DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR BRAZIL

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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to identify some of the elements which should help clarify what is meant by ‘defence diplomacy’ (or ‘military diplomacy’) and how this diplomatic tool has been used in the context of Brazil. As this discussion is still in its early stages, the goal will be to make a conceptual contribution toward a better definition of the term, especially considering the case of Brazil. Based on the examination of how the term has been empirically used in the history of the Brazilian Armed Forces, this text will demonstrate the extent to which Brazil’s international relations may benefit from defence diplomacy, in articulation with the foreign policy.


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INTRODUCTION

Defence diplomacy has increasingly been used as a military and diplomatic tool. It has been used not only by countries with a powerful military apparatus, but also where armed forces have been more limited in their operational capability, especially regarding the projection of power internationally.

The term ‘defence diplomacy’, however, has still not been defined in epistemological terms, and there has often been some confusion when defining it. In some occasions, one may refer to military diplomacy, and in others, to defence diplomacy. “The military tends to be used only when diplomacy fails. So is it contradiction to say that a country’s defence apparatus can be used for diplomacy?” This paper aims to identify some of the elements which should help clarify what is meant by ‘defence diplomacy’ (or ‘military diplomacy’) and how this diplomatic tool has been used in the context of Brazil. As this discussion is still in its early stages, the goal will be to make a conceptual contribution toward a better definition of the term, especially considering the case of Brazil. Based on the examination of how the term has been empirically used in the history of the Brazilian Armed Forces, this text will demonstrate the extent to which defence diplomacy benefit Brazil’s international relations, when combined with Brazilian foreign policy.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY OR MILITARY DIPLOMACY?

Both terms ‘military diplomacy’ and ‘defence diplomacy’ have been used in the literature without more accurate explanations of how they may differ (MUTHANNA, 2011; COTTEY; FORSTER, 2004; DU PLESSIS, 2008; GRAY, 2011; WINGER, 2014). Furthermore, the choice of using either term has often been determined by authors’ preferences than more specific criteria. Given that definitions are often ambiguous or vague, in this text we have chosen to follow the approach put forward by Du Plessis (2008). In his approach, ‘military diplomacy’ should be restricted to military action used in direct diplomacy, such as military attachés; whereas defence diplomacy would encompass not only a country’s armed forces but also its whole defence policy.

Thus, this paper adopts the term ‘defence diplomacy’ as it could
more easily lead to a better understanding of the diplomatic amplitude of actions, positions, and practices within a military context which appear to contribute to the development of doctrines and ways of operating and to the strengthening of the country’s image in the context of the projection of power. This would be the case whether the military context is international, be it bilateral or multilateral, or whether such actions and practices are carried out by military or non-military actors but still with a direct relation with the concept and employment of armed forces.

Defence diplomacy is generally understood as the non-violent use of a country’s defence apparatus to promote its strategic perspective (global or regional) through cooperation and mutual trust. This may include, for instance, the exchange of military personnel in courses and exercises, the establishment of international training and instruction missions, joint military exercises, engagement in peace operations under an international organisation’s flag, and the development of technologies and the industrial production of weapons through cooperation and technology agreements.

The term started to become more widely used after the end of the Cold War and during the period of breakdown of several countries which had until then been under the sphere of influence of the USSR (MEARSHEIMER, 1990, p. 5). With the goal of promoting the reconstruction of the armed forces of Eastern European countries, a series of diplomatic defence actions were carried out by Western countries, especially the use of programmes involving the exchange of military personnel and training. An example is the “Partnership for Peace” programme developed by NATO. Its goal has been to promote democratic norms of civil-military relationships and to integrate countries which had been part of the Warsaw Pact into Europe’s collective security agencies, especially NATO. The UK Defence Ministry published in 2000 a policy paper entitled ‘Defence Diplomacy’ (UNITED KINGDOM, 2000). It sought to provide in this paper some systematisation and interpretation of a series of cooperation activities and programmes adopted by its armed forces during the 1990s, and hence to also define its framework of what defence diplomacy means for the UK.

