modern public debt and taxation systems, and subsequently to strategically-motivated technological innovations and economic development projects (Gerschenkron, 1962; Trebat, 2011; Fiori, 2014; McNeill, 1982). Indeed, even when war does not occur, preparation for war requires the establishment of institutions and policies far beyond the scope of military entities. In this sense, the analysis of strategic planning – defined here as the activity of identifying military threats and formulating plans and projects to neutralize them in the various areas of the state – is a privileged angle of analysis for understanding both the evolution of state institutions and their development policies.

Between the 1930s and 1970s, Brazil underwent a period of intense evolution and institutional complexification of its state structures, a process linked to the editing of development policies largely responsible for converting the country from an agricultural into an industrial economy, which became known as the developmentalist era (Draibe, 1985; Tavares, 1972; Bielschowsky & Mussi, 2013). Even military political action, quite intense in the developmentalist era, is understood to be linked to civil society disputes (Stepan, 1971; Rizzo de Oliveira, 1976; Moraes, 1991), organizational strengthening interests in domestic politics (Carvalho, 2005; Coelho, 2000), or the need to fight internal enemies. As Miguel Centeno mentions in his analysis of Brazilian military thinking:

...beginning in the 1940s, the Brazilian military, and its continental counterparts, emphasize its internal roles, such as economic development and the defense of “national identity.” The threat to national security—a term with increasingly ominous implications in the 1960s—was viewed as internal. This point is critical: the enemy was within (Centeno, 2002, pp. 78-80).

All these perspectives have in common the total lack of importance given to South American interstate geopolitical rivalries as explanatory factors for state-making, editing of development policies, and military political action. This article aimed to demonstrate the impact of South American regional geostrategic rivalry on the institutions, financing mechanisms, and development policies of the Plano de Metas, carried out in the Juscelino Kubitschek Government (1956-1961). The Plano de Metas was chosen because it is one of the milestones of Brazilian developmentalism, and for being a period in which the country was under a democratic and civil government. To achieve our objective, the first section will present the formation, between 1910 and World War II, of a military thinking, and, subsequently, a strategic planning system, which articulated regional geopolitical threats with initiatives in the domestic policy and economic areas. The second section will show, by an analysis of the National Security Doctrine and documents issued by the High Command agencies, how the post-World War II regional external threat remained a reference for the Brazilian Strategic Planning System and was not replaced by an ideological internal threat in the period. Finally, the last section will address the impact of strategic planning, focused on regional geopolitical threats, on some of the key projects of the Plano de Metas in the areas of land transport, shipbuilding, nuclear and oil industry, as well as on the foreign financing of these development initiatives.

REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BRAZILIAN STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

Miguel Centeno argues, because of the internal focus of threats from the perspective of the Latin American military, that the bellicose model of state formation summarized in the introduction would not be valid on the continent. Although Centeno's theses are compatible with much of the Latin American experience, one must note that the continent is geopolitically diverse. Thus, since Independence, the La Plata Basin has been home to an intense regional rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, with a swinging movement in the power equilibrium between these two countries. In the early XXth century, after a long phase of Brazilian dominance in the previous century, Argentina was the region's main military and economic power (Doratioto, 2014; Fiori, 2014; Bandeira, 2010; Nunn, 1983).

One of the first reactions to Argentina's advantage in the regional

race was the sending of Brazilian officers for training in the German Army. Upon their return to Brazil, the officers trained in Germany, or “Young Turks,” and others from the Porto Alegre War Academy, founded in Rio de Janeiro a journal specializing in military matters, called *The National Defense* (ADN – *A Defesa Nacional*). This journal and its officers were very close to the Army Staff (EME – *Estado-Maior do Exército*), the institution’s top management agency, created in 1896 in the process of modernization of ground force. In the 1910s and 1920s, the officers who edited ADN often also served in the EME, as was the case with future presidents Eurico Gaspar Dutra and Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco (McCann, 2009). Other officials who took part in the journal during this period and had an impact on the later developmentalist period were Bertholdo Klinger, Euclides Figueiredo, Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, Mario Travassos, Góes Monteiro, Emílio Medici, and Orlando Geisel (Vieira, 2015).

The Argentine danger was manifested in its terrestrial, naval and, in the 1920s, also aerial, military superiority, and in its economic superiority. This program should be conducted by a politically centralized Organic State, free from the dominance of regional oligarchies and ultimately led by a National Defense Council dominated by the Armed Forces (Vieira, 2015).

Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro was one of the officers linked to ADN who stood out in this period. Although fighting the lieutenants in the 1920s, he was later the military leader of the Revolution of 1930 and major articulator of the notion of military tutelage over national politics (Goes, n/d).

Not surprisingly, the Army High Command reports in the 1930s reflect ADN’s ideas on the issue of acute concern for Argentina as the greatest threat to Brazilian security, and consider economic modernization as a means to address this challenge. As General Valdomiro Lima mentions in his report to the Superior Council of War, which brought together the Army generals:

From this point to Ponta Grossa, there are 602km, which were driven in 1924 by a small legal force with 56 vehicles from 3 to 4 days, despite the poor condition of the roads (...). São Paulo-Rio Grande (Lima, 1936, p. 25-26)”.

To solve this problem, General Lima proposed the modernization of the country, the only way to fight a total war:

“Modern warfare is waged by the Armed Nation, which, along with the considerable mass of personnel it can afford, is forced to expend a formidable amount of material of all kinds. The sciences, the arts, and the industries developed in peacetime must be fully mobilized so that the fighting masses can be given the material resources whose importance and variety exceed any predictions and resources that the old military forces dismissed or were unaware of” (Lima, 1936, p. 29).

