THE TRANSATLANTIC NARCO-NEXUS:
SOUTH AMERICA, AFRICA, AND
EUROPE IN THE CONTEMPORARY
DRUG-TRAFFICKING DYNAMICS¹

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ABSTRACT
The article analyzes the contemporary transatlantic flow of illegal drugs, taking on account the current transformation of the connections among South American, African and European Drug-Trafficking Organizations (ODTs) and the tendency to securitize this traffic which interests the Brazilian public, national and regional security and diplomatic policies. The article presents a history of the transatlantic drug-trafficking and the its contemporary contours in order to suggest viable initiatives to cope with this new and aggravated panorama pushed through by the so-called “war on drugs”.

Keywords: Drug-Trafficking. Transatlantic Nexus. Brazil

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INTRODUCTION

The “war on drugs” is a huge failure. There is no novelty in this sentence. Yet, it is still in force the global regime of drug control based on three UN treaties (1961, 1971 and 1988) that universalize the repressive approach toward a set of psychoactive drugs (McAllister, 2000).

Since the 1980s, however, the US emphasis on the militarization of the combat against drug-trafficking has coincided with the first European alternative experiences toward the “drug problem”, especially the implementation of the first programs of harm reduction in the Netherlands and others. The “European Model” (Gratius and Palacios 2012) has started a new approach centered on the “demand pole”, without stigmatizing or criminalizing the user. This model differs from the history of the US and the Latin American drug policies. Both aim to tackle the “supply pole”, which means targeting illegal crops, the interdiction of illicit drugs and the heavy criminalization of traffickers and users. Despite the recent initiatives to introduce “health-focused” approaches both in the US and in several Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay, and even Brazil, the main formula remains based on repressive measures against selected segments of each one of the countries in the continent (Rodrigues, Kalil, Zepeda, Rosen, 2017).

Almost forty years later, the situation has partially changed in a world-range perspective. The repressive formula is still predominant, but it is not hegemonic anymore. New problems, such as the use of opioids in the US (Quinones, 2016), the emergence of new significant illegal drugs’ markets (as the Brazilian one), and the spread of synthetic drugs (such as methamphetamines), have modified the panorama of global drug-trafficking. The international geopolitics and the political economy of drug-trafficking have been shifting, and consequently so has the relationship between South America and Europe on these matters. Hence, this paper seeks to briefly explore: 1) the political history – and major transformations – of drug-trafficking dynamics in South America (focusing on Brazil) vis-à-vis Europe’s, 2) a current overview of South America’s national drug policies, 3) the emergence of African Drug-Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and their relationships with international DTOs and local state and non-state forces, and, finally, 4) some critical contributions toward the inter-regional collaboration between South America and Europe to face this major social, political, economic and security challenge. We claim as a
central hypothesis that the 21th century brings what we call a new Trans-Atlantic Narco-Nexus, in which Brazil plays a major role as a platform for illegal drugs export toward Europe.

FROM WALL STREET TO LA DEFENSE

By the end of the 1970s, the US economic recovery and the beginning of the new international economic order entailed the massive use of a traditional, yet thus far not-that-hipped drug: cocaine. Symbol of glamour and energy for the new yuppie generation, the rise of the US cocaine market had a direct impact in South America’s Andean region, as it gathered a unique set of characteristics favorable to the development of this illegal economy (Bagley, 2014).

First of all, there were cultural, historical and environmental elements: the hydrochloride of coca (cocaine powder) is manufactured after the coca leaf extraction from an Andean highlands native bush. The prolific existence of coca fields in Peru and Bolivia was due to the traditional consumption of coca leaf, one that belongs to a secular cultural heritage of Andean peoples. The boost of the use of cocaine powder in the US led to a swift expansion of cultivated areas (Escohotado, 1998).