During the Cold War defence diplomacy was mainly understood as the projection of the possibility of the use of military force by the Soviet Union as well as by the United States – powers which sought to establish favourable relationships with other countries by selling weapons and promoting programmes to train and re-equip their armed forces,
thereby also increasing their geopolitical influence. During the post-Cold War period, however, there was an increase in the importance of and the number of objectives to be achieved through the scope of this mechanism. Cottey and Forster (2004), examining this ‘new’ dimension, list the following activities as particular to defence diplomacy: bilateral relationships between senior military and civil defence experts; the training of foreign civil and military personnel; the provision of expertise and advice to establish democratically accountable armed forces in the fields of the administration of defence and in military technical fields; the contact between and exchange of military personnel, units and visits by navy ships of friendly nations; the appointment of militarily friendly nations or civil experts in defence issues for positions in defence ministries or military units; the use of training teams in friendly nations; the provision of military material and equipment and any other support equipment; and bilateral or multilateral military training exercises.

In this sense, defence diplomacy would have as an objective either the maintenance of conditions of mutual trust among countries and regions so as to contribute to peaceful coexistence, or the substantial alteration of these conditions, in order to promote such coexistence. Returning to the policy paper by the MOD mentioned above, the paper does not list any specific programmes, but defines what the ministry seeks to achieve through the use of defence diplomacy:

to meet the varied activities undertaken by the MOD to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution (UNITED KINGDOM, 2000, p. 2).

In other words, the MOD’s main concern is how, during periods of peace, the armed forces and their structures, resources and operations may act as a foreign policy tool for maintaining and promoting peace and security. This view is in line with work by Reveron (2010). In his analysis of the American pro-active position during the Post-Cold War period, the United States is seen as having used its military apparatus in new ways, defined by him as ‘security assistance’.

Thus, a paradox emerges: given that the armed forces of a country are fundamentally an instrument for the use of force and the exertion of
hard power, would not then its ‘diplomatic use’ be uncharacteristic of its main reason to exist, thus rendering military power a soft power? From this emerges the choice of using the terminology of ‘defence diplomacy’ instead of ‘military diplomacy’ considering that because of semantic issues, the association between military power and hard power ends up not allowing the employment of the latter term in other ways.

**BRAZILIAN MILITARY ACTIONS CHARACTERISED AS DEFENCE DIPLOMACY**

Historically, the Brazilian armed forces have had solid practices in international relations and those practices are at the core of the contemporary configuration of the Brazilian defence apparatus. This is so not only in terms of the development of doctrines, but also in the understanding of their national and international role. Since the end of the 19th century up to the mid-20th century, French, German, British and North American military missions have taken place in Brazil. These have entailed classic cases of defence diplomacy, in which foreign militaries influence Brazilian doctrines, strategies and tactics, and equip Brazil’s forces with military equipment from their own countries. These military missions not only led to a considerable improvement in the technological development of the Brazilian armed forces, but also to the possibility to develop their own doctrines, distinct from those developed by global military powers. Thus, they also allowed Brazil to promote its military projection within the international sphere under its influence without the need of participation in coercive military action. The only exception to this is the Brazilian campaign in World War II involving the participation of Brazil’s three armed forces in combat in expeditionary missions. This case aside, Brazil was successful in developing during its period under the Republic its defence diplomacy in a context of peace, thus demonstrating the value of these practices.

To a certain extent, the creation of the Ministry of Defence in 1999 helped solidify and integrate several activities which had been under development in the armed forces and which could be considered as defence diplomacy activities. Even before reaching two decades since its creation, this seems to be a key issue for the Ministry of Defence:
As políticas externa e de defesa são complementares e indissociáveis. A manutenção da estabilidade regional e a construção de um ambiente internacional mais cooperativo, de grande interesse para o Brasil, serão favorecidas pela ação conjunta do Ministério da Defesa e do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, que devem aproximar suas áreas de inteligência e planejamento. (BRASIL, c2014)