After the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1932, and his appointment as Minister of War in 1934, Góes Monteiro started to have sufficient authority within the Army for the military institution to act as an agent within national politics, following the thought elaborated on the ADN pages and incorporated by the High Command. But the biggest step toward establishing military tutelage that would allow Army-sponsored economic modernization programs to be created came with the 1937 Coup by Góes and his great ally (and successor in the Ministry of War) General Eurico Dutra. The 1937 Coup instituted the *Estado Novo* (New State) regime, whose greatest support and guarantor was the High Command itself. In the following years, the Army would include representatives in the bureaucracy who were responsible for coordinating the implementation of the steel industry (Macedo Soares and Silva, 1998), the embryo of the oil industry (Wirth, 1973), and the financing and management scheme for the construction of the national road system (Vieira, 2018).

In short, in the 1930s and 1940s Brazil saw the beginning of the implementation of the geopolitically referenced modernization project elaborated on the ADN pages of the previous two decades. The components of this project were the establishment of an Army-backed regime, the creation of mechanisms for institutional transmission of strategic-military needs to civilian bodies – such as the National Security Council and Castro representatives in various administrative bodies –, and the elaboration and management of projects in the steel, oil, and land transport areas. At the end of the *Estado Novo*, therefore, there was a national strategic planning system that organically linked the assessment of threats to the country, the needs of the Armed Forces, and the projects deemed economically

necessary to support and strengthen the national military power so as to enable it to stand up to national opponents.

THE POST-WAR STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE

In 1945, the Army overthrew the Estado Novo regime that it had instituted eight years earlier. Given the circumstances of the end of the regime, it is not surprising that the institutions that linked military requirements to civil administration were not disjointed. In fact, the opposite happened: During the first democratic government, that of Marshal Eurico Gaspar Dutra, the system responsible for implementing and managing programs in the economic area that increased the country's war potential was strengthened. Thus, in 1946, the decree of creation of the General Staff was issued, which, according to the legal diploma, "collaborates in the preparation for the total mobilization of the Nation for War". The same decree stated that the General Staff Sections should liaise with their counterparts in the General Secretariat of the National Security Council (CSN) and the National Security Sections of Civil Agencies. This connection was essential, given that the CSN General Secretariat was responsible for elaborating the country's war hypotheses. Thus, the notion of a totalizing system of strategic planning in the Brazilian State was being considered.

In 1948, the General Staff was renamed as the Armed Forces General Staff (EMFA – Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas). In the following year, the Superior School of War (ESG – Escola Superior de Guerra) would be created, under its supervision. The ESG would become famous for the formulation of the National Security Doctrine (DSN), and for being the meeting point of a group of officers who had been involved in all key moments of national politics since the School's inception, from the overthrow of Vargas to the articulation of the 1964 regime. The officers who designed it or passed through the School, in turn, are its primary operators. This requires an analysis of the international political view contained in the Doctrine, its link with the domestic political and economic sphere, and its continuity or discontinuity regarding the Brazilian military thinking formulated in previous decades.

Dominant interpretations of the National Security Doctrine emphasize the American influence and the importance of the ideological, internal, and/or insurrectional adversary, indicating that the priority

of the doctrine would be the exclusion of popular interests and their representatives (Comblin, 1978; Rizzo de Oliveira, 1976; Lima, 2015). In this sense, the interstate threat, except perhaps from the distant Soviet enemy, would have no bearing on the doctrine. However, an analysis of the thinking of DSN's main systematizer, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, as well as the first doctrinal documents produced at ESG in the 1950s, allow us to elaborate an alternative perspective on this topic.

According to Couto e Silva's (1981a) geopolitical perspective, each sector of the national territory would have a particular geopolitical threat. Thus, the Northeast peninsula would be a possible target of Soviet attack because it contains the intercontinental passage. At this point, Couto e Silva is in line with the planning of the Armed Forces General Staff which, at least since 1954, foresaw the possibility of direct confrontation with the Soviets. However, it is important to note that both the High Command and Golbery were relying on conventional operations in direct association with the United States, not on counter-insurgency operations.

The South, Midwest, and the Amazon, in turn, were directly confronted with the South American regional threat posed by the possibility of a siege of hostile nations unified against Brazil by their common culture, sense of racial superiority, and historical-territorial resentment. Regarding the Hispanic nations, Golbery points out that:

"Old suspicions and old disputes undoubtedly separate them, but they do not seem to preclude a combination of interests and efforts when it comes to satisfying all ambitions and resentments at the expense of the exotic neighbor, which is now so overly rich by its overbearing imperialism that it cannot even properly exploit its immense lands, and whose will is thought to be somewhat disrupted by the high-dose contribution of inferior slave blood..." (Couto e Silva, 1981a, p. 53).

Predictably, among Hispanic nations, Argentina posed the greatest danger, as the ongoing dispute over influence in Paraguay and Bolivia had a high potential for conflagration, and, unlike what was happening with the Soviet opponent, Brazil would have to fight the Argentinians using only its own resources. There would, however, be an opportunity in the sphere of international politics, as Peronist Argentina antagonized the United States with its autonomous "Third Position" policy. This factor, coupled with

Brazilian control over the Northeast Salient and strategic materials needed by the US, would allow the country to reach an understanding with Washington to be their key country in South America, while Argentina would lose American support.

“Now, in such circumstances (1952), when among our Hispanic-American neighbors there is an undisguised opposition to the United States of America that masks itself in the Third Position or whatever label it takes, taking advantage of exactly that focus beyond the Atlantic and beyond the Pacific of America’s primary interests, Brazil appears to be in a better position because of its noncompetitive economy, its long and proven tradition of friendship, and, above all, its resources for a loyal bargaining – manganese, monazitic sands, the strategic position of the Northeast and the Amazon mouth with its Marajó cap – to negotiate a more significant bilateral alliance that will not only assure us of the resources needed to substantially compete in the security of the South Atlantic and to defend, if applicable, those Brazilian areas really exposed to extra-continental threats, against an attack involving the North American territory via Dakar – Brazil – Antilles, but an alliance that, on the other hand, translates the recognition of Brazil’s real stature in this part of the Atlantic Ocean, putting an end to any two-way and accommodative policy towards our country and Argentina, both nations, for example, equally strong, against all reason and all evidence, in weapons of naval warfare” (Idem, p. 50-51).