Secondly, those countries had an implemented network of illegality that was easily converted to the new drug trafficking activities. In Colombia, future kingpins such as Pablo Escobar (Medellin) and the Orejuela Brothers (Cali) simply adapted their previous experience in smuggling, vehicle robbery, emerald trafficking and marihuana production. The network of illegality already included the corruption of police officers, military personnel, politicians, judges, attorneys, customs officers and the control over international routes of distribution (Rodrigues, 2017).

During the 1980s, the US enhanced the “war on drugs” doctrine by offering military, intelligence and financial support to the then called “production countries”, which led to the conversion of most of the Latin American armed forces into counter-narcotics commandos. By then, the political economy of drug trafficking placed: 1) Peru and Bolivia as the main suppliers of coca leaves and pasta base, 2) Colombia as the hub for the chemical transformation of pasta base into cocaine, as well as the platform for international distribution, 3) the Caribbean as the main pathway to the US market, 4) Venezuela and Brazil as route countries aimed at the European market, not to mention their role as secondary consumption
plazas (Benítez Manaut, 2014).

Led by Reagan’s and Bush Sr.’s administrations, operations to intercept the drug transit in the Caribbean spilled over Colombia’s partnerships toward Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). At the same time, the US operations strengthened the presence of the Italian mafia and of African DTOs, mainly from Nigeria, in South America (Carrier and Klantschnig, 2012). Their expertise forged channels for the distribution of the Andean cocaine to Europe via Brazil using transatlantic routes and warehouses in archipelagos (Canarias, Madeira), as well as ports in Galicia (Spain), Marseille (France) and Naples (Italy).

After Escobar’s assassination (1993) and the following imprisonment of the Orejuela Brothers (1994 and 1995), the era of the major Colombian ‘drug cartels’ came to an end, leading to the emergence of the so-called cartelitos (mini-cartels) and the BACRIM (emergent criminal gangs). They still controlled the production of cocaine and disputed over spaces against fractions of guerrillas’ units and paramilitary groups also engaged in the cultivation of coca and in its refinement. However, these new groups did not have the same control over the international distribution of cocaine (and also heroin) to the US and the European markets, and following the implementation of Plan Colombia (2000), Colombian DTOs were to face even more hurdles. The US-sponsored program focused mainly on the Colombian military capacities to fight leftist guerrillas, fostering significant loss namely for the civilian population, structurally dependent upon, for instance, coca crops that were chemically destructed, and secondary damage for local DTOs.

It is not hard to realize how the weakening of Colombian DTOs impacted the regional power distribution among Latin America’s ‘drug cartels’. As a result, ‘Mexican cartels’ gained control of Colombia’s cocaine smuggling into the US. Peruvian and Bolivian DOTs magnified their activities through alliances with Venezuelan, Brazilian, Paraguayan and Argentinian DTOs aiming at local markets, as well as with European and African illegal groups based in these South American countries targeting the European market. The intensity of the illegal drug transit through the Atlantic Ocean has increased, connection South American and European DTOs via West and North African illegal groups dedicated to a vast array of illicit operations such as arm’s trafficking, human trafficking and, according to European and US authorities, to radicalized Islamist groups in the Sahel and Maghreb (Carrier and Klantschnig, 2012).
Since the mid-2000’s, the US drug market shifted its preferences undermining the consumption of cocaine in favor of the use of other drugs such as methamphetamines, cannabis (increasingly legal), opiates (pain-killers) and heroin. In Europe, this was not the same. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recent reports, the plummeting demand of the US cocaine market has been compensated by the surge of the European and the Brazilian demands, respectively the second and the third world greatest cocaine consumer markets (UNODC, 2016). According to Wigell and Romero (2013: 5), ‘Brazil has become a major bridge for the transatlantic drug trade’. For the authors, around 15% of the South American cocaine transiting toward Europe crosses through Brazilian ports. The shipments take advantage of the intense commercial flows between Mercosur and the European Union, using West African countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire as entrepôts (Carrier and Klantschnig, 2012). Figure 1 displays the intensity of cocaine flows crossing the Atlantic according to data compiled by UNODC.

