REPUTATION AND PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: BRAZIL AND MIDDLE POWERS IN CHALLENGING TIMES

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ABSTRACT
International law has been barely focused on the reputational status, which may be represented as a complex of attributes based on the perception of the others, that can determine the state’s position in the international arena and cooperation scenarios. Thus, the opportunity of taking an active role in the international agenda makes Brazil and other middle powers and emerging markets as high-value partners, with an increasing and representative participation in international organizations in the last years. In respect to the Brazilian case, those functions that can be cited as determinants of reputation range from the peacekeeping mandates it has detained, to the candidacy as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. This paper is focused on providing a conceptual framework to explain the enhancing of one actor’s international reputation based on Peacekeeping missions and considering Andrew Guzman’s typology (2001; 2010; 2011). This theme is an important way of thinking political gains in terms of international competition not only because it elucidates states’ conditions for obtaining success but, also, how eligible they are for projecting themselves besides military strength. In addition, the effectiveness and compliance ratio, either for the Brazilian case or other emerging markets, are not clear to a great part of the analysts. So, under the soft or hard law, the intention is to make an archeology of the reputation model that is connected to political gains in the Brazilian contemporary case, as to expand its international reliability and promote economic odds.

Keywords: Reputation. Peacekeeping Operations. Middle Powers.

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INTRODUCTION

Brazilian International Reputation has changed significantly in the last fifteen years. The model built over the Twentieth Century is considered as based on cooperation and pacifism, in general, although Brazil had substantially different partners. This characteristic has been cited in the literature as a foreign relations model that varies between a pro-America tendency and an independent one. Maria Regina Soares de Lima (2010) considers Brazilian foreign policy has some components that can be cited, for the past twenty years, as: the inclusion of the international agenda in Brazilian electoral platforms; Brazil emerging as a regional power; international politics discontinuity; and others. If Brazilian national identity was also made with the dream of external recognition, in fact, Brazilian diplomacy tradition could not surpass its international limits in terms of power of negotiation and bargain, till the recent years.

The motivations for consolidating Brazilian reputation in the international scenario were clear since the institutionalization of Brazilian foreign policy inside international institutions and forums (DINIZ, 2007; BRACEY, 2011). But what had not arisen was the real capacity to make difference in a multilateral litigation or agreement, as did Ruy Barbosa during the 1907 Hague Conference. Correa (2000) points that Brazil had created its principal foreign policy elements since Ruy Barbosa (a Brazilian diplomat) took place as the “Eagle of the Hague”, proposing equality among countries sovereignty, and considering they all should have the right to appoint representatives or judges to the newly created organization. This would guarantee that a shared participation among different actors would happen in the new institutions proposed to be guiding the international conflicts resolution arena.

With this, there are two models of interpreting international projection for emerging, middle or consolidated powers: the making of an exclusive club of power detention; and international coordination of emerging disputes inside a multilateral model of participation, with some level of capacity to induce states’ compliance to the collective decisions (GUZMAN, 2001). The environment where states conduct their choices is conceived here as a states’ system in which the institutions serve the international arena to avoid uncertainty in the as optimal level as it can configure. Though states are willing to participate in this arena, where motivations are variable, the solution of controversies is the object to be achieved. So, associated to this cooperation architecture are those factors related to development and
stability, promoting outputs that we believe are enhancing conditions for international economic competitiveness. The theoretical basis is on both a liberal-institutional and sociological approach of the economic behavior, as to observe how states cooperate under the peacekeeping missions arena and, consequently, how they can better position themselves progressively into those collective arrangements.

Then, trust is something states might achieve to make them part of a qualified system of cooperation (MISZTAL, 1996; INGHAM, 1996). This starting premise presents what would be a response from emerging powers: in which standards states should cooperate on security and defense so that they can maintain or gain reputation and trust in a limited budget scenario? Considering the difficulties associated to defy a condition originated by some kind of international institutions collectivity, emerging powers have much more advantage to conquering reliability and, consequently, reputation. In this cooperation scenario, avoiding disputes in a naturally hostile environment such as the international system on defense and security, may be an asset. On the other hand, international reputation is a value guaranteed by the assignment of a positive or a negative perspective about a state by the others, thus, cooperation gain seems to be a way to demonstrate value over international conflicts resolution and other challenges associated to a good faith position in international sphere (BRACEY, 2011; MEDEIROS, 2011).