In this sense, an increase in the involvement of the armed forces in three aspects was fundamental. The first one relates to the positioning of Brazil in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Brazil has contributed to these operations with military observers and troops since the first UN peacekeeping operation. However, since the beginning of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004, Brazil has taken a more active role in regards to the scale of peace operations. Since then, the Force Commander of MINUSTAH has repeatedly been a Brazilian general and the largest part of the military component of the mission has been formed by the Brazilian military from its three armed forces. In parallel to this, Brazil also had one of its generals as the commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which was a pioneering experience in the use of an intervention brigade by the United Nations – the standard employment of peace enforcement set out in chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Still during this period, initiated in Haiti, Brazil started to be part of and command the Maritime Task Force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This Task Force was established in 2006 and in February 2011 was placed under the command of a Rear Admiral of the Brazilian Navy, having as its flag ship a Brazilian Navy frigate. Going beyond the case of operations, the presence of a representative of the Brazilian military in the UN Department of Operations and Maintenance of Peace (DPKO) has guaranteed the possibility of the projection of Brazilian defence diplomacy in the international sphere. The invitation of Brazilian General Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto, former Force-Commander of MINUSTAH, to become part of the United Nations’ High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (October 2014-June 2015) is another example of the projection of Brazilian defence diplomacy.

The second aspect refers to the increasing participation of Brazil in
international fora on defence issues, both at the United Nations, at the Inter-American Defence Board, at multilateral fora, and with bilateral defence agreements. An example is the affirmative and active participation of Brazil in the expansion of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS), created by the UN in 1986, with the goal of preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region, as well as of promoting through multilateralism the region’s socio-economic potential. In addition to Brazil, another 23 countries are signatories of the ZOPACAS. Considering that the Brazilian coast on the Atlantic provides the country with an area of 3.5 million square kilometers, which has often been referred to as the ‘Blue Amazon’, the strategic relevance of ZOPACAS should go much beyond issues exclusively related to defence.

Still considering Brazil’s participation in international fora, it is also important to emphasise the efforts by Brazil to create and maintain the South-American Defence Council, CDS, created in 2012 under the aegis of the Union of South American Nations, UNASUR.

The third aspect relates to international cooperation. The Defence Ministry is active in this area with a series of actions, missions, exchanges and visits jointly or individually carried out by the forces. Missions such as the Brazilian Military Cooperation in Paraguay, dating back to the 1940s, is a good example of international cooperation in the South American context. Brazil’s Naval Mission in Namibia, which as contributed to the establishment of the Navy in this emerging country since the 1990s, is another example. All of these missions contribute to the projection of a defence perspective and the establishment of regional stability based on the Brazilian experience and they seem to be clear instruments of an active defence diplomacy. Brazil currently has very similar missions in several countries in South America, Central America and Africa.

The presence of Brazilian military attachés abroad and of attachés of friendly nations in Brazil reinforces this dimension of a diplomacy of defence and renders evident its role in the exercise of soft power and in contributing to stability and mutual trust among counties. Indirect gains from these defence diplomacy tools might be reflected in a broader industrial and technological development, as partnerships and agreements in the defence industry sector tend to favour international commerce.
DEFENCE DIPLOMACY PROCEDURES, MISSIONS AND ACTION IN BRAZIL’S NAVY

As a navy, the Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil, or MB) tends to be more international than the rest of the armed forces. Actions and procedures which could be defined as part of a diplomacy of defence lie in the origin of this force, even prior to the theoretical development of the concept. In this section, the aim will be to identify examples of defence diplomacy procedures and actions carried out by the MB, and secondly, to analyse their efficiency in a broader international relations context.

Starting with a standard formal mechanism, the Naval Attaché, the MB has 39 of these, with 12 of them being Defence and Naval Attachés. The remaining 24 are only Naval Attachés. This presence seems significant and should guarantee a broad diplomatic channel involving key actors in Brazil’s foreign policy.