**FIGURE 1**

**COCAINE FLOWS 2011-2015**


In Brazil, the time for amateurism in the so-called “organized crime” is in the past. Prison and favela-based groups, such as Comando Vermelho (Red Commando), in Rio de Janeiro, have been experiencing harsh competition from the São Paulo-based Capital’s First Commando (PCC), a mafia-like organization that controls favelas, impoverished
neighborhoods and the prison system, as well as other illegal activities besides drug trafficking (prostitution, smuggling etc.). PCC has reported connections in Paraguay, Bolivia and Portugal, as well as new and conflictive presence in Rio de Janeiro, by establishing alliances with local drug gangs, notoriously a dissidence from ADA group which control the world-know Favela da Rocinha. They also have been penetrating increasingly higher posts in the State bureaucracy, influencing judges, politicians and public security agents.

The transatlantic Narco-nexus, nevertheless, is not a one-way route. In emerging urban economies, such as the Brazilian, contemporary patterns of drug use have been developing toward the use of synthetic drugs produced in Western Europe. Both in South America and in Europe the repressive agenda (‘war on drugs’) provokes the so-called ‘balloon effect’ which occurs when ‘illicit activities ‘balloon out’ to out other regions in order to avoid interdiction by governmental authorities’ (Rosen and Zepeda, 2014: 19). These dynamics can all be traced back to Plan Colombia, which have ballooned out drug trafficking illegalities toward a more integrated South American-European market. Figure 2 shows the complex North-South transit of methamphetamines through the Atlantic Ocean, coming both from North America to South America, as well as from West Europe to South America.

**POLICIES OF DRUGS IN SOUTH AMERICA**

**FIGURA 2. METHAMPHETAMINES FLOWS 2011-2015**

Despite the historical emphasis on the ‘war on drugs’ doctrine, in South America, the production, commercialization and consumption of illegal substances have boomed during the 1990s, and so has the level of lethality of drug trafficking-related violence. This scenario has pushed forward some alternative policies, notably influenced by the “European Model” developed since the 1980s.

In Bolivia’s (1008 Act of 1988), Ecuador’s (108 Act reformed in 2005), Peru’s (22095 Act of 1978), Paraguay’s (1340 Act of 1988) and Venezuela’s (Organic Law against Illicit Traffic and Consumption of Narcotic Substances and Psychotropic of 2005) drug laws, personal consumption has been decriminalized, but there are still no legal measures to access medical cannabis nor the regulation of self-cultivation. In practice, the punishment approach still prevails. In Bolivia, the Evo Morales Administration has declared the coca leaf part of the cultural, nutritional and religious heritage, forcing the UN to accept the suspension of the total eradication goals. However, Morales “coca yes, cocaine no” policy has kept the repressive model toward producers and users, despite the expulsion of US DEA agents from Bolivia (Roncken and De Achá 2015, Grisaffi 2016).

On a different tone, in 2013, Uruguay took a big step when former President José Mujica enacted the 19.172 Act, which regulates the production, commercialization and distribution of cannabis. There are three ways to acquire it: self-cultivation; partaking in associations of producers; and purchasing cannabis in authorized pharmacies with a limit of up to 40 grams per month (Aguiar and Musto 2015, Garat 2016).

Following a similar path, in 2014, Chile legalized the therapeutic use of marijuana and then, in 2015 (Law n. 20.000), the self-cultivation of up to six plants per household was allowed for therapeutic purposes, with medical prescription, and the purchase of a maximum of 10 grams for private consumption without prior authorization. The legislation does not criminalize nor sanctions personal and private use of any type of drug. However, if the consumption is to take place in a public area, the legislation foresee fines, compulsory community work or compulsory attendance (up to 60 days) to programs of rehabilitation or treatment. In practice, in spite of these formal advances, the police still cultivate traditional repressive patterns (Sepúlveda 2015).