This argument is focused on this theoretical approach applied to the Brazilian foreign policy evolution as an emerging power actor. As a case study, in complement to the theory proposed, we present an overview of the peacekeeping participations and its connections to Brazilian strategy around a new paradigm of cooperative gain and power projection.

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY TRADITIONS

What Maria Regina Soares de Lima calls an unfreezing of the status quo after the Cold War (2010) has much with political engagement, peacekeeping operations and the emerging of local and civil instabilities all around the world. At the same time states originate political institutions to regulate (trade, for instance), grow their capacity to make difference (regional arrangements) and make collective security agreements (combating piracy or international terrorism), military capability is still a factor of either participating in cooperative instances or power projection as respectability.

There is no doubt Brazil is facing changes in its decision making processes in terms of foreign policy, not only because the theme is partially
inside the electoral agenda, but also, because there is much more of an inter-ministerial conjecture building international politics that makes technical cooperation an important part of middle powers strategies. This has to do with the emerging countries exactly because they cannot behave as their powerful partners in the same arena, but they have a neutral advantage that can keep them numerically and economically present international institutions. This could be the case of Japan, as a middle power defense actor, although, Zisk (2001) has stated that the restrictions on Japan participation in peacekeeping missions could be a limiting factor as a potential candidate to the UN security Council.

Additional to that middle powers partnership, the constitution of what was an acronym and became an institutionalized group – BRICS – has proved to be a way to create relevance in international scenario. As part of their plain to make changes in the international financial rules, they turn G-8 arrange into G-20, what is considered to be a turning point of their advantage in terms of competitiveness and reliability (LIMA, 2010).

Even if the so called reform of the Security Council is being announced since 1994, the Brazilian project of putting itself in an international position more correspondent to its robustness in the international economy (in terms of GDP, population or territory) took part of the most publicized plans in terms of rearranging the seats and promoting are more balanced representation on the United Nations prospects. (SARAIVA, 2005)

Thus, Brazilian intentions around a permanent seat were not only to invoke emerging powers participation but also to contest power arrangements in terms of security. As well as the others, political proposition did not scape from revealing the intentions to make part of the group and not to contest it, beginning with the continuity of the veto rule. This serves both to the equilibrium discourse, in which Brazilian could face the others to guarantee peaceful meanings and stability made from the peripheral states but, on the other hand, amplifying powerful participation, over considering the limits of power in terms of territorial, population, GDP and military budged participation.

Trust is, so, one of the principal meanings of that dispute around Security Council reform and United Nations’ in general. That fits to one of the hypothesis of this paper, which is the faith that states tend to comply if their reputation in international sphere is based on trust and cooperation. If this is a paradigm of acceptance, the other way is to make military dissuasion prosper on behalf of bargaining. (MEDEIROS, 2011) If a State may guarantee
its power from both, certainly, it will face contradictions. This does not mean it is not useful for the powerful state, but it implies lost of reputation in terms of reliability, international law trust and compliance.

This strategy is less useful, then, to old and new middle powers, as the meaning of its recurrent strategy is moderation, institutional confidence and stability. Therefore, Customary International Law as the primary source that conduct international law into rule is the main political scheme in which a state my advance its international reputation. Although some theorists neglect interdependent pressures over powerful states, they cannot avoid thinking of international custom pressure to some of their performances (GUZMAN, 2001; 2010; PAUWELYN, 2006). So, if it’s difficult to deny the existence of different levels of power inside an organization, in general terms, there is no way to deny custom interference on states behavior individually.

REPUTATIONAL COSTS AND POWER

Andrew Guzman’s (2001; 2010) approach of international law is based on international relations, as it is focused not on the subjects that may involve sovereignty, as war, but also on those that provoke routines, customs and provoke regulation, that take part of states behavior and international contingencies. Though, the existence of a focal point may be sufficient to states’ compliance, as soft law is considered to be the key point of international cooperative system. The doctrine around soft law existence varies between an interpretation of soft law as a kind of international law prerogative, and a denying of it qualifying that soft law is quasi-legal, subsequently, it is not law.