In reality, what the DSN coordinator does is providing a theoretical basis for the Brazil-US military agreement negotiated the previous year by his superior, Góes Monteiro, while complaining about the equal treatment the US gives to Brazil and Argentina in the naval dimension.

In addition, his threat interpretation regarding the main problems for containing it is aligned with the Army Staff: The Hispanic Coalition, or AUP, is foreseen by EME in its 1948 report. Golbery also affiliates with Juarez Távora’s geostrategy of continental defense, which in the following year includes South American supremacy among Brazil’s Permanent National Objectives (Távora, 1954).

Clearly, therefore, General Golbery's geopolitics reflected a view of external threat represented mainly by the South American states, as described in the war hypothesis already used by the Army, and by the Soviet Union, as described in the USSR hypothesis of EMFA documents. Here, two elements are relevant: First, the continuity, in the context of the Cold War, of the Argentinian threat. Second, the external-state character of the threats meant that the Armed Forces' adoption of counterinsurgency tactics would not be the only or primary way to fight the identified dangers. This explains the fact that the alignment with the United States dates from 1940/1942, and the perception of the Soviet threat from at least 1954, but instruction in counterinsurgency combat tactics began only in the late 1950s, and by French, not American, influence (Martins Filho, 2008 & 2012).

Even after the incorporation of counterinsurgency warfare tactics in the late 1950s, they did not replace the interstate and conventional threat in neither the ESG Doctrine nor the EMFA perspective. Thus, the Military Conception of War elaborated in 1963 foresaw the following hypothesis of a conflict in the traditional way in the Southern Cone:

"In this war, any country can be a potential enemy. Since this war is detached from ideological content, one should expect that it will not necessarily include support for the contenders of the great antagonistic groups and that it will be short-lived by the interference of continental organisms (...) This war, it seems, must come in the conventional form" (EMFA, 1963, p. 698).

The 1963 Conception of War also considered possible that the communist threat could manifested itself within other South American countries, and thus a non-ideological continental war could evolve into a revolutionary conflict:

"One cannot rule out the possibility of certain countries from the continent, particularly the neighboring ones, joining the communist bloc; given the recognized political instability of these countries, it is legitimate to consider any of them as potential enemies" (EMFA, 1963, p. 695).

In this sense, the communist threat merges with the traditional perception of continental-Hispanic threat within the Armed Forces. In short,

in the early decades of the Cold War, there was not a simple replacement of the notion of external and state threat for a vision of revolutionary and insurrectional communist internal threat.

Given the continuity of the threat view, the thesis of total war first formulated against Argentina in the Old Republic also remained a reference in the doctrine elaborated at the ESG. Total war within Brazilian military thinking is conventional at the operational level, that is, it involves confrontation between national armies. At the ESG, the greatest example of such combat was World War II, which served as a reference for studies at the institution during the formulation of the Doctrine, including one article by Idálio Sardenberg, future president of Petrobrás (Sardenberg, 1954).

In the perspective of the ESG, following the footsteps of ADN, conventional military power depended fundamentally on industry. As Juarez Távora states:

“The technical and scientific character of Modern War, coupled with its destructive power – imposing, for the balance or superiority of military potential, the invention of new weapons and devices, or the improvement of the existing ones –, matters not only in the constitution of scientist and technician teams, but also in the equipping of a powerful industry, fueled by abundant and adequate raw materials, powered by huge amounts of energy, and liberally financed – to create the prototypes of weapons and devices ideated or modified, and then mass produce them” (Távora, 1952, p. 10).

Ultimately, the combat capacity of the armed forces depended on the support that would be provided by the economic infrastructure, and, thus, from Távora’s perspective, the nations before the open war would enter a “race for mobilization”. In developed countries, it was possible that this stage included the scope of military action, that is, the conversion of civilian production into military production. In the Brazilian case, however, the challenge was not only to mobilize the existing industrial capacity, but to strengthen it. That is, prior to mobilization, there was the preliminary task of strengthening national potential. Another element maintained by the School of the tradition of Brazilian strategic thinking was the concern with economic autarchy. This goal derives from Golbery’s argument that the most formidable opponent for the country would be the Soviet Union, but in this case Brazil would have support from its allies.

On the other hand, facing the continental adversary, the country would have to support itself alone. Távora, in turn, envisions the possibility that, in the midst of a worldwide conflagration, the supply routes would be interrupted, which would require the maximum use of its own internal potential. As the general states:

“The likely extension of the war to the whole world – implying the insecurity of transoceanic and even coastal trade routes and, consequently, those of import supplies – imposes on each country the maximum exploitation of its own resources and the timely storage of critical and strategic materials” (Távora, 1952, p. 9).

Indeed, the combination of the multifaceted requirements of modern warfare associated with the uncertainty of foreign supply made the productive autarchy of a country the desired ideal in strategic planning:

“In the event of war – particularly in the Modern War –, this tendency towards self-sufficiency becomes even more desirable due to the insecurity of sea routes, through which raw materials are normally obtained from abroad” (Távora, 1952, p. 14).

Thus, the Superior School of War fully incorporated in its thinking both the notion of continental and Argentine threat and the need for autarchic industrialization developed by the Army since the 1910s. Therefore, the School’s innovation was not replacing the adversary or form of conflict in strategic thinking, but rather attempting to sophisticate national planning tools for a total South American and interstate war.