In 2009, the Argentinian Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the criminalization of illegal drugs consumption and, in 2016, Law 27.737 was amended to decriminalize the possession of drugs for personal use.
In addition, coca leaves in their natural state and intended for the practice of cooking are no longer typified as narcotic drugs, and by the beginning of 2017, medicinal cannabis and its derivatives are now legal for patients treating certain pathologies under medical recommendation. Nonetheless, self-cultivation remains a crime unless it is intended for treatment, and repressive approaches remain in force in cities such as Rosario, where DTOs have increased their activities (Corda 2015).

In Colombia, the Constitutional Court reviewed the 1986 National Statute on Narcotic Drugs (ENE) in 1994 ruling out the criminalization of those who carry or use a minimum permitted dosage of drugs. In 2009, the same Court had again to examine a constitutional reform intended to criminalize the consumption, reiterating its previous position declaring unconstitutional that bit of the reform. The consumption of drugs is still interpreted as an individual right to freely develop their own personality. Paradoxically, even though consumption is not criminalized, it is still constitutionally prohibited. In 2015, President Juan Manuel Santos signed a decree (n. 2467) regulating the cultivation, distribution, consumption and possession of cannabis plant seeds and their derivatives for medicinal and scientific purposes; and in May 2016 the government called in for the registration of licenses to produce.

In Venezuela and in Ecuador, despite the anti-US Bolivarian rhetoric, the general framework for the drug laws has maintained the repressive approach, especially in Venezuela, where the Chávez’s and Maduro’s Administrations used repression as a pinnacle of the State’s distance from any drug-trafficking influence contradicting US accusations (Antillano and Ávila 2015). At the same time, the Bolivarian regime has been accused by US authorities, the UNODC and national and international experts of being a “narco-regime”, in which the military, the Bolivarian National Guard (germanderie responsible for the border’s patrol), business men, and high-ranked civilian public servants are in charge of the shipping of Colombian cocaine and heroin toward Europe, in connection with African illegal groups (Landaeta, 2015).

In Ecuador, the Rafael Correa Administration (2007-2017) opted for an approach related to the categorization of ‘the drug problem’ as a matter of public health. Results have been ambiguous since the traditional prohibitionist, repressive approach is entrenched in the practices of the police, the judiciary and the military (Pontón and Duque, 2015). In Peru, the legacy of the most repressive years – back in the 1980s and 1990s –
still lingers, especially in the Andean highlands, where the coca leaf, pasta base and cocaine production have soared, and a busy corridor for cocaine export has emerged connecting Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, West Africa and Southern Europe (Soberón. 2015).

In 2006, Brazil promulgated new legislation on drugs. Although Law 11.343 does not foresee the criminalization of users, it provides that it is the police chief that typifies what amount is to be deemed criminal, generating major consequences for the country’s prison system and the young black, poor population (Boiteux, 2015). The country has the fourth largest incarcerated population in the world (after the US, China and Russia) with approximately 700,000 prisoners, a figure that has increased 400% in the past 20 years. One of the consequences of this law was the rapid increase in drug-related sentencing that grew at a rate of 18.5% per year. Regarding medicinal cannabis, the Brazil’s National Health Surveillance Agency has already issued a favorable opinion over the access to the non-psychoactive cannabidiol, while discussion over the individual right to use and to the cultivation of cannabis is stalling. On the other hand, in 2010, the Brazilian government started deploying military forces to fight DTOs by occupying slums and patrolling urban areas, especially in Rio de Janeiro (Rodrigues 2015, Rodrigues and Labate 2016). This decision sets the country as a late-comer in the wide-spread Latin American practice of militarization against drug trafficking (Rodrigues, Kalil, Zepeda and Rosen 2017).