“A reputational model of compliance makes it clear that CIL [Customary International Law] affects the behavior of a state because other states believe that the first state has a commitment that it must honor. A failure to honor that commitment hurts a state’s reputation because it signals that it is prepared to breach its obligations. This implies a definition that turns on the existence of an obligation in the eyes of other states rather than the conventional requirements of state practice and a sense of legal obligation felt by the breaching state. (...) A country that wants to make a promise, but recognizes that there is a high probability that it will violate that promise, may not want to put too much reputation on the line (GUZMAN, 2001, p. 2).”
Under the argument that reputation is linked to prestige, some other theorists consider there is no law subjacent to states’ willingness and that is all about states using prestige “to ensure that the lesser states in the system will obey the commands of the dominant state or states (GILPIN, 1981, p. 30). Considering this, neo-realists face the challenge of denying international institutions as having some value of pressure under powerful states.

Whereas the focus of a powerful state may be its own interest, notably, human security agenda has changed the focus of international relations cooperation paradigm as even them are obliged to participate in new order subjects (BEHRINGER, 2005, p. 309). The idea of a core national interest is proposed by Behringer (2005, p. 309) to explain an object that is expected to be centered on states’ and citizens’ integrity. But, if it does not fit to human security agenda, even the most powerful states as United States are conducted to observe costume and international law fundamentals of rights, as long as considering States’ sovereignty. Analyzing four cases of human security initiatives, Behringer (2005) points that there is a fast-track diplomacy in common among middle powers, we should consider, pragmatically connected to many other arising powers and initiatives.

This fast-track diplomacy is a way of considering peer-to-peer architecture of relationship in international arena. This is connected to not centralized institutional arrangement, in which states make voluntary connections not obliged to any international organization or a neutral manager. The concept of epistemic communities (HAAS, 1992) reinforces the character of soft law in the use of international connections and reputation process as a consequence of peer-to-peer strategies of foreign policy. Considering public opinion and the diversity of agents in international sphere and, although believing states are the most important part of building international law order, peer-to-peer strategies consolidate reputation as trust and substantive connected to humanitarian issues.

According to Resnick et al (1996, p. 47), even if concentrated in an interpretation on the firms, reputation is dependent on: “(…) long-lived entities that inspire an expectation of future interaction; capture and distribution of feedback about current interactions (such information must be visible in the future); and the use of feedback to guide trust decisions”. In any of the above cited characteristics, interactions in the international arena, whenever peaceful, touches peacekeeping arrangements or experiments in different levels. The limits or resourcefulness in terms of capabilities may outweigh countries’ look for reputation.
The competitiveness among the middle powers enjoying reputation gains in terms of international projection makes difference in terms of foreign policy tradition. Thus, India, México, Indonesia or Brazil find challenges of being respected and potentially preponderant in a decision-making process in the international sphere. Narlikar (2010) argues that Brazilian strategy is less forcible and persuasive compared to countries like those of the BRICS’. However, in 2010, she does not deal with the Brazilian disagreement about sanctions against Iran. Her hypothesis is centered on some variables (four) that those middle powers have in common. Those seem to be, for us, a limit of the explanation on their synergies because of a different way Brazil had grown its domestic institutions, especially in terms of international compliance and transparency. Because of the differences on the domestic institutional model, and also, on the multilateral focused diplomacy is that natural approximations of the BRICS seem to be less important than the convenience to make use of the acronym.

In 2011, that did not seem to be a political tradition reinvented, but an executive diplomacy controversy that had to do with Brazilian President Dilma government (2011-2016), representing the party continuity of President Lula’s government (2003-2011). Suffering in 2016 from a controversial impeachment process, allied to corruption scandals of the opposition/situation party members, and the condemnation of many political representatives, Brazil has been facing an important political and economic crisis with consequences on its institutions without precedence. During turmoil’s between 2016 and 2017, it seemed to be clearest as ever the decision on leaving Haiti’s mission progressively.