The basis for the strategic planning system in the National Security Doctrine is the national leadership’s definition of the Permanent National Objectives (ONPs). The ONPs are generally quite broad in character, such as maintaining national sovereignty or the welfare of the population. Thus, the concrete reference to the planner becomes the Current National Objectives, or goals derived from the need to neutralize the obstacles identified in the Strategic Conjecture Assessment for the achievement of the ONPs. If one concludes that adverse pressures require the use of military power, the country’s Hypotheses of War are formulated. In addition to the war hypotheses, the Strategic Assessment produces a comparison between the adversary’s national power and Brazilian power. If the former

is larger than the latter, it is necessary to include in the planning the goal of strengthening national potential, that is, economic development (Couto e Silva, 1981b).

Potential strengthening must be within two deadlines, the critical deadline and the mobilization deadline. The first refers to the time until the expected start of the conflict, and the second to the lapse between the beginning of the war and the main military operations. Thus, as the strategic assessments change, the potential strengthening initiatives also change, and the latter accelerates as the expected critical deadline gets shorter. Obviously, maximum speed and urgency would be given after the conflict itself began. In this sense, economic development, from the perspective of the National Security Doctrine, has its pace dictated by war. As General Golbery mentions:

“Planning for the National Potential strengthening is a continuous cycle, unfolding relentlessly from peacetime and continuing throughout the war period, but with modified emphasis” (Couto e Silva, 1981a, p. 342).

As happened with ADN thinking, the external threat, and the need to expand the state’s military and industrial capacity to confront it, also leads to the mandatory reorganization in domestic policy. This is because, as General (and future acting president) Aurélio Lyra Tavares says, “The State must be seen as a living organism, subject to the same rules of evolution and with fields of vulnerability comparable to those characterizing human biology” (Lyra Tavares, 1959, p. 89). In this sense, the political field was analogous to the nervous system, the military power to the muscles, and the economy to the circulatory system. This reproduced the organic conception of state embodied decades earlier by ADN. And, like the Young Turks, Lyra Tavares defended the incompatibility between war and total mobilization with internal dissent. This reestablished, on another level of sophistication, the strategic paradigm that linked the South American interstate threat to economic development and to the need for state reorganization by military action.

STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM AND PLANO DE METAS

The National Security Doctrine provided the intellectual apparatus that would guide the High Command and its cadres in their action in

the economic field, a performance that had a significant impact on a key moment of the Brazilian development process, the Plano de Metas of the Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) government. The relationship between strategy and development projects took place in two dimensions: external and internal financing, and the decisions on their implementation. Thus, military officers associated with the High Command were responsible for creating and securing foreign credit arrangements, establishing financing funds, and managing the companies and agencies that executed the projects.

The Plano de Metas represented a milestone in the Brazilian industrialization process, completing the installation of basic industries and integrating the country's energy and transport infrastructure (Lessa, 1975). In general terms, the plan articulated 30 goals grouped into five main sectors, which should be the object of large public investments, either directly or by credits made available by Banco do Brasil or BNDE. The total funding of the goals amounted to 355 billion *cruzeiros*, of which 236 would be spent in the country and 119 billion, or \$2.3 billion, abroad (Centro Celso Furtado, 2010). Obviously, for a country with a chronic external bottleneck problem, obtaining the \$2.3 billion needed to finance the overseas expenditures that the plan's projects would require would be a substantial difficulty. Part of the problem was solved with Instruction 113 of the Currency and Credit Superintendence of the Café Filho government. This instrument basically allowed foreign companies to import machinery and equipment without using foreign exchange, that is, without requiring the foreign currency entering the country. Investments under Instruction 113 amounted to \$900 million, leaving \$1.4 billion to be covered by foreign direct investments or loans. In this area, the plan's largest source of funding was \$276 million in public funding through Eximbank (Centro Celso Furtado, 2010).

Eximbank was not the only US support vehicle for the Plano de Metas. One of the main items that weighed negatively on the Brazilian trade balance was wheat, mostly imported from Argentina at a price considered excessive by the Brazilian government. In 1955, General Juarez Távara, a former ESG commander, negotiated with the United States the first two agricultural surplus agreements, popularly known as wheat agreements. These agreements foresaw that the US government would lend to the Brazilian government the amount needed for purchasing the domestic wheat needs in the US market. The Brazilian government would then sell the wheat purchased with the domestically loaned dollars in the domestic market, in *cruzeiros*, which would then be deposited in BNDE

(Ramos, n/d). The total amount deposited in the Bank as a result of these operations was 11 billion *cruzeiros*, or about \$200 million (Centro Celso Furtado, 2010). Technically, the BNDE funding derived from the Wheat Agreements was internal, as it made available to the bank only national currency. However, by postponing spending with the purchase of wheat abroad, in practice, the mechanism, as well as Eximbank financing and investments via Instruction 113, helped to reduce external bottlenecks.

It was not only in foreign policy that the role of the High Command was felt. Within military planning for the war, the oil and land transport sectors, especially road ones, were interconnected: According to the EMFA, fuel shipments accounted for half of the tonnage to be sent to the operation sites in the event of war. Hence, it was necessary to plan, in an articulated way, the extraction, refining, and transport of oil and its derivatives. During the Plano de Metas, the highways received investments of 23 billion *cruzeiros* originated from the tax, and the road sector was one of the only ones to exceed the planned objectives (Centro Celso Furtado, 2010).

Having solved the issue of road transport to the possible operation sites, it was necessary to obtain and refine the oil. This dimension brought the problem that the country imported the vast majority of the oil and fuel it consumed, thus, as ESG reports also warned, being dependent on earning foreign currency to meet the needs of the military machine and civilian consumption in case of conflict. To solve this constraint, the search for self-sufficiency in extraction and refining was necessary. The second goal did not require the fulfillment of the first: Increasing refining capacity meant saving money, because it was more expensive to import ready-made fuel than crude oil.