In addition to this diplomatic presence through attachés, there is also a series of missions of military cooperation, ranging from the active participation in UN peace operations (among some with the largest number of contingents being sent: MINUSTAH and UNIFIL, already mentioned in the previous section), to the Marine’s Technical Advisory Group (Grupo de Assessoramento Técnico de Fuzileiros Navais or GAT-FN) at the Namibian Navy and at the Coast Guard of Sao Tome and Principe, the latter to support the formation of a company of Marines. In these same two countries, the MB also has the Naval Assistance Mission (Missão de Assessoria Naval) in Namibia and the Naval Mission of Brazil in Sao Tome and Principe. There is also the Naval Mission of Brazil in Cape Verde.

The presence of the MB abroad in missions has an impact on defence policy, as it also contributes to the projection of soft power and the spread of the perspective of Brazilian defence, and is also extended to other training activities with the armed forces of friendly nations. In this context, the MB has an officer as an instructor at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, USA; an officer as an instructor of navigation at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, USA; a sergeant as an instructor at the Admiral Padilla Naval Cadet School (Escuela Naval de Cadetes Almirante Padilla) in Cartagena, Colombia; a sergeant as an instructor at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation in Fort Benning, Georgia, USA; an officer as an instructor at the Escola Superior de Guerra in Colombia, as part of the academic staff of the School;
an officer as an instructor at the Academia de Guerra Naval in Guayaquil – Ecuador; an officer as an instructor at the Armada Paraguaia (ARPAR); and an officer as an instructor at the Centro de Instrucción de Comandos Anfíbios in Chaguaya (in Lake Titicaca), Bolivia. In the case of Bolivia, it is worth mentioning that there has also been a lecturer of Portuguese at the Escola Marítima da Armada Boliviana since June of 2013. The latter case may also demonstrate how defence diplomacy has a relevant role in the promotion of other values from Brazil, thus performing a role beyond an exclusively military role. These missions of training and teaching are also a sign that Brazil is not anymore only a receptor of military training missions, as it used to be in the past, but is exporting its defence mentality.

The list providing evidence of the MB’s presence, whether via groups of military or individual military, in international missions which have a direct impact on what has been referred to in this paper as defence diplomacy, is long and significant. There are MB military personnel in the reception of all ships which have been bought or manufactured abroad, in the activities to modernise aircrafts like Lynx helicopters, in the Naval Commissions in Washington and Europe (London), and RPBIMO (Brazilian Representation to the International Maritime Organisation).

As an example, in the United States, there have been MB Officers in exchanges in the staff of the Submarine Force of the US Navy; in the area of logistics of material; at the United States Marine Corps Forces South (MARFOR SOUTH); United States Coast Guard (USCG) – this one to gain knowledge in naval patrolling; the United States Western Hemisphere Institute for Security and Cooperation (WHINSEC); the United States Marine Corps (USMC); the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC); and at the Naval Academy of Annapolis. In addition to these exchanges, an MB officer is commissioned at a ship of the USN; and another officer is commissioned at the NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Centre in San Diego. There is also a liaison officer at the Naval Forces Command of the USN; one at the Joint Interagency Task Force - South (JIATF-S); one Submarine Rescue Liaison Officer from the MB at the US Navy Submarine Force Atlantic (COMSUBLANT); and a liaison officer at the Staff Command of the South Command of USN.

Similar missions have been carried out in French Guiana, the United Kingdom, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Belgium, France, Denmark, Mexico, Angola, Namibia, Bahrain, Portugal, and the African Union, in addition to the MB’s presence in international agencies and organizations directly dealing with defence issues.
This participation by the MB in procedures, missions or actions that can be characterized as defence diplomacy seems to be a result of not only the sending of military personnel to missions, but also of receiving military personnel and students from other nations. From 2011 to June of 2016, 819 members of the navies of friendly nations were students in courses offered by the MB, with the largest contingent of 468 individuals coming from Namibia, followed by Angola's with 87 individuals. In the majority, countries involved in these activities are countries from Africa or South or Central America, but also South Korea, the United States, France, India and Lebanon. Currently (2016), there are only 29 international students at the Naval Academy (Escola Naval). These students are from Namibia, Venezuela, Senegal, Mozambique, Angola, Nigeria, Lebanon, Peru, Cape Verde and Paraguay.