But the permanence of a traditional diplomacy and a multifaceted internationalization (defense, R&D, etc.) was the guarantee of a continuity in terms of Brazilian participation abroad, which can be represented by Haiti and Lebanon peacekeeping missions and the assumption of Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti – recently named to be the chef de cabinet of the actual Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres. Although political advantages of being a middle state may not be clear, indirectly, there is much of subjective in their performance on cooperation system and international relations. This performance is both associated to the military investment on multilateral initiatives linked to human security and the disposal of making statements that may not be perfect treats, but are part of custom linked to states willing to participate in international peace process (ABBOTT, DUNCAN, 2000).
What was for a long time interpreted as a pacifist foreign policy, was recently being turned to an executive marked power strategy to create itself as a relevant actor in international conflicts resolution, extending the aim of the countries contribution in international arena. Thus, international soft law guarantees a level of cooperation with less pressure of obligation, which has more effect in some cases than hard international law application, specially considering the sanctions compliance and their importance to international peace agreements de facto (GUZMAN; MEYER, 2010; GUZMAN, 2011). The focal point to be considered here is inducing soft law to solve straightforward coordination problems, avoiding future costs involving real violation of treats.

This aspect come close to the technical cooperation initiatives that are an important part of states’ foreign policy because are the starters of any bilateral or multilateral agreement. Also, the military preponderance is not less significant, but reintegrated to a multilateral aspect of foreign policy, in which they use to serve strategic compromises not strictly sectored, as traditionally military forces were associated to war. In this case, absolute gains are more important because states utilities are associated to their own performance, as a consequence of cooperation networks. Furthermore, states scape from relative gains (own gain versus the loss of other), not genuinely willing to cooperate as a natural choice, but as a different way of being part of international system amplifying states focus and alternatives (POWEL, 1991).

ABOUT PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS AND STATES’ GAINS

After trying to propose the importance of the reputational gain on middle powers participation on the international arena, we want to address why do States have different attitudes about Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). And also, to observe why some countries want to show their engagement as a value to their participation on the international system and and others do not share the same perspective. Finally, we want to observe why countries may change their positions one the matter and try to figure out what is the real meaning of this participation, as there is not a one-side stand on that.

This analysis also deserves questioning due to a distinction in two different historical periods: during the Cold War and after that (1988). The period of the Cold War is not the focus of this study; however, this choice can be explained. The first one is about the choice of the year 1988 to distinguish the end of the Cold War. A lot of studies about it point out the fall of Berlin wall as the main mark, but...
the choice of 1988 is justified by others as the beginning of the end, when Bush was elected in the United States and an era began. Also, for this study, focused on Brazilian case, 1988 is an important year of changes with the adoption of a new legal framework: a new Constitution. The second one is about the position change of USA and URSS in this scenario and after that. In a superficial view of the matter, the assurance of great persuasion that the two big poles had on their areas of influence, it’s possible to see that, during the forty years of Cold War the great powers avoided to integrate the contingents of PKO. (BEIRÃO, 2007)

After the end of the Cold War, there was a radical change of the Permanent Members UNSC participation regarding the PKO, however, the analysis of this commitment has important characteristics that can be inferred from the table as follows:

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement of Member States of the UN PKO in 1948 to 2015</th>
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<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
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<td>CANADA</td>
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<td>PAKISTAN</td>
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<td>BANGLADESH</td>
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<td>RUSSIA (FORMER-URSS)</td>
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<td>BRAZIL</td>
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<td>ARGENTINA</td>
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<td>IRELAND</td>
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<td>EGYPT</td>
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<td>DENMARK</td>
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<td>FRANCE</td>
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<td>POLAND</td>
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<td>MALAYSIA</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>URUGUAY</td>
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<td>NETHERLAND</td>
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<td>FINLAND</td>
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<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
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<td>CHINA</td>
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<td>TURKEY</td>
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</table>

1 – The data reflect the statistics computed until December, 2015.
2 – The tiebreaker criteria for the classification adopted were, in descending order: total contributions until now and secondly, number of participations after 1988.
3 - The country names in bold correspond to UN Member States which are permanent members of UNSC.
4 - Beyond the top 30 members contributors to PKO highlighted at the table, other 130 Member States have engaged in UN PKO. Such coverage, 160 participants from 193 UN Member States and clearly shows that the use of PKO as an advanced arm of the UN to safeguard international peace and that it’s well accepted by the majority of its members.