The second problem was specifically military and directly linked to the two war hypotheses the High Command considered, the “USSR” and the “AUP”, or Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In the first case, and showing how the profile of the communist threat at this time was remarkably conventional, the challenge was to protect refineries, oil fields, and aviation supply lines, especially from Soviet submarines. Given that direct Soviet attacks were difficult, the central challenge of planning for the oil sector associated with the USSR hypothesis was primarily to supply the Northeastern Theater, area of national and allied forces in support of intercontinental traffic.

In the case of the AUP coalition, the EMFA considered that enemy forces could achieve virtually all extraction, refining, and transport capacity

using submarines or airpower based in Clorinda, Argentina, as well as the Paraguayan capital. It was therefore necessary to provide anti-aircraft coverage for oil transport, storage, and refining facilities. Moreover, in the economic sphere, it was necessary to supply the Southern Theater. In terms of sources of supply, the Brazil-Argentina rivalry in South America was translated into different oil suppliers. Buenos Aires bought mainly from Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. Brazil, in turn, depended on Venezuelan oil transported by English and American companies. The supply structure had a positive point: Argentina would not attack the ships of those powers bringing oil to Brazil. Internally, the installation of oil infrastructure met the strategic criteria: As the refining capacity was being installed in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, oil came from Venezuela and, refined, was transported to the Southern Theater. That is, the refining park was halfway to the end-use area. If the reserves in the Amazon and Northeast were confirmed, or if Brazil made possible the desired extraction of Bolivian oil, the favorable situation would not change.

The High Command's priorities for the oil sector were reflected in the Santos-São Paulo Oil Pipeline projects and in Petrobrás' first major refinery, Cubatão, as well as in the Plano de Metas projects. Until 1961, Petrobrás exponentially expanded its extraction and refining capacity under the general direction of General Idálio Sardenberg, founding member of the ESG. The great project of the period was the installation of Duque de Caxias refinery (therefore following the strategic criterion of installing refineries far from enemy territory and midway between the extraction area and the theater of operations) (Centro Celso Furtado, 1959). Another relevant project was the expansion of the Cubatão refinery, carried out by lieutenant colonel Ernesto Geisel as head of the facility (D'Araujo & Castro, 1997).

The High Command's operations in the economic area extended beyond beyond EME and EMFA/ESG, and directly involved the Navy as well. In 1941, Decree 3100 created the Merchant Marine Commission (CMM) to organize and stimulate this economic sector, the civil component of the Brazilian maritime power. During the war, 36 Brazilian civilian vessels were sunk by German submarines, and, after the world conflict, the national fleet did not undergo a major renovation (Goularti Filho, 2010). In 1947, the EMFA began studies to formulate the country's war plans, and thus sent to the EMA a request on the Navy's logistical capabilities. According to the response, the Navy's main challenge would be to transport an infantry

division and supplies from Rio de Janeiro and Santos to Pelotas and Porto Alegre, focusing on the port of Rio Grande. In this endeavor, the Navy could count on a favorable geographic factor for its operations:

“The geographical situation is very favorable to the defensive action of our forces, acting as a protection for convoys near the coast and in cooperation with air forces. The enemy will have to make the attack against our transports approaching the coast, exposed to air attacks by light and submarine forces; the transports still have the option of shelter in the intermediate ports available near the coast, except in the Rio Grande stretch. The enemy risk will not be small in operations of this nature, since a damaged unit can only be repaired in a very distant place; if the damage to repair depends on docking, you will only find a dike in La Plata, near Buenos Aires” (Marinha do Brasil, 1947, p 10).

However, even though geography favored defense, the Navy would face major difficulties in supplying the Southern Theater due to the weakness of the merchant fleet:

“The merchant fleet we have for transport is still very poor in terms of ship displacement and speed. Taking the average ship type of 4000 gross tons, we would have to employ about 20 ships to carry an infantry division, and it would not be likely to have an average speed greater than 10 knots” (Idem, p. 3).

Improving the quality of the merchant fleet needed to carry out war operations in the Southern Cone necessarily required the installation of the naval industry in the country. Thus, in 1956, the Development Council presented to President Juscelino Kubitschek a report suggesting a financing program for the renewal and expansion of the merchant marine associated with the installation of domestic and foreign shipyards in the country. Two years later, by the initiative of Admiral Lúcio Meira, the Merchant Navy Renewal Fee was instituted, levied on national and foreign shipowners and deposited in a Merchant Marine Fund, which would be used to finance the construction of ships under the direction of CMM. The shipyards themselves would be installed from projects approved by the Shipbuilding Industry Executive Group (GEICON), also established in

1958. The CMM would be headed during the Kubitscheck administration by Admiral Silvio Borges Mota, former deputy director of the ESG Studies Department (CPDOC, n/d). GEICON, in turn, would be chaired by Lucio Meira, formerly an officer of the Military Cabinet, an agency associated with the General Secretariat of the National Security Council, and of the Navy Staff (Kornis, n/d). Admiral Álvaro Alberto would also be on the board of GEICON (Santos Val, 2016). During the Plano de Metas, this agency, along with CMM, would be responsible for the installation of the Ishiwajima, CCN, Emaq, Verolme, Caneco, and Só shipyards, with a combined vessels production capacity with a total tonnage of 140000 tons/year. The investment in the sector was 14 billion *cruzeiros*. (Pires Jr., 2016).