The MB also takes part in several combined naval operations and multinational operations, an important way for forces to gain knowledge from each other. Therefore, it may also serve as a very valuable instrument of defence diplomacy as it can contribute to the building of peaceful relations and trust among armed forces. The main combined operations carried out by the MB in cooperation with other Navies are:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Participants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRATERO</td>
<td>BRAZIL and ARGENTINA</td>
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<td>FRATERO ANFÍBIA</td>
<td>BRAZIL and ARGENTINA</td>
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<td>BOGATUN</td>
<td>BRAZIL and CHILE</td>
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<td>BRACOLPER</td>
<td>BRAZIL, COLOMBIA and PERU</td>
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<td>PLATINA</td>
<td>BRAZIL and PARAGUAY</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACRUX*</td>
<td>BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, PARAGUAY and URUGUAY.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATLANTIS*</td>
<td>BRAZIL and URUGUAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAS AMPHIBIOUS</td>
<td>BRAZIL and USA (and other invited countries)</td>
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<td>UNITAS</td>
<td>BRAZIL and USA (and other invited countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATLASUR*</td>
<td>BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA and ARGENTINA</td>
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<td>OBANGAME EXPRESS</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATLASUR*</td>
<td>BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA and INDIA</td>
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*Biannual
In sum, the procedures, actions and missions of the MB taking place in international cooperation, the bilateral relations between the military and specialists of various levels of expertise, the presence of attachés, the training of the military personnel of friendly nations and the sending of military personnel from the MB to take courses at other forces, as well as ship visits and joint operations, appear to be significant instruments of defence diplomacy which promote a peaceful coexistence and mutual trust among nations. These actions are not sporadic, nor do they result from political choices. They are part of a long tradition in the MB which emphasises the possibility of employing naval power as a benign power:

This means that Brazilian naval doctrine includes the use of defence diplomacy, favoured by this paper, by adapting it to its particular context and adopting the concept of naval diplomacy.

Taking into consideration the concept of Strategic Environment developed in the National Strategy of Defence (Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, END), one can notice the MB’s effort to highlight these instruments of defence diplomacy with countries in South America and Western Africa. There also seems to be a concern in maintaining a high level of defence diplomacy engagement with the United States of America.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The understanding of defence diplomacy as an exercise of soft power, with instruments usually associated with hard power, such as military apparatus and structures, has been consolidated globally. This understanding appears to demonstrate that defence diplomacy is a valuable
mechanism used by government organisations to enhance their positions globally by using their defence institutions in a peaceful manner. In the case of Brazil, the participation of the armed forces in the international sphere, whether in peace operations (multinational operations), combined operations, or exchanges of military personnel in training missions and many other mechanisms of internationalization of military actions not related to war (or, as defined by the MB, benign activities), seems to render possible developing a mentality of defence diplomacy according to domestic needs, limitations and national interests. A broad interpretation of the actions, missions and procedures of the MB may allow us to see the significant capacity and experience that the Navy has historically contributed to Brazil’s defence diplomacy. The incorporation of this experience by Brazilian foreign policy seems to provide a valuable but still new formula, but which may significantly contribute to the development of the concept of defence diplomacy based on the Brazilian experience.

Thus, it seems evident that this does not only entail a theoretical question to be developed here, but also a recognition of the possible benefits of incorporating and systematically coordinating the armed forces in Brazilian foreign policy, given the armed forces’ role in the projection of the country’s power.
DIPLOMACIA DE DEFESA E SEU POTENCIAL PARA O BRASIL

RESUMO
Neste texto procura-se identificar alguns elementos que ajudam a esclarecer o que se chama de diplomacia de defesa (ou diplomacia militar) e como esta ferramenta se situa no contexto brasileiro. Por ser discussão ainda latente, não se pretende exaurir a questão, mas apenas, por meio de construção conceitual, agregar uma melhor definição do termo, em especial no caso brasileiro. Pretende-se apresentar, a partir do empirismo do emprego histórico das Forças Armadas brasileiras, o quanto as relações internacionais podem se beneficiar da mesma, sendo real articuladora complementar da política externa brasileira.


REFERENCES