In sum, despite of constructive changes in the legal apparatuses, the criminal/repressive approach continues to be the main response to drug issues in South America, which is reflected in our overcrowded prison systems and the extremely high levels of urban and rural violence.
According to Carrier and Klantschnig (2012), it would be a misperception to classify as “recent” presence of African DTOs into the global illegal drugs business. Leaving apart the crucial role of psychoactive drugs in the Trans-Atlantic history, especially the alcohol for the slavery trade from the 16th to the 19th century, the presence of African connection related to the contemporary drug-trafficking economy is not a novelty. For the authors, since the increasing of illegal drugs consumption in Europe, during the 1960s and 1970s, the continent and their then new Nations were already crossed by drug-trafficking routes from the West (South American cocaine), from the East (Asian heroin) and from the Northwest African fields of cannabis (hashish) aiming at the European market. A similar analysis is made by Labrousse and Koutouzis (1996) regarding the role of African DTOs and African public servants in the drug-trafficking
economy. For those authors, countries such as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte D’Ivoire could be classified in a spectrum from being “Narco-States” to “Trafficking States” or “Non-States/Trafficking Territories” (Labrousse and Koutouzis, 1996: 82).

A “Narco-State” is, following their typology, a “country in which the State or a sector of the State apparatus is involved with drug-trafficking and/or profits from drug-trafficking” (Idem: 82). The next category, “Trafficking State”, would be “the country where the State or a sector of it are directly involved in a vast array of illegal trafficking, including drug-trafficking (Idem: idem). Finally, a “Non-State/Trafficking Territory” would be a “country where the government does not control the part of its territory in which there are drug-trafficking activities” (Idem: idem). If we connect analyses by Ambers (2014), Carriers and Klantschnig (2012), UNODC (2016), and Landaeta (2015) it would be possible to identify different levels of drug-trafficking activities in West Africa, including an allegedly articulation with jihadist groups in countries such as Mali, Algeria, Libya and Morocco (Carrier and Klantschnig, 2012; Labrousse, 2010). Those articulations would include the collusion of Venezuelan drug-traffickers, Nigerian mafias, Brazilian operatives and a complex set of groups from the Andes to the Sahara which are very complicated to verify since researchers have access to difficult-to-prove official reports, journalistic pieces and denouncing books or articles (Landaeta, 2014; Coutinho, 2018; UNODC, 2016). However, it is interesting to note the improvement of governmental (from Africa, Europe, the US and even Brazil) preoccupation in with the so-called “non-traditional threats” in the Guinea Gulf, specially piracy and drug-trafficking (Renkel, 2015).

Nevertheless, Carrier and Klantschnig claims, quoting the UNODC World Drug Report from 2011, that, despite the increasing volume of cocaine seizures in Africa since the year 2000 (from, approximately 200 kg, in 2000, to 7 tons in 2007) it represents less than 1% of the world total cocaine seizures in 2011. So, the authors suggest a possible emerging securitization of drug-trafficking in West Africa, i.e., the production through a set of interconnected discourses (by governments, NGOs, think tanks, foreign aid agencies, extra-African states) of an artificially high-level menace which would be dreadful to regional security and that would be threat the very existence of the already “fragile” West African states. The authors, of course, refer to Buzan’s, Waever’s and De Wilde’s (1998) securitization theory in which no activity or phenomenon is an “existential threat” to the State
per se, but there is a process of defining something or someone as such a vicious menace. Through a “speech act” – reports, official statements, political discourses – a target is defined as an “existential threat” which must be fought using all the State’s capabilities and without (or with a little) public accountability. Despite all the criticism we should have to dedicate to this theory – which is not the aim of this article – it is valuable the warning put by Carrier and Klantschnig (2012) to not merely accept the reports, academic and quasi-academic think tank papers that peremptorily identify a “huge threat” concerning drug-trafficking in West Africa. This “anti-drugs” agenda related to the transatlantic flows could be contaminated, for example, by the European and the US so-called “war on terror” strategy, which also concerns local and authoritarian governments, such as the Nigerian and its fight against Boko Haram.

This precaution is also crucial to analyze the Trans-Atlantic Narco-Nexus as a whole, since the empirical research is difficult, and the access of primary sources is limited and questionable. For now, we can only suggest that this connection is moving money, drugs, arms, humans in an illegal economy that has been growing since the 1980s. It is possible to go further with this research by confronting several different sources and by counting, in the Brazilian case, for example, with the political will of the security agencies to open up their intel for experts in order to allow studies that are more than speculative suggestions of some fuzzy violent activity that leaves its marks all along the trail from the Andean region to Europe.