The same Admiral Álvaro Alberto who took part in the installation of the naval industry during the Juscelino Kubitscheck administration had, in the Vargas administration, formulated the project of the National Research Council, CNPq, and was appointed its first director. During his direction at CNPq, the agency had the nuclear sector as its top priority, which absorbed more than half of its budget. In the 1950s, the biggest issue involving nuclear activities was the commitments made to the United States that foresaw the sale of strategic minerals to them for the development of the sector. Of these minerals, the most important was thorium, from which uranium 233 and plutonium 239 could be obtained, both of which could be used to make nuclear weapons. Brazil had, since 1945, committed to buying all domestic thorium production and selling it to the United States, and in 1955 the sale of thorium was associated with the American financing for the purchase of wheat that had resulted in amounts deposited in BNDE to finance the Plano de Metas (Andrade & Santos, 2013).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the Atomic Minerals Export Commission, defended the agreements. On the opposite side was Álvaro Alberto's CNPq, which defended the policy of specific compensation, that is, the supply of nuclear raw materials in exchange for nuclear technology. The fact that Álvaro Alberto exonerated himself from CNPq during the Café Filho government, more closely linked to ESG and Távora, and that Congress installed an investigation about the sale of thorium to the United States, allows the creation of a conflicting image between nationalists interested in developing the nuclear sector and surrenders wanting to prevent this development for a subordinate association with the United States. In addition to the perception of the dichotomy between nationalists and surrenders, there is also the idea that

in this early phase, in spite of military participation, the Brazilian nuclear program had a peaceful character and no warlike applications of nuclear technology.

Developments in the Juscelino Kubitscheck administration led to a more complex view than the nationalist-developmental versus surrender-colonialist dichotomy, as well as the idea of a “peaceful militarization” of the nuclear program. During the Kubitscheck administration, the head of the General Secretariat of the National Security Council was General Nelson de Melo, a former leader of the Democratic Crusade who, with the support of Távora and the ESG, had defeated nationalist Horta Barbosa, supported by Estillac Leal and Getúlio Vargas in 1952. In 1956, the president appoints a commission led by General Melo, also composed of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, Aeronautics, and Agriculture, and of the heads of the Economic Development Council, CNPQ, and EMFA, to devise a new policy for the nuclear sector. Two key issues that the commission needed to address were the creation of a central agency to manage the nuclear area, initially proposed by EMFA, and the agreements with the United States.

In July 1956, General Nelson de Melo sent Kubitscheck his appreciation of the American proposal for the supply of thorium to the United States in exchange for research reactors. According to the general, the agreement had a point detrimental to the Brazilian interest, because it contained restrictive clauses that prevented the development of nuclear research for war purposes:

“The proposed agreement, being specifically for peaceful purposes, contains clauses restricting the use of the nuclear fuel supplied by the United States, including the special elements produced in reactors fueled with imported fuel. These restrictions prevent the development of research and studies, by our military bodies, on atomic weapons. From the point of view of National Security, the military aspect cannot be neglected in a long-term policy in this sector. The development of science and technical means may perhaps soon increase our war potential through this form of energy, and we must be prepared for it” (Nelson de Melo, 1956, p. 2-3).

The restrictive nature of the agreement meant that, for it to be accepted, modifications would be required, such as reducing its term from

30 to 10 years, and including a provision that made it clear that the country would be allowed to use material provided by the United States to obtain the pump raw materials, uranium 233 and plutonium 239.

“It is necessary to make clear in the text of the Agreement that Brazil may use the leased fuel, including in nuclear fuel production or regeneration reactors, that is, the possibility of using thorium or uranium to obtain uranium 233 and plutonium 239. We should also be guaranteed the free disposal of all nuclear fuel thus obtained” (Idem, p. 5).

In short, the CSN General Secretariat sought autonomy to ensure the country's ability to develop nuclear weapons. Finally, regardless of whether the agreement with the Americans was signed or not, the country, from General Melo's perspective, could not give up its policy of autonomously obtaining nuclear fuel from the United States in the short term (through the IAEA or another power), and of achieving full autonomy in the long run. To develop these capacities, the Interministerial Studies Commission proposed, in the following month, August 1956, the establishment of the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), which would be responsible for assuming the nuclear responsibilities of CNPq and MRE, and for managing the training program of scientists, technicians, and experts in the field. In addition, the commission called for the suspension of the export of strategic minerals to the United States. This last point was not made, but CNEN would be created two months later, in October 1956, by decree 40110 (Andrade & Santos, 2013). The first president of the agency, responsible for the continued supply of atomic minerals and other joint projects with the United States, was Álvaro Alberto's former advisor at CNPq, Admiral Octacílio Cunha, appointed to the post by the minister of the Navy. CNEN's management also included Bernardo Geisel, brother of future President Ernesto Geisel.

In the 1950s, and especially during the Kubitschek presidency, we can see that the military and High Command institutions, acting on strategic grounds focused on the USSR and especially the Southern Cone, had a decisive influence on the formation of financing instruments and management of economic development programs. In the transport area, the massive construction of roads by DNER took place, in practice an army satellite agency financed by a fund and a tax proposed by the EME in the previous decade. In the oil sector, the extraction and refining goals

were in accordance with the priorities set by the EMFA and were executed by Petrobrás under the administration of military personnel associated with the ESG and the National Security Doctrine. The naval industry was established under the baton of Lucio Meira and other admirals linked to ESG and the Navy General Staff, an organization that had identified in 1947 the expansion of the national merchant navy as a priority for war logistics. Finally, the nuclear sector had its first steps under the tutelage of Admiral Álvaro Alberto and General Nelson de Mello, and CNEN emerged under the supervision of the High Command, having as one of its objectives to provide the country with the scientific, technological, and industrial infrastructure to manufacture nuclear weapons. This decade thus repeats a pattern of militarized development associated with regional geopolitics that had already been observed in previous years.