Some contributing countries not at “top 30 table” deserves some considerations (ranked next to their names):

UNITED KINGDOM (33º) - UNSC permanent member, 20 participations in PKO. At the end of 2015 has personnel at 8 UNPKO. However, actually, it is just the 51st largest personnel contributor (289).
ITALY (36º) - Participated in 18 PKO sending military contingents, however, is one of the countries that currently more contribute financially with UN operations. However, actually, it is the 26th largest personnel contributor (1.103).
GERMANY (41º) - State with the aspiration for a permanent seat in UNSC. Shared 17 PKO. However, actually, it is just the 61st largest personnel contributor (172).
CROATIA (43º) - Despite winning its independence about 10 years, since the post-Cold War, shared 16 PKO (3 Extinct and 13 still active), and therefore, at the end of 2009, It was the State sharing the major PKO.
JAPAN (102º) - State with the aspiration for a permanent seat in UNSC, contributed with 5 PKO (UNTAG, UNTAC, ONUMOZ, UNTAET and UNMISET), however, actually, it is just the 53rd largest personnel contributor (272).
VANUATU (110º) - One of the smaller states, however,
it was in 4 PKO and it’s still present in UNMIT Operation.

MONTENEGRO (120º) - Last State to join the UN (2005). However, it contributed in two extinct PKO (UNIMSET and ONUB) and it is present in the UNMIL operation, amounting three contributions till the 2015.

MEXICO (138º) - Another country with aspiration for a permanent seat in the UNSC. In the past, it only participated at MTO (ONUSAL), and just in 2012 rejoined UN PKO. At the end of 2015 it was contributing with 24 people.

ETHIOPIA (72º) – Another country with not so big experience at UN PKO, but, at the end of 2015 was the 2nd personnel contributor (8,309).

RWANDA (75º) - Another country with not so big experience at UN PKO, but, at the end of 2015 was the 4th personnel contributor (5,685).

The analysis of the proposed framework enables some interesting conclusions. Among the “top 10 contributing countries” none is a Permanent Member of UNSC. The inherent risks of a direct engagement of a great power (economic and military) in a PKO could foist a setback that can not compensate for the bonus achieved. This stance was possible because of the enormous pressure that some of these powers could impinge on their areas of influence.

Until 1992, the USA remained relatively far from big engagement in PKO. The first Gulf War (1991) was a turning point for the U.S. international agenda, under the George Herbert Walker Bush (1989-1993) government. The United Nations was crucial to the releasing of the first foray in the Gulf War. In another way, Russia (falling the URSS tradition), after the decline of his power, sought to gain reputation as a “world citizen”, engaging more strongly in conflict resolution under UN Norrie MacQueen (2006). Recently, because of the USA viewpoint under the government of George Walker Bush (2001-2009), there was a change on the international recognition by the UN Peacekeeping Operations. The second Gulf War was waged without the institutional backing of the UN and there was a change in the U.S. attitude towards the PKO. However, if considering the
post-1988, there weren’t large decreases in the number of PKO, or reduced participation by other countries after the second raid in the Gulf. President Obama was elected with a big world hope about his recognizing of the major multilateral organizations, but he had to face economic difficulties and the American engagement at Iraqi and Afghanistan, so that he had continued the U.S. distance from UN PKO.

Thus, the major powers have been in different positions to increasing their participation in PKO. Consequently, the search for international reputation gain due to the contribution to the great nations in the maintenance of international peace has opened two other groups of States for a greater engagement in PKO. At first, states that have recently been (or are) under PKO - those who, earlier, were “parties” in the conflict. Their voluntary help to PKO put them on a position of acceptance of the UN system and had also provoked an opportunity to increase international sympathy to themselves as well. Of course, it may be the low risk of such activities that allows their engagement in a better condition. Doing so, they can also enhance their states within the prestige of the international system by demonstrating a high level of compliance with the peacekeeping process (MACQUEEN, 2006). In this case, there are some examples: Egypt after Suez, engaged in a PKO; and Israel did the same after the conflicts of the late 1960s. Some countries can be listed in the case, other than the above ones: Morocco, Croatia, Montenegro, Senegal, Rwanda, Nepal, and others.