**FINAL REMARKS**

It seems moot to reaffirm the failure of the “war on drugs” approach to tackle the illegal psychoactive substances economy, the drug-related violence and the public health problems derived from problematic consumption. It is high time to take a step forward from the “diagnosis of failure”. South American countries are nowadays in a stalemate between their traditional repressive, racist, sexist and classist practices in public safety and new reformist agendas, most of them inspired by European experiences. However, the endurance of the repressive and militarized anti-drugs agenda has proved itself the most certain way to get the situation worse. One of the many examples of this increasing complication is the hypothesis of a growing Trans-Atlantic Narco-Nexus which spreads its consequences throughout South America, West Africa and Europe. So, if it is the case to deepen a partnership among South American, Africana...
and European countries in order to transform this costly reality, we would underscore the following crucial issues as final ideas to be food for thought:

a) It is fundamental to admit that there is no way of containing money laundering and the transference of illegal assets without a straight control over capital fluxes, which does not interest many European and South American private companies and speculators;

b) European countries take the ‘economic development’ card as a way to overcome poverty and, then, to tackle the ‘narco-dollar seduction’ over millions of South Americans and Africans. One of the most funded modalities toward this aim is the so-called “crop substitution”. It is important, however, to acknowledge that South American and African peasants are capable of measuring costs and benefits, and, in their strife for surviving, it is idealistic to suggest they take one for the team, and replace lucrative illegal coca, marihuana or poppy cultivations for beans, bananas, peanuts, cocoa or corn. In order to be effective, “crop substitution programs” should be based on: infrastructure investments (highways, railways, ports), funding for family agriculture (and not for agribusiness monocultures), artificial valuation of South American and African legal crops in the European market, and legalization of current illegal crops for legal finalities, such as the pharmaceutical industry and the sustainable textile industry.

c) The “war on drugs” is a not a “war” against substances, but a combat on the poor, young, black or on originary populations. The incomplete adoption of the “reformist legislation” – allegedly inspired by the “European Model” – has kept the old pattern of criminalizing the micro-dealer, applying particular types of violence targeting young and poor women. European partners could establish as a criteria for investments in criminal justice reforms the improvement of the criteria both of the distinction between “traffickers” and “users” and of “drug trafficking kingpins” and “dealers”, from a standpoint of abolishing the criminalization and imprisonment of “users”, as well as of “dealers”.

d) European Partners could care more about the accountability of the funding provided for criminal justice reforms and drug policies in South America and West Africa in order to avoid money deviance for militarization purposes, appropriation by corruption or use for repressive tactics that disrespect basic human rights.
e) The depenalization of “users” is an important step forward in overcoming prohibitionist practices. However, the gradual legalization of all current illegal crops and drugs must enter the discussion, understanding legalization as the design of specific legislation and regulation for different kinds of psychoactive drugs which is the only feasible way to deconstruct the illegal drug trafficking industry, a humongous economic world that generates around one trillion dollars per year.
O NARCO-NEXO TRANSATLÂNTICO: AMÉRICA DO SUL, ÁFRICA E EUROPA NA DINÂMICA CONTEMPORÂNEA DO TRÁFICO DE DROGAS

RESUMO

O artigo analisa o atual fluxo ilícito de drogas transatlântico, levando em consideração as correntes transformações nas conexões entre Organizações do Narcotráfico da América do Sul, África Ocidental e Europa e a tendência a securitizar esse tráfico, o que impacta diretamente nas políticas de diplomático-militares brasileiras, tanto no plano nacional e de segurança pública, quando no de sua projeção regional no Atlântico. O artigo apresenta uma história do tráfico de drogas transatlântico e seus contornos presentes de modo a oferecer sugestões viáveis para fazer frente a um panorama que se agrava diante da continuidade das políticas de “guerra contra as drogas”.

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