CONCLUSIONS

This article developed the argument that South American regional geopolitics and military power had a significant impact on a key moment of Brazilian developmentalism, the Plano de Metas of the Juscelino Kubitschek government. To this end, a historical review was carried out, seeking to connect the regional rivalry Brazil-Argentina with the formation of a modernizing thinking among Brazilian officials. In the 1930s and 1940s, this modernizing thinking, coupled with the growth of military political leadership, resulted in a strategic planning system articulated around the General Secretariat of the National Security Council and the Army Staff, and had an impact on the first structural projects of the developmentalist cycle in the country in the petrochemical, steel, and land transport areas. This system would expand soon after World War II, with the creation of the Armed Forces General Staff and the Superior School of War, and would have as its operating doctrine formulated by ESG officers. It was then argued that both the EMFA and the DSN maintained, between the 1940s and 1960s, despite the Cold War scenario, a concern over a conventional and interstate conflict with Argentina in the Southern Cone, which grounded the continuity of the paradigm that articulated war readiness with political centralization and economic modernization. Finally, supported by historical documents, the operation of the Brazilian strategic planning system in the 1950s and its impact on some of the decisive policies of the Plano de Metas was shown.

To support the argument that regional geopolitics, in the form of interstate conflict, had a relatively significant impact on Brazilian developmentalism does not imply denying the other perspectives, which emphasize other political and economic factors. Moreover, while geopolitics, interstate dispute, and war readiness were relevant to the institutional and economic evolution of the Brazilian state, these elements were not identical to the European experience. There was no open war here, no effective mass mobilization, events that were in the basis, for example, of the consolidation of democratic institutions in Europe. Both the relationship with other causal variables and differences with the European experience should be the subject of further studies. We hope, however, that this article has stimulated a deepening of the study on the relationship between geopolitics and historical macrosocial dynamics in Brazil and Latin America.

GEOPOLÍTICA, STATE-MAKING E INDUSTRIALIZAÇÃO NO BRASIL: O PAPEL DO PODER MILITAR E DO PLANEJAMENTO ESTRATÉGICO NO AUGE DO NACIONAL- DESENVOLVIMENTISMO BRASILEIRO

RESUMO

O presente artigo objetiva estabelecer os marcos históricos doutrinários que contribuíram para o aprimoramento do Direito Espacial durante a Guerra Fria. Ainda nesse contexto, analisa-se o desenvolvimento dos principais diplomas legais que foram responsáveis pela construção do arcabouço jurídico da referida ramificação do Direito Internacional Público, avaliando, ainda, as perspectivas e desafios presentes nesse mesmo cenário.

Palavras-chave: Direito Espacial. Espaço Sideral. Guerra Fria. Direito Internacional Público. COPUOS.

REFERENCES

ALVES, Vagner Camilo. Ilusão desfeita: a “aliança especial” Brasil-Estados Unidos e o poder naval brasileiro durante e após a II Guerra Mundial. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Brasília, DF, v. 48, n. 1, p. 151-177. jan./jun. 2005.

ANADRADE, Ana Maria Ribeiro de; SANTOS, Tatiane Lopes dos. A dinâmica política da criação da Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear. *Boletim Museu Paraense Emílio Goeldi*, Belém, v. 8, n. 1, p. 113-128, jan./abr. 2013.

BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto de Moniz. *Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: conflito e integração na América do Sul*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2010.

BIELSCHOWSKY, Ricardo; MUSSI, Carlos. Padrões de desenvolvimento na economia brasileira: a era desenvolvimentista (1950-1980) e depois”. In.: BIELSCHOWSKY, Ricardo. *Padrões de desenvolvimento econômico (1950-2008): América Latina, Ásia e Rússia*. Brasília: CGEE, 2013.

CAPELLA, Leila Maria Corrêa. *As malhas de aço no tecido nacional: a revista “A Defesa Nacional” e o Serviço Militar Obrigatório*. 1985. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) - Universidade Federal Fluminense, Niterói, RJ, 1985.

CARDOSO, Fernando Henrique; FALETTO, Enzo. *Dependência e desenvolvimento na América Latina*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2004.

CARVALHO, José Murilo de. *Forças Armadas e política no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2005.

CENTENO, Miguel Angel. *Blood and debt: war and the nation-state in Latin America*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.

TAVARES, Maria da Conceição et al. *O Plano de metas e o papel do BNDE*. *Memórias do Desenvolvimento*, Rio de Janeiro, v.4, n.4, p. 45-87, set. 2010.

COELHO, Edmundo Campos. *Em busca de identidade: o Exército e a*

política na sociedade brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2000.

COMBLIM, Joseph. A ideologia da segurança nacional. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1978.

SILVA, Golbery do Couto e. Conjuntura política nacional o poder executivo & geopolítica do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1981a.

SILVA, Golbery do Couto e. Planejamento Estratégico. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1981b.

CPDOC. Silvio Borges Mota. CPDOC/FGV. S/d. Available from: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/silvio-borges-de-sousa-mota>. Access on: Feb. 13, 2019.

D'ARAÚJO, Maria Celina; CASTRO, Celso (org.). Ernesto Geisel. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Ed., 1997.

DORATIOTO, Francisco. O Brasil no Rio da Prata (1822-1994). Brasília: FUNAG, 2014.

DRAIBE, Sônia. Rumos e metamorfoses: estado e industrialização no Brasil: 1930 a 1960. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985.

ERTMAN, Thomas. Birth of the Leviathan: bulding states and regimes in Medieval and early modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

FAUSTO, Boris. A Revolução de 1930: historiografia e história. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1970.

FERNADES, Florestan. A Revolução burguesa no Brasil: ensaio de interpretação sociológica. São Paulo: Ed. Globo, 2005.

FIORI, José Luís da Costa. Ciclo e crise na dinâmica de um estado periférico: uma reflexão em dois movimentos sobre a crise do estado brasileiro. 1985. Tese (Doutorado) - Instituto de Economia Industrial, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 1985.

FIORI, José Luís da Costa. O poder global dos Estados Unidos: formação, expansão e limites. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2004.

FIORI, José Luís. História, estratégia e desenvolvimento: para uma geo-

política do capitalismo. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2014.

FIORI, José Luís; MEDEIROS, Carlos; SERRANO, Franklin. O mito do colapso do poder americano. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2008.