A second group of countries, clearly identified, consists of countries that are traditionally among the strongest supporters of peacekeeping and contribute importantly. MacQueen (2006) also calls them as middle powers. States with medium military power, and therefore, big military support to PKOs. The term “middle powers”, perhaps could be best called as “powers at the middle”, another connotative meaning assigned to them by their real role during the Cold War. They remained at a nearly neutral posture, “at the middle” all long the bipolar détente. In fact, only some of these states actually remained formal neutrality during the Cold War (such as Ireland and Sweden). Others, as Canada (which indeed participate in PKO nowadays), the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, for example, were active members of the Western alliance, but projected an image internationally responsible and more neutral.

For some of those states, the extensive participation in PKO helped them to ensure a reinforcing of military experience in relation to
their neighbors - other powerful states that were expanding influence as the cases of Canada (relatively to USA), Ireland (relatively to UK), and even Pakistan and Bangladesh (relatively to India). More recently, micro and small states have engaged in this endeavor as a way to exploit their traditional military cultures (such as Fiji and Nepal) or, more precisely, as a way of gaining access to military technologies and procedures that they would probably not have the funds to develop or acquire (such as Kenya, Senegal and Uruguay). States engage themselves also as a source of receiving economic compensation financed by the UN to maintain its armed forces and police.

Recognition may be an important factor, but there is a limit for that recognition in matters of a long-term reputation (such for small states as Tuvalu, Togo and Vanuatu). The effect for middle powers is exactly different from this experience because economic venues are not the factor for their engaging and reputational costs may be higher making theirs achievements negative or positive.

The analysis of the Brazilian case in the three major groups of countries before mentioned is also complex. If, on one hand, reputation in the benefit of multilateralism and neutrality as a peaceful country and feature some massive engagement in PKO enables the country to be considered among the “middle powers”, for another, its extensive engagement with contingent forces (except for the average participation in UNEF I in Suez) coincides with a period of intense integration with its neighbors, with a non-competitive military character, but in search of some natural regional strength. Nevertheless, since ONUMOZ (1994) Brazil’s participation has grown and South American union has never been installed, even with MERCOSUR or UNASUR.

Moreover, the allocation of resources to the military area (effective for operating expenses, ie, excluding expenditures for payment of active and inactive staff) is not allowed to Brazil to be considered like Canada or Sweden. The statement by Ambassador Luiz Augusto de Araujo Castro, at the Seminar “Brazil’s Foreign Policy for the XXI Century” held in the Chamber of Deputies in August 2002, makes it clear – that Brazil is close to nations seeking resources (CASTRO, 2004):

“And while I talk on the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, which has an important role in foreign relations and national
defense, I believe that in the near future must find ways to allow financial budget and a more intense participation of Brazil in peace operations of United Nations. [...] There are budget constraints in virtually all areas of government activity, but I think that the projection itself internationally in Brazil and our interest in exerting positive and constructive role in the world justifies a special effort to find solutions to the real budget difficulties in this military area.”

Thus, it is the question if the greater engagement with quotas does not match the recent period of low military budget and, therefore, that PKO engagement would be a way for its armed forces looking to keep their staff trained. Thus, the PKO active participation can cope with new technologies, processes and materials from other states, or even the re-equipping with resources financed by the UN and not formally included in the budget – like the case of the Brazilian Armed Forces. For this proposition, it would be able to consider some approximation of the Brazilian case to the third group of countries.

Although the classification into three groups showed by MacQueen is very relevant, the analysis of the Table, with the 30 largest holdings in PKO, allows highlighting countries which can hardly be classified in the three groups mentioned. The cases of Nigeria, Jordan, Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia, Austria, Indonesia and Turkey are complex examples of the suggested categories. Some of these countries seem to emerge also in other areas of action - not only in PKO -, but as emerging economic potential powers. Others, seem to have clear rise over its surroundings, which could justify a certain quest for regional leadership and reputation. Others still, cannot be considered micro or small states, but not much of a insertion in the international arena and, therefore, do not justify their large shareholdings, unless the multilateral inclination (international philanthropy) in maintaining peace.