GASPARI, Elio. As ilusões armadas: a ditadura escancarada. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002. v.2.

GERSCHENKRON, Alexander. Economic backwardness in historical perspective: a book of essays. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1962.

MONTEIRO, Pedro Aurélio de Góes. A Revolução de 30 e a finalidade política do Exército. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Adersen, 1934.

GOULARTI Filho, Alcides. A trajetória da marinha mercante brasileira: administração, regime Jurídico e planejamento. Pesquisa & Debate, São Paulo, v. 21, n. 2 (38) p. 247-278, 2010.

KORNIS, Monica; MEIRA, Lucio Martins. CPDOC/FGV. S/d. Available from: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/lucio-martins-meira>. Access on: Apr. 06, 2018.

LESSA, Carlos. Quinze anos de política econômica. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1981.

LIMA, Laura. Worlding Brazil: intellectuals, identity and security. London, New York: Routledge, 2015

TAVARES, Aurélio Lyra. Segurança nacional: antagonismos e vulnerabilidades. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1958.

SILVA, Edmundo de Macedo Soares e. Um construtor do nosso tempo: depoimento ao CPDOC / Lucia Hippolito e Ignez Cordeiro de Farias (Organizadoras). Rio de Janeiro: Fundação CSN, 1998. 172p.

MARTINS FILHO, João Roberto. A conexão francesa: da Argélia ao Araguaia. Varia História, Belo Horizonte, v. 28, n. 48, p. 519-536, 2012. (UFMG. Impreso).

MARTINS FILHO, João Roberto. A influência doutrinária francesa sobre os militares brasileiros nos anos de 1960. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, v. 23, n. 67, p. 39-50, 2008.

McCANN, Frank. Soldados da Pátria: história do Exército brasileiro 1889

-1937. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2009.

McNEILL, William H. *The pursuit of power: technology, armed force and society since A.D. 1000*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

MORAES, João Quartim de. *A esquerda militar no Brasil: da coluna à comuna*. São Paulo: Siciliano, 1991.

MURICY, Antônio Carlos. *Trajetória e desempenho das elites políticas brasileiras*. [Entrevista cedida ao] CPDOC/FGV, Rio de Janeiro, 1981. Available from: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/historal/arq/Entrevista35.pdf> Access on: Apr. 06, 2019.

NASCIMENTO, Fernanda de Santos. *A revista a defesa nacional e o projeto de modernização do Exército brasileiro (1931-1937)*. Orientador: Janete Silveira Abrão. 2010. 240 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) - Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, 2010.

NUNN, Frederick. *Yesterday's soldiers: European military professionalism in South America, 1890-1940*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.

PIRES Jr., Floriano Carlos Martins. *O cluster marítimo no Rio de Janeiro: possibilidades e desafios*. In: OSORIO, Mauro; MELO, Luiz Martins de; VERSIANI, Maria Helena; WERNECK, Maria Lúcia (Org). *Uma agenda para o Rio de Janeiro: estratégias e políticas públicas para o desenvolvimento sócioeconômico*. Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2016.

RAMOS, Plínio de Abreu. *Acordos do trigo*. Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC. Available from: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/acordos-do-trigo>. Access on: Apr. 06, 2019.

RASLER, Karen A.; THOMPSON, William R. *War making and the building of state capacity: expanding the bivariate relationship*. Available from: <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-642>. Access on: Apr. 06, 2019.

OLIVEIRA, Eliezer Rizzo de. *As Forças Armadas: política e ideologia no Brasil 1964 - 1969*. Orientador: Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro. 1976. 211f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciência Política) - Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Hu-

manas, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, 1976.

VAL, Sylvio dos Santos. O périplo do cisne negro: poder, política e tecnologia na Marinha do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Gramma, 2016.

SARDENBERG, Idálio. A guerra total: estratégia no campo militar. Rio de Janeiro: ESG, 1954. 26p.

SODRÉ, Nelson Werneck. Introdução à revolução brasileira. São Paulo: Editora Ciências Humanas, 1978.

SODRÉ, Nelson Werneck. História da burguesia brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1967.

STEPAN, Alfred. Os militares e a política. Rio de Janeiro: Artenova, 1975.

TAVARES, Maria da Conceição. Auge e declínio do processo de substituição de importações. In: TAVARES, Maria da Conceição. Da substituição de importações ao capitalismo financeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores. 1972.

TÁVORA, Juarez do Nascimento Fernandes. Importância do potencial econômico na guerra moderna. Rio de Janeiro: ESG, 1952.

TÁVORA, Juarez do Nascimento Fernandes. Objetivos nacionais permanentes. Rio de Janeiro: ESG, 1954.

TILLY, Charles. Coerção, capital e Estados Europeus. São Paulo: Ed Unesp, 1996.

IMLAY, Talbot; TOFT, Monica Duffy (Org.). The fog of peace and war planning: military and strategic planning under uncertainty. New York: Routledge, 2006.

TREBAT, Nicholas Miller. O departamento de guerra e o desenvolvimento econômico americano, 1776-1860. Orientador: Carlos Aguiar de Medeiros. 2011. 252 f. Tese (Doutorado) - Instituto de Economia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2011.

WEFFORT, Francisco. O populismo na política brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1978.

WIRTH, John D. A política do desenvolvimento na era de Vargas. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 1973.

VIEIRA, Ricardo Zórtea. Os profetas armados: geopolítica e pensamento militar nas origens do desenvolvimentismo brasileiro. OIKOS, Rio de Janeiro, v. 14, n.1, p. 05-22, 2015.

VIEIRA, Ricardo Zortéa. Em busca da supremacia: guerra multidimensional no Cone Sul e a transformação estrutural brasileira do século XX. Orientador: José Luís da Costa Fiori. 2018. 196 f. Tese (Doutorado em Economia Política Internacional) - Instituto de Economia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2018.