Brazil has shortcomings in the military budget that do not support a rising regional arms race. However, it has established itself as a leader among developing countries. His aspiration for greater integration into the international arena is marked in the speeches of its President and Foreign Ministers since the change of the new world order. The appreciation for multilateralism and greater representation on the board decisions has
ratified that position.

There is however, other ways of understanding why some countries have substantially increased their participation in PKO. It’s the financial bias, only superficially addressed in the previous classification. The financial, material and especially in reducing the quota-share that Member States should finance the UN have strong appeal to the efforts of some countries.

The below table shows clearly that’s no easy correlation between participation and financing contributions to UN system of PKO. It’s possible to identify that the biggest contributors are not in the first positions of PKO participations with just two exceptions: Russia and China, that are quickly increasing their participations.

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The top 10 providers of assessed contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping operations for 2016 are:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• United States (28.57%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• China (10.29%)</td>
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<td>• Japan (9.68%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Germany (6.39%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• France (6.31%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• United Kingdom (5.80%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Russian Federation (4.01%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Italy (3.75%)</td>
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<td>• Canada (2.92%)</td>
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<td>• Spain (2.44%)</td>
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Source: (UN:2016)

For some member states, the financial question of reimbursement is very relevant as a way to re-equip its armed and police forces, since the UN grants at the end of operations, the final possession of the means obtained by considering them already impaired by the use. The reduction achieved with the annual contribution is often compensated by such engagement. Thus, the foregoing in view of the Manual of Peacekeeping Operations of the Brazilian Navy (EMA-402), shows that the significant increase of investments from countries with lower expression on the world scene may have been motivated by purposes not only focused on the “willingness to assist the UN in maintaining international peace and security”, but with a more practical set of goals
and objectives.

Therefore, the framework cannot show a unison approach among the permanent seat candidates at the Security Council. The strategies to achieve their litigation and reputation of their achievements are quite diverse, with some points of contact. While some appear to massively participate in PKO, others do not devote particular interest in this strategy to concentrate on his bid for inclusion. Let’s assume that, among the candidates mentioned, Nigeria, India, Brazil, Egypt, and even Germany seem to have chosen to devote efforts to participate in PKO, and thus earn greater international visibility through this action.

On the other hand, we see that Brazil, Japan and Germany also seem willing to keep constantly in meetings of the Security Council, even as non-permanent members, as part of their integration strategies in the process of reshaping the structure of the UN. It shows, conclusively that, in relation to the use of PKO, states have different purposes when deciding whether or not to engage in peacekeeping operations, but it seems clear that the noble purpose of universal help to the peace is not always what drives such decisions.

Thus, trying to use indicators of seeking greater international PKO participation is intended to show how the international game is played with several pieces of different weights and with different objectives. In the Brazilian case, the appreciation for multilateralism backed by actions at the UN level was only used as a subsidy to search for more evidence of global insertion through cooperative actions in the international arena.

**FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Reputation is almost an impression, hard to be evaluated and measured. But there are some states’ conjectures that can show how reputational value can be important to them. The reputational balance when considering a participation in the international scenario can be worthy of note if the proposition aligns with the United Nations demands. At the same time, material, human and financial contributions derived because of this type of engagement can guarantee sustainability or development to middle and small powers military forces and defense capabilities in general.

As a chess game, there are different kinds of possible actions; but in this cooperative scenario building the overall assumption is more
important than the individual move. It’s possible to identify and categorize some variables that indicate these actions on behalf of maintaining itself as an actor in the arena with an important return and a low risk movement. At the examples presented about participant groups at PKO, it can be concluded that such state actions is more likely to invoke perception and the international understanding of the world scenario in terms of reputations and acquiring experiences and means.

The typology presented by Andrew Guzman can help us seeing what kind of actions can really enlarge political gains in international competition in which cooperation is more likely to predominate. The multilateral international system shows that those categories can be useful to understand how states are playing the game and to see the perspective on their possible next steps. Indeed, the UN PKO it’s just one of the variables that we can see about their reputation gain. The Brazilian case is very complex to be clearly understood, but it seems, undoubtedly, it’s serves as an important example about how the states may choose international organizations and regimes as important pieces to its surveillance in the international environment.
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